



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS
NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
27130 TELEGRAPH ROAD
QUANTICO VA 22134-2253

5720 2015-003655
SER00LJF/15U0615

Mr. Grant F. Smith
Calvert Station
P.O. Box 32041
Washington, D.C. 20007-0341

Dear Mr. Smith:

This further responds to your February 15, 2015 request seeking information pertaining to the Jonathan Pollard investigation.

During a telephone conversation and follow-up e-mail communication dated March 27, 2015 with a member of my staff it was agreed that at this time you would accept documents previously released. Upon review of these documents you retain the option of requesting additional documents.

The processing of that report has been completed. Our review of the document reveals that it contains personal identifiers (such as names and social security numbers) of third parties, the release of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personnel privacy. Accordingly, we must partially deny your request and withhold this information pursuant to the FOIA 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(E). We have also provided an enclosure explaining the various exemptions of the FOIA.

As the official responsible for the partial denial of your request, or if you believe an adequate search for responsive records was not accomplished, I am advising you of your right to appeal this determination. Your appeal must be postmarked within 60 calendar days from the date of this letter and should be addressed to the Secretary of the Navy's designee: Office of the Judge Advocate General, (Code 14), 1322 Patterson Avenue, S.E., Suite 300, Washington Navy Yard, D.C. 20374-5066. The envelope and letter should bear the annotation "FOIA Appeal." Please include a copy of your original request with your appeal letter.

There are no assessable fees associated with the processing of your request. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact our office at (571) 305-9092 or via electronic mail at ncis@navy.mil.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "E. E. Wannamaker", is written over a horizontal line.

E. E. WANNAMAKER
LT, JAGC, USN

Encl: Documents



Explanation of FOIA/PA Exemptions

Subsections of Title 5, United States Code, Section 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could be reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could be reasonably expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

Subsections of Title 15, United States Code, Section 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

22A [REDACTED]

U.S. NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY REPORT (PENDING)

14NOV90

ESPIONAGE (II)

b7E

CONTROL: 12NOV85-05DC-0637-3CNA

COMMAND/NISCOM WASHINGTON, DC/63285

MADE AT/20DC/WASHINGTON, DC [REDACTED] NIS RESERVE AGENT

REFERENCES

- (A) 20DC ISR/16OCT90
- (B) 0022 ALS/18OCT90

CASE SUMMARY

1. SUBSEQUENT TO REF (A) AND AS DIRECTED BY REF (B), ALL PERTAINING CASE FILES ARE BEING REVIEWED IN PREPARATION FOR CLOSING ROI. UPON COMPLETION OF CLOSING ROI, COMPLETE 20DC INVESTIGATIVE FILE WILL BE FORWARDED TO CODE 0022A FOR RETENTION.

DISTRIBUTION

NISCOMHQ: 0022
NISRO: 20HQ

b6
b7C

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AUTHORIZATION FROM THE NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE.

U.S. NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

ACTION LEAD SHEET (PENDING)

18OCT90

ESPIONAGE (II)

CONTROL: 12NOV85-05DC-0637-3CNA

b7E

COMMAND/NISCOM, WASHINGTON, DC/63285

MADE AT/0022/NISCOM, WASHINGTON, DC [REDACTED] SPECIAL AGENT

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ACTION/LEAD

A.20DC...SUBMIT CLOSING ROI. ANY ADDITIONAL REPORTING WILL BE FORWARDED VIA (SUPP). UPON COMPLETION OF CLOSING ROI FORWARD COMPLETE 20DC INVESTIGATIVE FILE TO CODE 0022A FOR RETENTION.

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ACTION: 20DC

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U.S. NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

*Also want to see if this
just been to 2040 to
have done class
class*

INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY REPORT (PENDING)

ESPIONAGE (II)

CONTROL: 12NOV85-05DC-0637-3CNA

16OCT90

b7E

COMMAND/NISCOM WASHINGTON DC/63285

MADE AT/20DC/WASHINGTON, DC [REDACTED] SPECIAL AGENT

REFERENCE

(A) 20DC ISR/30SEP90

CASE SUMMARY

1. REPORTING AGENT MET WITH FBI CASE OFFICER ON 02OCT90. THERE HAS BEEN NO INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD.

DISTRIBUTION

NISOCMHQ: 0022
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U.S. NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY REPORT (PENDING)

30AUG90

ESPIONAGE (II)

CONTROL: 12NOV85-05DC-0637-3CNA

b7E

COMMAND/NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE, WASHINGTON, DC/63285

MADE AT/20DC/WASHINGTON, DC/ [REDACTED] SPECIAL AGENT

REFERENCE

(A) 20DC ISR/18JUN90

CASE SUMMARY

1. SUBSEQUENT TO SUBMISSION OF REF (A), SA [REDACTED] FBI-WMFO, ADVISED THAT ONE OF THE ISRAELI'S UNINDICTED CO-CONSPIRATORS IN THIS CASE, [REDACTED], ARRIVED IN THE UNITED STATES ON 20AUG90. THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (INS) INFORMED DOJ THAT [REDACTED] ARRIVED AT NEW YORK'S JFK AIRPORT WITH A TOURIST PASSPORT AND A 14 DAY VISA. [REDACTED] PROVIDED HIS U.S. ADDRESS AS: 3514 INTERNATIONAL DRIVE, WASHINGTON, DC (THE ISRAELI EMBASSY). THE ASSISTANT US ATTORNEY IS AWARE OF HIS PRESENCE AND IS CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF ASKING [REDACTED] TO SUBMIT TO AN FBI/NIS INTERVIEW.

2. AS A RECAP, [REDACTED] HOUSE IN POTOMAC, MD WAS USED IN 1984 FOR COPYING DOCUMENTS PROVIDED BY SUBJ JONATHON JAY POLLARD BEFORE A PERMANENT SAFE HOUSE WAS SECURED BY THE ISRAELI'S. ALTHOUGH [REDACTED] WAS INTERVIEWED BY THE US INVESTIGATIVE TEAM IN ISRAEL IN DEC85, HE WAS LESS THAN FORTHCOMING ABOUT THE STILL UNIDENTIFIED PEOPLE WHO DID THE ACTUAL COPYING IN [REDACTED] HOUSE, AND HIS OWN CULPABILITY WAS PRESUMED BY HIS HASTY EXIT FROM THE US THE DAY PRIOR TO SUBJECT POLLARD'S ARREST. [REDACTED] IS THE FIRST OF THE KNOWN ISRAELI PLAYERS IN THIS CASE TO RETURN TO THE U.S. AND THE ISRAELI'S MAY BE USING HIM AS A "TEST CASE" TO CHECK THE DOJ REACTION.

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b6 b7C

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U.S. NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

aren't we gonna close this like we discussed
18 JUN 90
b/11

INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY REPORT (ISSR) (U)

SUBJECT: (U)

CONTROL: 12ADM35-2000-0637-30NA

[REDACTED] b7E

COMMAND/REPORT/NO:

DATE AT/DOO/WASHINGTON, DC [REDACTED] SPECIAL AGENT

REFERENCE

(A) 2000 ISR/063730

SYNOPSIS

1. SUBSEQUENT TO SUBMISSION OF REF (A), REPORTING AGENT ATTENDED A MEETING ON 25 APR 90 AT THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, DC WITH FBI SA [REDACTED] AND THE NEW ASSISTANT U. S. ATTORNEY, [REDACTED] AS WELL AS REPRESENTATIVES FROM NSA, CIA, AND FBIHQ. THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WAS TO DISCUSS A MOTION BY SUBJECT JONATHAN POLLARD'S DEFENSE ATTORNEY TO GAIN ACCESS TO THE SENTENCING DECLARATION PREPARED BY FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CASPAR WEINBERGER. ALL ATTENDEES CONCURRED THAT ACCESS BY THE DEFENSE TEAM NEED TO BE PREVENTED AND THIS LATEST MOTION BY THE DEFENSE IS AWAITING A JUDGMENT BY JUDGE [REDACTED]. ADDITIONALLY, THE DEFENSE HAD REQUESTED THAT POLLARD'S GUILTY PLEA AND SENTENCE BE VACATED DUE TO ALLEGED MISCONDUCT ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT; I.E. COERCION OF SUBJECT AND [REDACTED] INTO PLEA AGREEMENTS.

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NISRO: 2048

b6 b7C

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ZCZCONIS6851KVA791 LOG LN 050 0961920 JRNL TAPE 122
PTTUZYUW RULSSGG8771 0961921-UUUU--RULKNIS.
ZNR UUUUU

P 051400Z APR 90 ZYB
FM NAVINVSERVRA WASHINGTON DC//20DC//
TO RULKNIS/COMNISCOM WASHINGTON DC//0022//
RULSND/NAVINVSERV NCREG WASHINGTON DC//20HQ//

BT
UNCLAS [REDACTED] LIMDIS //N03850//
INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY REPORT (PENDING) 05APR90
ESPIONAGE **b7E** CONTROL: 12NOV85-20DC-0637-3CNA

COMMAND/NAVINVSERVCOM, WASHINGTON, DC/63285
MADE AT/20DC/WASHINGTON, DC/[REDACTED] SPECIAL AGENT
REFERENCE
(A) 20DC ISR/22JAN90 **bb b7C**

SYNOPSIS
1. SUBSEQUENT TO SUBMISSION OF REF (A), NO INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY
HAS BEEN CONDUCTED DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD.

DISTRIBUTION
NISCOMHQ: 0022
NISR0: 20HQ
BT
#8771

22A
A:20
4/5

[REDACTED]
Let's close this case.

Not yet

NNNN

b7E

UNCLAS [REDACTED] LIMDIS //N03850//

A:20
Y23

U.S. NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY REPORT (PENDING)

22JAN90

ESPIONAGE (III)

CONTROL: 12NOV85-2000-0637-3CNA

[REDACTED] b7E

COMMAND/NISCOMHQ/63285

MADE AT/2000/WASHINGTON, DC [REDACTED] SPECIAL AGENT

REFERENCE

(A) 2000 ISR/01NOV89

SYNOPSIS

1. SUBSEQUENT TO SUBMISSION OF REF (A), 05JAN90 CONTACT BY PARTICIPATING AGENT WITH FBI-WMFO SA [REDACTED] DETERMINED THAT [REDACTED] HAS BEEN RELEASED ON WORK RELEASE AND IS EXPECTED TO BE GRANTED PAROLE CIRCA MAR90.

PARTICIPATING AGENT

[REDACTED], SPECIAL AGENT, NISCOMHQ

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NISRO: 20HQ

b6 b7C

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Ron [initials]
A-20

ZCZCONIS9745VKA353 LOG LN 050 3062148 JRNL TAPE 079
PTTUZYUW RULSSGG0379 3062145-UUUU--RULKNIS.
ZNR UUUUU

P 021947Z NOV 89 ZYB
FM NAVINVSERVRA WASHINGTON DC
TO RULKNIS/COMNISCOM WASHINGTON DC
RULSND/NAVINVSERV NCREG WASHINGTON DC
BT

b7E

UNCLAS [REDACTED] LIMDIS //NO3850//
INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY REPORT (PENDING) 01NOV89
ESPIONAGE CONTROL: 12NOV85-20DC-0637-3CNA

COMMAND/NAVINVSERVCOM, WASHINGTON, DC/63285
MADE AT/20DC/WASHINGTON, DC [REDACTED] SPECIAL AGENT
REFERENCE

b7C

(A) 20DC ISR/22AUG89

SYNOPSIS

1. SUBSEQUENT TO REF (A) THERE HAS BEEN NO INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY OR CONTACT WITH THE OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY.

DISTRIBUTION

NISCOMHQ: 0022
NISRO: 20HQ
BT
#0379

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UNCLAS [REDACTED] LIMDIS //N03850//

ZCZCGNIS7537KVA142 LOG LN 050 2440043 JRNL TAPE 120
FTTUZYUW RULSSGG3608 2440042-UUUU--RULKNIS.

ZNR UUUUU

P 311603Z AUG 89

FM NAVINUSERVRA WASHINGTON DC
TO RULKNIS/COMNISCOR WASHINGTON DC
RULSNDA/NAVINUSERV NCREG WASHINGTON DC
BT

UNCLAS [REDACTED] LIMDIS //N03850//

INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY REPORT (PENDING) 22AUG89
ESPIONAGE [REDACTED] CONTROL: 12NOV85-20DC-0637-3CNA

b7E

COMMAND/NAVINSERVCOM, WASHINGTON, DC/63285
MADE AT/20DC/WASHINGTON, DC [REDACTED] SPECIAL AGENT
REFERENCES

(A) 20DC ISR/28JUN89

(B) NISCASE FILE: I/ILLWIND/CCN: 09SEP86-20DC-0423-4GMA

SYNOPSIS

1. SUBSEQUENT TO SUBMISSION OF REF (A), AN INTERVIEW WAS
CONDUCTED WITH [REDACTED] CONCERNING HER KNOWLEDGE OF
SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS ASSOCIATED WITH THE INVESTIGATION INITIATED BY
REF (B). COINCIDENTALLY, [REDACTED] WAS SUBJECT'S TRAVEL AGENT IN
1985 AND MADE ARRANGEMENTS FOR HE [REDACTED], CO-SUBJECT [REDACTED]

b7C

PAGE 02 RULSSGG3608 UNCLAS

[REDACTED] TO TRAVEL TO EUROPE AND ISRAEL. [REDACTED] WAS
INTERVIEWED BY THE GRAND JURY PRIOR TO SUBJECT'S CONVICTION,
HOWEVER, SHE WAS NOT INTERVIEWED BY THE FBI AT THAT TIME.

2. NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME CONCERNING
THAT WHICH WAS RELATED IN REF (A).

EXHIBIT

(1) FD-302/INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED] 14JUL89...(COPY ALL)

DISTRIBUTION

NISCOMHQ: 0022(M)

NISRO: 20HQ(M)

BT

#3608

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UNCLAS [REDACTED] LIMDIS //N03850//

10

U.S. NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

OPERATIONS REPORT (ONLY)

22 MAY 89

ESPIONAGE

CONTROL: 19MAY89-03GL-0261-3001

1/NEWSPAPER ARTICLE ON POLLARD CASE FROM 19 MAY 89 ISSUE OF THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE

MADE AT/036L/GREAT LAKES, IL/ [REDACTED] SPECIAL AGENT

SYNOPSIS

1. EXHIBIT (1) IS A LENGTHY NEWSPAPER ARTICLE CONCERNING THE JONATHAN POLLARD ESPIONAGE CASE THAT APPEARED IN THE 19 MAY 89 EDITION OF THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE. THE ARTICLE WAS APPARENTLY INSPIRED BY THE PUBLICATION OF WOLF BLITZER'S BOOK, "TERRITORY OF LIES". EXHIBIT (1) IS PROVIDED FOR INFORMATION.

EXHIBIT

(1) NEWSPAPER ARTICLE... (0022 ONLY)

DISTRIBUTION

NISCOM: 0022 (1)

NISRD: 0344

b7c

SIGNAVINST 220.96 - INITIAL REVIEW		05 JUN 1989
Date Acquired/Reviewed:		
Retention Decision	00 <input type="checkbox"/>	90 <input type="checkbox"/> 1 YR <input type="checkbox"/> EXEMPT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Date to be DESTROYED (REVIEWED):		
[REDACTED]		22
Reviewer's Signature	Code	
<i>Annual Review</i>		
Date Reviewed	Reviewer's Signature	Code
Date Reviewed	Reviewer's Signature	Code

Pollard, Jonathan J. (H-11)

2350

Copy:

Action:

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11

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FILE

04047 00:20 07/22/87 IN:LKV 0092 OUT:P3 #0746
NSIC OPERATIONS CONTROL CENTER UNCLAS GENSER MESSAGE ROUTING

00.... 01.... 02.... 21.... 22.... 22A... 22B... 22C... 22D-ATAC...
22E3.. 23... 24.... 25.... 26.... 27.... 27.... 28.... 29.... GMF....
SHOTGUN..... SVC CLERK.... READBOARD.... ROUTER... [REDACTED]

R1TUZYUW RULSSGG0244 2022349-UUUU--RUEOLKA.

ZNR UUUUU

R 211919Z JUL 87

FM NAVINUSERVRA WASHINGTON DC
TO RUEOLKA/COMNAVSECINVCOM WASHINGTON DC
BT

b7E

UNCLAS LIMDIS [REDACTED] /N03850//
ACTION/LEAD SHEET (PENDING)
ESPIONAGE

21 JUL 87

CONTROL: 12NOV85-05DC-0637-3CNA

[REDACTED] (U)

S/POLLARD

COMMAND/NAVINUSERVCOM, WASHINGTON DC/63285
MADE AT/20DC/WASHINGTON, DC/ [REDACTED] SPECIAL AGENT
SYNOPSIS

b7C

1. SUBJ WAS SENTENCED ON 04 MAY 87 TO LIFE IN PRISON FOR
ESPIONAGE COMMITTED ON BEHALF OF ISRAEL. SUBSEQUENT TO HIS
SENTENCE, SUBJ'S ATTORNEY FILED A MOTION TO REDUCE THE SENTENCE
WHICH IS APPENDED AS EXHIBIT (1). SUBJ'S MOTION CITES THE
FOLLOWING REASONS FOR REDUCING HIS SENTENCE:

- (1) THE DAMAGE TO THE U.S. FROM HIS CONDUCT WAS MINIMAL.
- (2) THE GOVERNMENT BREACHED ITS COMMITMENT TO GIVE CREDIT
TO SUBJ FOR HIS COOPERATION.
- (3) A LIFE SENTENCE IN SPITE OF COOPERATION WILL MAKE IT

b7E

PAGE 02 RULSSGG0244 UNCLAS LIMDIS [REDACTED]
DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN COOPERATION FROM FUTURE ESPIONAGE
SUSPECTS, AND

- (4) SUBJ'S SENTENCING IS EXCESSIVE IN LIGHT OF SENTENCES
GIVEN IN OTHER RECENT ESPIONAGE CASES.

2. ATTORNEYS FOR SUBJ'S [REDACTED] HAVE ALSO
FILED AN APPEAL ON HER BEHALF REQUESTING HER SENTENCE BE REDUCED TO
TIME ALREADY SERVED AND THAT SHE BE RELEASED IMMEDIATELY.

3. NO DECISIONS HAVE BEEN MADE YET BY JUDGE [REDACTED] (THE
SENTENCING JUDGE FOR BOTH DEFENDANTS ON 04 MAR 87), HOWEVER, THE
APPEALS ARE NOT EXPECTED TO BE SUCCESSFUL.

EXHIBIT

(1) MOTION TO REDUCE SENTENCE/25JUN87...(COPY ALL/BY MAIL)

DISTRIBUTION

NSICHQ: 0022 (M)

CONTROL: 20HQ (M)

BT
#0244

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ROUTINE

R 032012Z APR 87

FM NAVINVSERVRA WASHINGTON DC

TO COMNAVSECTINVCOM WASHINGTON DC NAVINVSERVREGO NORFOLK VA

BT
UNCLAS [REDACTED] LINDIS//NO3850//

ACTION/LEAD SHEET (PENDING) 01 APR 87
ESPIONAGE CONTROL: 12NOV85-05DC-0637-3CNA

b7E

[REDACTED] U)
COMMAND/NAVINVSERVCOM, WASHINGTON, D.C./63285
MADE AT/05DC/WASHINGTON, D.C./ [REDACTED] SPECIAL AGENT
SYNOPSIS

1. ON 26MAR87, [REDACTED] FBI-WFO, PROVIDED ADDITIONAL FD-302'S TO REPORTING AGENT, WHICH ARE APPENDED AS EXHIBITS (1) THROUGH (8). EXHIBITS (1) AND (2) REPORT THE INTERVIEWS OF [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED], NISC, WHO PROVIDED A CLIPBOARD LOG FOR REVIEW WHICH REVEALED ENTRIES FOR TWO PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN 08JUN81 BY NISC OF THE BOMBED BAGHOAD, IRAQ, NUCLEAR FACILITY. FOR BACKGROUND, ACCORDING TO EARLIER DEBRIEFINGS OF SUBJ, [REDACTED] REQUESTED PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE BOMB DAMAGE FROM SUBJ IN JUN84 AS HE [REDACTED] HAD CONDUCTED THE AIR STRIKE OF THE FACILITY BUT HAD NEVER SEEN PHOTOS OF THE AFTERMATH OF THE RAID. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REQUESTED COPIES OF THE PHOTOS GIVEN TO [REDACTED] BY SUBJECT TO ADD AN ADDITIONAL COUNT TO THE INDICTMENT HANDED DOWN ON [REDACTED] EARLIER THIS YEAR. [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] EXPLAINED THAT SUBJ WOULD HAVE HAD EASY ACCESS TO THE CLIPBOARD LOG FROM WHICH HE COULD HAVE OBTAINED THE CONTROL NUMBERS OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS HE DESIRED. EXHIBIT (3) IDENTIFIES THE PHOTOGRAPHS DESCRIBED ABOVE WHICH WERE SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASED TO THE FBI BY NISC. EXHIBIT (4) DETAILS THE INTERVIEW OF SUBJ ON 19FEB87 FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF IDENTIFYING THE PHOTOGRAPHS (NAMED IN EXHIBIT (3)) AS THE ONES HE PROVIDED TO [REDACTED] IN JUN 84. SUBJ POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED ONE OF THE TWO PHOTOS AS ONE HE GAVE [REDACTED] BUT HE STATED THAT THERE WAS A SECOND PHOTOGRAPH WHICH HE ALSO GAVE [REDACTED] AND HE PROVIDED A DESCRIPTION OF THAT PHOTO. BASED ON THIS INTERVIEW WITH SUBJ, [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] WERE REINTERVIEWED (EXHIBITS (5) AND (6) PERTAIN) IN ORDER TO OBTAIN ANY ADDITIONAL PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE BOMBED IRAQI FACILITY AND THEY SUGGESTED THE INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED] A FORMER NISC ANALYST WHO HAD ORIGINALLY REQUESTED THE

b
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c

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DLVR:NAVINVSERVRA WASHINGTON DC(1)...ORIG

RID:000-000/COPIES:0001

707731/8341/094 1 OF 2 #1 0560 094/08:537 032012Z APR 87
CSN:RXDY0552 NAVINVSERVRA WASHINGTON DC

PHOTOGRAPHS IN 1981. EXHIBIT (7) REPORTS THE INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED] NOW EMPLOYED BY THE DEPT. OF THE ARMY, WHO RECALLED THAT SUBJ VISITED HIM AT NISC AND REQUESTED SATELLITE PHOTOGRAPHS RELATING TO TERRORISM AND WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN PICTURES OF THE BOMB SITE. [REDACTED] RECALLED THAT HE GAVE SUBJ A LARGE BOX OF PHOTOS AND ALLOWED HIM TO GO THROUGH THEM AT HIS LEISURE AS HE [REDACTED] DID NOT HAVE TIME TO LOOK FOR THEM, AND SUBJ SUBSEQUENTLY REQUESTED FIVE COPIES OF ONE PHOTOGRAPH AND TWO VIEWGRAPHS. [REDACTED] WAS ASKED TO SEARCH HIS FILES FOR ANY 1981 PHOTOS OF THE BOMB SITE AND EXHIBIT (8) REFLECTS THAT HE WAS UNABLE TO FIND ANY SUCH PHOTOS DUE TO THEIR AGE.

2. THE PHOTOGRAPHS OBTAINED DURING THE COURSE OF THE ABOVE INTERVIEWS WERE PROVIDED TO AUSA [REDACTED] BY SPECIAL AGENT [REDACTED].

EXHIBITS

- (1) FD-302/INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED]/13FEB87...(COPY ALL)
- (2) FD-302/INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED]/13FEB87...(COPY ALL)
- (3) FD-302/17FEB87...(COPY ALL)
- (4) FD-302/INTERVIEW OF SUBJ/19FEB87...(COPY ALL)
- (5) FD-302/RE-INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED]/20FEB87...(COPY ALL)
- (6) FD-302/RE-INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED]/20FEB87...(COPY ALL)
- (7) FD-302/INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED]/06MAR87...(COPY ALL)
- (8) FD-302/REINTERVIEW OF [REDACTED]/13MAR87...(COPY ALL)

DISTRIBUTION

NSICHQ: 0022 (M)
CONTROL: 05HQ (M)/
[REDACTED] RJU

BT

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b7c

16

NSIC OPERATIONS CONTROL CENTER UNCLAS GENSER MESSAGE ROUTING

00.... 01.... 02.... 21.... 22... 23.... 24.... 25.... 26....
27.... 28.... 29.... SHOTGUN..... KEYPUNCH..... GMF.....

SVC CLERK..... READBOARD..... ROUTER. [REDACTED].....
RTTUZYUW RULSSGG9436 0730122-UUUU--RUEOLKA.
ZNR UUUUU

R 132025Z MAR 87
FM NAVINUSERVRA WASHINGTON DC
TO RUEOLKA/COMNAVSECINVCOM WASHINGTON DC
RUCOLKA/NAVINUSERVREGO NORFOLK VA
BT

UNCLAS LIMDIS [REDACTED] /NO3850//

ACTION/LEAD SHEET (PENDING) 13 MAR 87
ESPIONAGE CONTROL: 12NOV85-05DC-0637-3CNA

[REDACTED] (U) **b7E**
COMMAND/NAVINUSERVCOM WASHINGTON, DC/63285
MADE AT/05DC/WASHINGTON, DC/ [REDACTED] SPECIAL AGENT
SYNOPSIS

1. ON 04 MAR 87, SUBJ AND [REDACTED] WERE SENTENCED IN U.S.
DISTRICT COURT BY CHIEF JUDGE [REDACTED] SUBJ WAS
SENTENCED TO LIFE IN PRISON AND [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] WAS SENTENCED TO TWO CONCURRENT FIVE-YEAR
PRISON TERMS. EACH WAS ASSESSED \$50.00 IN COURT COSTS, ALTHOUGH
NEITHER WAS FINED. FOLLOWING THE SENTENCING, [REDACTED]
ATTORNEY REQUESTED THAT SHE REMAIN FREE ON BOND PENDING LOCATION
OF A PRISON WHICH HAS MEDICAL FACILITIES ADEQUATE TO TREAT HER

b7C

PAGE 02 RULSSGG9436 UNCLAS LIMDIS [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] DENIED THE REQUEST. SUBJ WILL BE
ELIGIBLE FOR PAROLE IN TEN YEARS, WHILE [REDACTED] WILL
ELIGIBLE AFTER APPROXIMATELY 40 MONTHS.

2. ON 03 MAR 87, ON OF SUBJ'S CO-CONSPIRITORS, ISRAELI [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] WAS INDICTED ON ESPIONAGE CHARGES AS A RESULT OF HIS
ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES WITH POLLARD. JOINT NIS-FBI INTERVIEWS
CONCERNING [REDACTED] ROLE ARE CONTINUING.

DISTRIBUTION
NSIC HQ: 0022
CONTROL: 05HQ
BT
#9436

NNNN

U.S. Hunts American 'Mr. X' In Pollard Espionage for Israel

By Bob Woodward
and Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writers

Nearly a year after Israeli spy Jonathan Jay Pollard was sentenced to life in prison, Justice Department officials have concluded that Israel almost certainly had another American espionage agent—dubbed ██████ by government investigators—in the CIA or the Defense Department, according to informed sources.

The Justice Department is continuing its investigation to attempt to establish the identity of a second Israeli spy, the sources said.

The belief that a ██████ must exist grew out of a massive, three-stage debriefing and polygraphing of Pollard over many months, the sources said. Pollard told U.S. of-

Wash Post. 2/19/88 pA-1
ficials that his Israeli handlers often specified by date and document control number the highly sensitive U.S. documents they wanted him to acquire, and once showed him a top secret U.S. document to which—investigators have established—he did not have access.

It was an index or catalogue that Pollard was then able to use to obtain documents from U.S. intelligence agencies during one phase of his espionage. U.S. investigators have concluded that the other American—██████—had provided this index and other specific information on U.S. secrets that Pollard learned from his Israeli handlers.

U.S. intelligence agencies have drawn up lists of suspects, but no evidence has been developed so far

See POLLARD, A6, Col. 1

b7C

EXHIBIT (1)

U.S. Hunts for 'Mr. X' in Pollard Spy Case

POLLARD, From A1

pointing to any individual as a possible source.

Justice Department spokesman [redacted] said yesterday. "As we have indicated previously, there are unanswered questions in the case and the investigation continues."

An Israeli Embassy spokesman, [redacted] said yesterday that the Pollard case was an aberration and the Israeli government has no spy or spies in the U.S. government and does not conduct espionage against the United States or its interests.

The allegations, according to investigators, must have been so highly placed or in such a position that he could not regularly gather documents, whereas Pollard was a low-level analyst who had a courier card and whose job was to assemble information. Investigators concluded that Israel may have been more interested in protecting [redacted] than Pollard.

Efforts by the U.S. government to probe for the identity of [redacted] ran into a stone wall in Israel, where officials heatedly denied there was or had been another spy. One source who dealt with the Israelis in the investigation said, however, that "the denial was less than categorical."


U.S. investigators also have been searching for evidence of a direct connection between Pollard's arrest on Nov. 21, 1985, and the Israeli role in secret arms sales to Iran. The previous August and September, Israel had shipped 608 American-made TOW antitank missiles to Tehran with U.S. approval.

Within weeks of Pollard's arrest, [redacted] on an aide on the National Security Council staff, received Israeli permission to use \$800,000 left over from an aborted Israeli sale of U.S. military spare parts to Iran for "whatever purpose we wanted," [redacted] has testified.

The money was used to buy military equipment for the Nicaraguan contra rebels, the first such diversion in the Iran-contra affair.

Investigators for the Justice Department and independent counsel [redacted] attach significance to the timing of the Pollard arrest and the first contra diversion. One key investigator said recently, "There has to be a connection... two of the most important events of 1985 to both [the] United States and Israeli governments weren't occurring in a vacuum."

Shimon Peres, then prime min-



Pollard, sentenced to life in prison, worked in secret Navy antiterrorist center.

ister of Israel, has told associates that as a result of the Pollard case, he wanted to help win the freedom of U.S. hostages being held in Lebanon "to please George Shultz... and do a favor for America and maybe they would forgive us for Pollard," according to one informed Israeli source.

Pollard has a near-photographic memory, the sources said, and was able to recall documents, dates and technical material on a broad range of subjects. He pleaded guilty to espionage charges.

The three stages of Pollard's debriefing were the initial interrogation of some 30 to 40 hours; weeks of polygraph examination conducted by one of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's most experienced specialists, and in-depth debriefings by members of U.S. intelligence agencies lasting several hours three or four times a week over many months.

Justice Department investigators, including FBI officials and polygraph specialists, concluded that Pollard was being truthful in his post-arrest debriefings as he explained meticulously how he was able to access Central Intelligence Agency [redacted] National Security Agency [redacted] classified facilities to obtain documents from computers and files, the sources said. Investigators concluded that Pollard also was telling the truth when he said he was working alone and was not directly aware of another Israeli spy, though he explained in detail how the Israelis gave him top secret information about what documents and files they wanted him to gather.

The quantity and scope of the intelligence information that Pollard passed to Israeli officials during his

17 months of spying has yet to be explained in public.

As pieced together from intelligence sources it included: a Technical and other information on special NSA projects designed to intercept foreign communications called signals intelligence (SIGINT), and to protect the security of U.S. military and intelligence communications. Sources said that in the government, NSA has claimed that it must replace the capabilities disclosed by Pollard, and that this will cost billions of dollars. But other officials have said this cost estimate is much too high. A Code word and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), the most important U.S. intelligence secrets, to which Pollard had access as an employee of the U.S. Navy's top secret antiterrorist effort. It was so broad and extensive that, in the words of one source, the espionage operation "allowed Israel to spy on every country in the world" by using the information gathered by all U.S. intelligence agencies. Included were not only intelligence on the Middle East but also vital, in-depth assessments of U.S., Soviet and other foreign military capabilities. One official referred to Pollard's access as "mind-boggling."

During the course of the two-year Justice Department inquiry, investigators have established that fund-raising efforts for Israel in the United States were often used to identify pro-Israelis in sensitive positions in the U.S. government.

One source said that it was possible that Israel had several additional sources of U.S. intelligence information and not just a single [redacted] and at least one senior Justice Department official has expressed skepticism that another Israeli agent will ever be found. But after being briefed on the case last month, Attorney General Edwin Meese III ordered that the Pollard case be kept officially open so investigators can pursue their inquiry. Several internal Justice Department memos on the case refer only to [redacted].

Early in the investigation, when U.S. officials were not certain who recruited Pollard, they referred to that recruiter as [redacted]. That [redacted] was later identified as Israeli [redacted].

[redacted] who was indicted here last year on charges of recruiting Pollard and receiving U.S. documents from him, [redacted] is in Israel and is not expected to stand trial.

From June 1984 to November 1985, Pollard provided the Israelis with thousands of documents—some 800,000 pages, sources said. At times the Israelis could not photocopy the material fast enough, investigators concluded. The apartment used as the photocopying center for the documents at 2830 Van Ness St. NW was given high security status by the Israelis, including

"TEMPEST" electronic protections to ensure that the equipment inside did not radiate signals that could be picked up outside the apartment.

Rafi Eitan, a former official in Mossad, an Israeli intelligence service, headed a special unit called Lechem that ran and controlled Pollard. Eitan circulated summaries of the documents obtained from Pollard within the Israeli Defense Ministry and the intelligence agencies where "Rafi was considered a god, getting the most incredible material ever," one source said.

U.S. officials worried that the Soviets or other countries have agents in Israel who may have been able to obtain some of the sensitive material or at least detailed descriptions of it. Another concern is that some in the Israeli military or intelligence establishment could have traded some of the information with other countries, including the Soviet Union, for intelligence on neighboring Syria, which is considered the most serious and immediate threat to Israel.

One source said Pollard supplied intelligence that investigators believe was passed to South Africa, a country with which Israel has maintained close relations.

At the time he was spying for Israel, Pollard was working at the Navy's new Antiterrorism Alert Center (ATAC), which was created to ensure that the Navy and Marine Corps had access to all U.S. intelligence that could alert the services to an incident similar to the Beirut Marine barracks bombing in the fall of 1983 that killed 241 U.S. service personnel.

After the bombing and another bombing of the U.S. Embassy annex on Sept. 20, 1984, the United States discovered that there were clues or warnings in their intelligence files that had not reached the field in time, or which involved such sensitive communications intercepts that they would not automatically be distributed to the field.

ATAC was set up as an antiterrorist clearinghouse with the blessing of the White House, the CIA and the Navy, which afforded Pollard extraordinary access and cooperation from the entire intelligence bureaucracy. Pollard could request sensitive information that no one wanted to deny to the Navy because the ATAC mission was to save American lives, the sources said.

A top secret, 46-page description of the damage done by Pollard to U.S. intelligence sources and methods was submitted last year to U.S. District Court Judge [redacted].

[redacted] by then-Defense Secretary Casper W. Weinberger. Though the prosecutors had asked only that Pollard be given a substantial prison term, [redacted] last March 4 sentenced Pollard to life. One source said that [redacted] was stunned that one spy could do such damage. Pollard's [redacted].

[redacted] received a five-year prison term for assisting him.

In a supplemental, unclassified sworn statement to [redacted] Weinberger said, "It is difficult for me, even in the so-called 'year of the spy,' to conceive of a greater harm to national security than that caused by the defendant in view of the breadth, the critical importance to the U.S., and the high sensitivity of the information he sold to Israel."

Weinberger said that Pollard "both damaged and destroyed policies and national assets which have taken many years, great effort and enormous national resources to secure."

Staff researcher Melissa Mathis contributed to this report.

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Kin say Pollard being badgered to name abettors in espionage

Wash. Times 2/22/86 p. A6

FROM COMBINED DISPATCHES

The parents of Jonathan J. Pollard say Navy investigators showed the convicted spy a list of names of 25 American Jews and asked him to identify those who had helped him commit espionage for Israel.

"They kept badgering him to indicate which of those on the list was involved in the spy plot."

He is a professor of microbiology at the University of Notre Dame, said Friday.

Both the senior [redacted] and his [redacted] denied that the latter had an accomplice in spying for Israel. Their statements came after The Washington Post reported Friday that government investigators had concluded that someone in the CIA or Defense Department also had spied for Israel.

Pollard's [redacted] said that when the list of names was shown to him and he was told they were prominent members of the American Jewish community, he recognized only one name. She did not know what that name was.

Meanwhile, Israeli television reported yesterday that Pollard may be part of a dramatic three-way swap of Israeli, U.S. and Soviet spies in the planning stage.

Israel would release a well-known businessman originating from the

Soviet Union, Shabtai Kalmanovitz, who was recently arrested on suspicion of spying for Moscow, the television report claimed.

The Soviet contribution to the package would be to send home an American spy whom the television report did not name.

There was no official confirmation of the report.

Israel's ambassador to the United States on Saturday vigorously denied the second agent scenario.

"I can assure you [Israel] is not spying on the United States either in the United States or overseas," Ambassador Moshe Arad said in a broadcast interview. "There's no doubt that the Pollard affair has been an aberration."

Justice Department sources, speaking on condition of anonymity, said there are differing views within the department on the question of whether there is a second spy. While there appear to be some solid indications that there was another operative, some officials have doubts about it, the sources said.

The Post story quoted unidentified sources as saying government investigators have dubbed the alleged second spy [redacted].

But Jonathan Pollard, a former civilian intelligence analyst for the Navy who was sentenced in March

to life in prison, said he knew of no [redacted]. He admitted selling American defense secrets to Israel over a period of 15 months until his arrest in November 1985 outside the Israeli embassy in Washington.

[redacted] was sentenced to five years in prison for helping him.

"I gave no information suggesting the existence of a [redacted] in government... Having said that, I obviously have no knowledge of whether any other person or persons was helping Israel," Pollard said in a statement he telephoned from prison to [redacted] who conveyed it to The Associated Press. Under a plea-bargaining agreement, Pollard is not allowed direct contact with the news media.

Pollard's parents said their son had been held in a psychiatric ward at the federal prison in Springfield, Mo., for 10 months as Navy investigators tried to force him to implicate others.

His lawyer, [redacted], said, however, he believed the idea was to keep him in protected surroundings to prevent him from disclosing national security secrets.

[redacted] head of the penitentiary's social services department, said Pollard was assigned to the Diagnostic and Observation



Jonathan Pollard

Unit, a psychological evaluation treatment unit. He said Pollard not "a mental patient," but "there other considerations for keep him there."

[redacted] wrote to Rep. Hamilton, Indiana Democrat, asking him to intercede on his son's behalf.

An aide in Mr. Hamilton's office who asked not to be identified, the congressman promised he would try to help. "He felt Pollard should not be discriminated against compared with other prisoners," the aide said.

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EXHIBIT (2)
23

PRIORITY

P 072101Z NOV 86

FM NAVINVSERVRA WASHINGTON DC

TO COMNAVSECTINVCOM WASHINGTON DC NAVINVSERVREGO NORFOLK VA

BT
UNCLAS LIMDIS [REDACTED] /N03858//

ACTION LEAD SHEET (PENDING) 06 NOV 86
ESPIONAGE **b7c** CONTROL: 12NOV85-05DC-0637-3CNA

[REDACTED] (U)
COMMAND/NSIC WASHINGTON, D.C./63285
MADE AT/05DC/WASHINGTON, D.C. [REDACTED] SPECIAL AGENT
SYNOPSIS **b7c**

1. FBI-WFO RECENTLY ADVISED THAT SENTENCING OF SUBJECT [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] HAS BEEN POSTPONED FROM 20 NOV 86 TO AN UNSPECIFIED DATE IN
EARLY 1987. THE POSTPONEMENT IS THE RESULT OF A REQUEST FROM THE
SUBJECT'S DEFENSE ATTORNEY DUE TO [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] THE JUDGE GRANTED THE REQUEST
AND APPARENTLY AUTHORIZED A DELAY UNTIL AFTER THE HOLIDAYS.

DISTRIBUTION
NSIC HQ: 0022
CONTROL: 05HQ
[REDACTED] RJO
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DLVR:NAVINVSERVRA WASHINGTON DC(1)...ORIG

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CSN:RXOY1211 NAVINVSERVRA WASHINGTON DC

ROUTINE

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FM NAVINVSERVRA WASHINGTON DC

TO COMNAVSECINVCOM WASHINGTON DC NAVINVSERVNREGO NORFOLK VA

BT
UNCLAS LIMDIS [REDACTED] 00385077

ACTION/LEAD SHEET (PENDING) **b7E** 11 SEP 86
ESPIONAGE CONTROL: 12NOV85-0500-0637-30NA

COMMAND/NAVINVSERVCOM, WASHINGTON, DC/63285
NADE AT/0500/WASHINGTON, DC/[REDACTED] SPECIAL AGENT
SYNOPSIS

1 EXHIBITS (1) THROUGH (6) FORWARD RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH
SUBJECT BY NIS/FBI ON 24, 29 AND 30 JUL 86; AND 05, 06 AND 20 AUG

b7C

86. RESULTS OF INTERVIEW ON 13/14 AUG 86 BY NSA HAVE NOT YET BEEN
RECEIVED. NOR HAVE RESULTS OF INTERVIEW BY CIA BEEN RECEIVED FOR
26/27 AUG 86 AND 03/04 SEP 86.

2 POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS OF SUBJECT TO VERIFY THE ACCOUNTS
PROVIDED IN THE ABOVE INTERVIEWS WILL OCCUR IN THE LATTER PART OF
SEP 86 DUE TO THE INVOLVEMENT BY THE FBI-WFO POLYGRAPH EXAMINER IN
THE [REDACTED] POLYGRAPHS.

b7E

3. SENTENCING OF SUBJECT [REDACTED] IS NOW SCHEDULED FOR 20 NOV

86.
EXHIBITS
- (1) RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH SUBJ/24JUL86... (COPY ALL BY MAIL)
 - (2) RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH SUBJ/29JUL86... (COPY ALL BY MAIL)
 - (3) RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH SUBJ/30JUL86... (COPY ALL BY MAIL)
 - (4) RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH SUBJ/05AUG86... (COPY ALL BY MAIL)
 - (5) RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH SUBJ/06AUG86... (COPY ALL BY MAIL)
 - (6) RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH SUBJ/20AUG86... (COPY ALL BY MAIL)

DISTRIBUTION
NSICHO: 0022 (M)
CONTROL: 05HQ (M)
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DLVR:NAVINVSERVRA WASHINGTON DC010...0816

ATD:0500-000/COP/ES:0000

6001527472/258 1 OF 1 NR 0093 25A/15116/ 151335Z SEP 86
CSN:RXOYD103 NAVINVSERVRA WASHINGTON DC

RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH JONATHAN JAY POLLARD
AS RECORDED BY SPECIAL AGENT [REDACTED], ON
24 JULY 1986, IN WASHINGTON, D.C.

Jonathan Jay Pollard was interviewed starting at 0830, at the United States District Court Building, Washington, D.C. by reporting Agent and Special Agent [REDACTED] Naval Investigative Service (NIS), Special Agents [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and [REDACTED] OPNAV Damage Assessment Task Force.

Pollard began by clarifying some points from the 23 July 1986 interview. When he first met [REDACTED] in Washington, Pollard was already working at the NIS ATAC. Pollard recalled that when he was describing his duties and access to [REDACTED] he described the Anti-Terrorist Alert Center (ATAC) job.

Regarding how the Israelis exploited the material he provided, [REDACTED] told Pollard that the material was kept in a single vault in Israel and no reproduction of the material was allowed.

Regarding the procedure to be used if Pollard wanted to pass information to Israel outside of the regular meet schedule, i. e., initiated meets, Pollard had a key to [REDACTED] apartment. If he had some "hot" information he was to take it to the apartment and give it to [REDACTED]. If she was not there Pollard was to leave the material in a closet just inside her front door. Pollard said he used this procedure on two occasions. First he obtained threat information that an Arab terrorist group was initiating a car bomb attack on an Israeli road block in Lebanon. The Arabs had a stolen French diplomatic license plate they planned to use on the car bomb vehicle. According to Pollard, [REDACTED] later informed him that the Israeli military had been able to act on this information and interdict the vehicle in question. Pollard advised that the second emergency drop involved information that the Soviet T-72M main battle tank had been introduced into Syria.

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In regard to special taskings by the Israelis, Pollard advised that during June/July of 1985, [REDACTED] requested that he obtain all information available on the Palistine Liberation Organization (PLO) Headquarters outside Tunis and all information available on Tunisian and Libyan air defenses, in preparation for an attack by Israel on the PLO Headquarters. According to Pollard, the subsequent attack was planned in part from this material. Pollard also stated that [REDACTED] had told him that a contingency plan for the attack was developed then the Israelis waited for a suitable pretext to execute the plan. The pretext was achieved when the Arab terrorists attacked a private yacht in Cyprus, killing three Israelis.

Pollard then began to discuss the second day of meetings with ██████████. He again met ██████████ in the lobby of the Hilton Hotel in Paris at 9/10 A.M. ██████████ went touring with ██████████ and ██████████. Pollard and ██████████ returned to the same apartment as the previous day. Pollard, ██████████, ██████████ and ██████████ all participated in this meeting. ██████████ directed Pollard to provide passport photos of himself ██████████. When Pollard asked why, ██████████ told him that they were citizens now and needed documentation to make it "kosher."

██████████ lectured Pollard on security, and the basic concepts were:

A. if Pollard got caught the U.S. probably would do nothing, so shouldn't worry; or

B. if the U. S. does take action Pollard should not worry because the Israelis would take care of him.

██████████ advised Pollard that he should never take a polygraph examination. If Pollard was ever required to take a polygraph he should resign his position.

Pollard was required to provide an itinerary for the rest of his European vacation, which included a driving trip through France, Italy, Austria and Germany; with a flight back to the U. S. from Munich.

A cover story was developed to explain Pollard's trip to Europe and the ring that the Israelis planned to present to ██████████. (According to Pollard the Israelis believed that ██████████ was unaware of Pollard's espionage activity.) Pollard created a fictitious "Uncle Joe Fisher", a black sheep member of the family who was a diamond broker in Europe. Pollard thought of the name "Fisher" because it was his maternal grandmother's maiden name. ██████████ stated he would backstop this fiction by providing an "identification" for "Fisher" in New York. ██████████ and Pollard then prepared a letter to Pollard from "Uncle Joe" which explained how Pollard could afford the trip to Europe and referred to the ring as a present for ██████████. Pollard dictated the letter as ██████████ wrote it on Hilton letterhead stationery. Pollard stated that the Israelis said they would provide him the ring at their next meeting in the U. S., which they did.

Pollard told ██████████ that he would like for ██████████ to continue as his handler but was told that ██████████ had "important things" to do at his air base and it was important that they "isolate" ██████████ from the espionage operation.

Pollard was asked to explain his political beliefs to ██████████. Pollard told him that he did not want to do anything which would jeopardize the potential for long term residence in

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the U. S., explaining that ██████████ did not want to emigrate to Israel. ██████████ stated that they would never make Pollard "choose" between the U. S. and Israel, but ██████████ was conspicuously silent on this point.

According to Pollard both ██████████ and ██████████ argued that Pollard should not receive money because if he was caught it would make him seem more like a mercenary spy than a patriot spy. ██████████ was adamant that Pollard be paid, saying "This is salary. Every officer that works for me has a salary." Pollard advised that at the request of ██████████ he had brought his U. S. government Leave and Earning Statement to Paris with him. It was decided that Pollard would be paid at the same rate as his U. S. salary, i. e. \$1,500 per month.

At the same meeting ██████████ provided \$10,000 to \$11,000 cash to Pollard to cover the expense of his trip to Europe. Pollard was required to informally document the cost/estimated cost, show them his airline tickets, and advise of the cost of his suite at the Hilton.

Pollard stated that at the time of the Paris trip ██████████ had already reviewed at least some of the documents he had previously provided, including the Saudi Arabian Order of Battle material. Pollard advised that he was given no guidance on how to spend the money he was to be paid. ██████████ wanted operational meetings to occur in Europe and Pollard did not know at that time that ██████████ was assigned to New York. Pollard objected to that procedure because of having to take leave and other problems such as the Special Security Officer learning of Pollard travelling out of the U. S.

Other methods of compensation were also discussed. Pollard suggested the Israelis steer public relations business to ██████████ but ██████████ was opposed. Pollard said that ██████████ believed women should stay at home, not work. The possibility of a house being provided for Pollard in Washington was also discussed. ██████████ said it could also be used operationally as a safe house. ██████████ said the matter would be explored.

██████████ assured Pollard that, if anything happened to Pollard, ██████████ would be taken care of. ██████████ privately told Pollard that he knew Pollard and ██████████ were friends and assured him that he would be seeing ██████████ in the future, but only socially. ██████████ stated that under no circumstances should Pollard ever discuss operational matters with ██████████ or "show him anything."

At the conclusion of the second meeting in Paris, arrangements were made for the next operational meeting in the U. S., which was to occur on 21 January 1985, with alternate dates of 22 Jan and 23 Jan.

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Pollard stated that he immediately returned to work at the ATAC after returning from Europe. In addition to providing publications addressing the Israeli Essential Elements of Information (EEI), he started accumulating message traffic. There were three intelligence summaries that he obtained daily for the Israelis:

- (1) Mediterranean Littoral OPINTEL Summary-FOSIF Rota
- (2) Middle East and North Africa Summary - NSA
- (3) Indian Ocean Littoral Intelligence Summary - FOSIF WESTPAC

He also provided any message traffic which related to Arab intelligence services. ██████████ had specifically requested information concerning "PLO Force 17."

Pollard stated he established a routine for obtaining information. The DIA libraries were a "gold mine." He spent a lot of time at the Defense Intelligence Agency Center (DIAC) Building which contained the DIA Collateral Library, the DIA SI library and the "Central Repository" where all Defense Attache Office messages and other Intelligence Information Reports (IIR's) were available. Pollard advised that it was not necessary at that time for him to provide a certified request (DD Form) to obtain publications. He would simply fill in the requests himself after he located a document concerning an EEI. He would obtain IIR's through xeroxing, with no audit trail whatsoever. The Central Repository had a computer terminal which allowed him to scroll through IIR's originated by specific DAOs. The Israelis were interested in information concerning Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria and Pakistan, so he used the computer to review traffic from the DAOs at Baghdad, Damascus, Riyadh, Cairo, Algiers and Islamabad, copying anything that looked interesting. He then simply placed the material in his brief case and walked out of the building. If it was too late to return to the office, Pollard stored the material at his residence. Otherwise, he kept the material at his office in the ATAC, where he accumulated a large volume of material for the January 1985 meeting. He also routinely visited the NISC libraries.

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Because of the Presidential inauguration and other conflicts Pollard was unable to make the primary (21 Jan) or first alternate (22 Jan) meeting dates. At 1800/1900 on 22 January 1985 (Tuesday) Pollard went to the ATAC to pick up the material he had stored for delivery to ██████████. Because of the large amount of classified material involved, Pollard estimated that it took him about 4 to 5 hours to carry the material from the NIC-1 Building to his car, which was parked in the lot across the street from the front entrance. Pollard loaded material into his briefcase and carried it to the car, where he had stored five suitcases. The publications and messages were segregated because he had to return publications due to an audit

trail while the the messages/IIR's could be retained by the Israelis. Pollard estimated he made 15/20 trips to his car. There were 2 people on watch in the ATAC, but because of the physical layout in the spaces at that time, his actions could not be observed. He did walk over and talk to the watchstanders from time to time. The security guard at the front door of NIC-1 presented another problem. Since the building was locked after normal business hours it was necessary for Pollard to ring a bell to gain admittance. After a couple of trips Pollard told the guard (private security service) that he was moving material for a project he was working on to the NIC-2 building. (Pollard had a courier card authorizing him to remove material from the building.) The guard said that he did not want to keep opening the door for Pollard so a block was placed in the door, enabling Pollard to enter without restriction. After the document transfer was completed Pollard drove home and stored the suitcases in his residence overnight, after telling [REDACTED] to stay in the living room and watch TV while he brought them in.

On Wednesday, 23 January 1985, Pollard transported the classified material to the Deborah Street house. Pollard believed that he called in sick that day, since it was a normal work day.

Pollard was met by [REDACTED] and a third man he believed lived in the Deborah Street house. (Pollard subsequently identified a photograph of [REDACTED] as "similar" in appearance to the third man.) [REDACTED] was "amazed" at the volume of material and started examining it right away. At this meeting, Pollard also provided his NIS credentials, NIC access badge and ONI courier card, which were xeroxed and returned. The third man (possibly [REDACTED] carried the publications upstairs for copying and then returned them. Three of the suitcases contained material for which there was no audit trail and which, therefore, did not have to be copied. Pollard recalled that he observed the third man take Ilford color photographic film from a refrigerator in the kitchen and carry it upstairs. The third man also had a Hasselblad camera in his possession.

At this meeting the regular schedule was established. Pollard was given the key to an apartment on Van Ness Street N.W. in Washington ([REDACTED] apartment). Pollard was also given two black leather brief cases to facilitate removing documents. Pollard was to make drops at the apartment every other Friday and [REDACTED] would copy the publications. On the last Saturday of each month Pollard was to have operational meetings with [REDACTED] at the apartment.

[REDACTED] mentioned the RASIN manual as a specific EEI ([REDACTED] had also requested this document in Paris.) Pollard understood this manual dealt with signals intelligence but knew nothing else.

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Pollard was to leave material for [REDACTED] to copy on Fridays and return to pick up the following Saturday or Sunday, depending on what day he and [REDACTED] agreed to. This procedure held until a second apartment was obtained in the same building for copying material. Then it was sometimes possible to complete the copying while Pollard waited.

Pollard advised that it became his practice to hold material he viewed as particularly significant until the meetings on the last Saturday of the month so he could discuss it with [REDACTED]

During the February 1985 meeting with [REDACTED] Pollard was shown the first chapter of the RASIN manual and learned it was a National Security Agency (NSA) publication. [REDACTED] told Pollard that the Israelis were able to access the uplink of the Soviet Military Assistance Group (MAG) in Damascus. The Israelis needed the RASIN manual to see if it would be economically and technically feasible to decrypt these signals.

Pollard advised that during the early phase of the operation the joint Egyptian/Argentine Condor missile became a prime EEI. He was subsequently shown an Israeli intelligence report, written in Hebrew, derivative of the Condor information he provided. Pollard claimed that Israel had only been aware that Egypt was attempting to build a medium range ballistic missile and little else. Pollard contacted [REDACTED] at NISC-40 (naval missiles) regarding the Condor and was given the name of an analyst at DIA who had material on the missile. Pollard contacted and visited the DIA analyst who provided him his complete folder on the Condor and showed him where the copy machine was located. As a cover story Pollard told the DIA analyst that NIS was working a Technology Transfer case on an Egyptian missile engineer who was approaching U. S. companies on the West Coast for information.

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During each meeting with [REDACTED] Pollard would be provided an evaluation of the information passed the previous month. Pollard would also be given a "classified" briefing on developments in the Middle East, including Israeli intelligence collection on Arab Countries. [REDACTED] would sometimes show Pollard actual Israeli reports including clandestine ground level photographs of Arab targets.

Pollard stated that except for the letter seized from his residence concerning Kharg Island, the monthly briefings to [REDACTED] were verbal. The letter recovered at the time of his arrest was a draft of the letter he actually provided [REDACTED] the previous month (October 1985). His comments in that letter regarding concealing the letter from [REDACTED], were provided to ensure that the Israelis believed [REDACTED] was unaware of his espionage activity.

Pollard said the Israelis were concerned they would be the victims of a "technical Pearl Harbor" unless they were fully aware of weapons systems and technology available to the Arabs.

The long term goals of the operation, as defined in Israel by ██████ during their second meeting, were for Pollard to work for 10 years then emigrate to Israel. \$30,000 per year would be deposited in a Swiss Bank under Pollard's new name, "Danny Cohen." Pollard was shown an Israeli passport in this name with his picture affixed.

Pollard said that he was very satisfied with his performance and service to Israel, but by November 1985 he believed he had done enough and was considering resigning from the Navy, although he had not discussed this with the Israelis. Pollard believed he had given Israel enough information "to win the next war." Pollard said he was personally having problems justifying his espionage activity. What he was doing was obviously illegal and he wanted certain things from life which were not compatible with being a spy; for example, starting a family. Secondly, Pollard realized his actions were fundamentally dishonest. He analyzed his situation as similar to "loving two women and cheating on both. It doesn't matter that both are virtuous, you still feel hollow inside."

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Pollard stated that he was given no cover story to use if his activities were detected. The Israelis simply told him not to worry about it. ("If the U. S. finds out they won't do anything about it.") When he called ██████ on the night of 18/19 November 85, to tell him he was in trouble ██████ asked "Do they know who it is?" Pollard had been given three voice signals to use when apprising ██████ of an emergency. The term "10%" meant Pollard could not make a meeting; "20%" meant war was imminent in the Middle East; "30%" meant Pollard was in trouble. He mentioned 30% in the call to ██████ Pollard was also given an emergency telephone number to call in the Washington area, but forgot it. ██████ told Pollard "keep quiet for 3 days." Pollard interpreted this to mean that ██████ needed three days to arrange an escape plan.

On 20 November 1985, having heard nothing from ██████ Pollard called the Israeli Embassy and asked for the "Security Officer." He asked this person if he had "received any information from ██████ or ██████ or ██████ regarding two packages that were coming in." The Israeli said there was "no longer any ██████ in the United States." Pollard claimed he told the security officer he was "an agent who needed to come in." The Israeli said "any Jew who is in trouble should come to the Embassy." Pollard commented to the Israeli that he had a problem with surveillance. The Israeli said he should lose

the surveillance and repeated his previous comment about Jews in trouble coming to the Embassy. Pollard then told the Israeli that he would come in to the Embassy the next day and would be driving a red Mustang. He told the Israeli what time to expect him.

Pollard said that when he and [REDACTED] approached the gate of the Israeli Embassy on the morning of 21 November 1985, the gate swung open as he drove up, so he proceeded directly into the Embassy grounds. A car which was parked by the gate pulled in behind him. Pollard stopped near the Embassy building and the second car pulled in behind him. Pollard and the driver of the second car both got out and after greetings the man embraced him. A second man, who identified himself as "Security" came out of the embassy and greeted Pollard. Pollard stated that this man's voice was the same as the person who had spoken to him on the phone the previous day. The "security" man then walked back to the gate and talked with an FBI agent from the surveillance team who was standing outside the embassy grounds. When he returned the "security" man said, "I hate to tell you this - you have to leave." Pollard claims he said "Do you know who I am. Do you know how important it is for me to get to Israel? Can I claim the right of return?" The Security man then said, "It is not permitted. You can leave now or I will let them in."

Pollard stated that during his initial interrogations by NIS/FBI he had picked [REDACTED] as his fictitious "handler" because he believed [REDACTED] met the profile of a spy and would occupy U. S. authorities for the 72 hours needed for [REDACTED] to arrange his escape. Pollard denied this was a pre-arranged plan, just something he worked out on the spur of the moment.

Pollard advised that on one occasion he had been given his monthly payment by [REDACTED] otherwise [REDACTED] paid him. Pollard denied that [REDACTED] performed any function other than copying documents.

Pollard said he learned of intelligence analyst jobs being available at the Naval Intelligence Command through [REDACTED] who he met on one occasion at TRW. Pollard did not specifically recall why he was visiting TRW.

When dealing with the Israelis Pollard never told them of the previous incident involving the South African Defense Attache which resulted in the loss of his security clearance. Pollard said he approached the South Africans on his own initiative (1979/80) in order to obtain information on a Soviet ship transiting the South Atlantic that was of interest to the U. S. Navy. Pollard was given a photograph of the ship in

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question by the South African and Pollard later gave the South African a photograph of a Soviet submarine stationed at Luanda (Pollard obtained the photograph from work.) Pollard said he reported this contact to his Navy supervisor and was later put in contact with TF-168, which wanted to collect information on the South African through Pollard. Pollard later attended a joint TF-168/CIA meeting regarding his South African contact. Pollard claimed that CIA wanted to take over the operation but TF-168 insisted on retaining control. Pollard denied that Israeli intelligence had anything to do with that matter. According to Pollard, his only contact with CIA regarding the South African episode was the joint meeting with TF-168.

Pollard advised that he and Yagur discussed the attitude of U. S. personnel toward the State of Israel in general, but never went so far as discussing individuals.

Pollard denied that he ever provided the disclosure guidance for U. S./IDF Intelligence Exchange meetings to the Israelis. The disclosure guidance found at his residence was inadvertently retained by Pollard, who attended the exchange meeting it concerned, but was not given to the Israelis.

Regarding U. S. intelligence exchange agreements with Arab and other countries, Pollard stated that he was not aware of these agreements so could not have provided any details of them to Israel. Pollard conceded that some of the finished intelligence product he provided to Israel could have been derivative of material obtained through exchange agreements, but he was unaware of specifics. Likewise, some of the U. S. material provided Israel contained caveats indicating the U. S. shared the information with specific countries, i.e. "CANUKUS."

The Israelis seemed to have a good understanding of code words and tags used on U. S. classified material but asked Pollard if he would provide a table defining all code words. Pollard claimed he never provided the table.

During his second meeting with [REDACTED] in Tel Aviv (August 1985), Pollard was informed that \$30,000 per year would be deposited in a Swiss Bank account under the name "Danny Cohen" which was to be Pollard's Israeli name. Additionally, Pollard's "salary" was increased to \$2,500 per month because of the value of the material he was providing. Pollard was shown an index prepared by the Israelis which reflected all information he had provided. This index included messages and IIR's as well as publications.

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Pollard stated that he was becoming concerned about his own safety, particularly in light of ██████ desire for the operation to last 10 years. In his mind, Pollard wanted to give the Israelis enough information to "win the next war" but he didn't want to continue for 10 years. He requested a second meeting with ██████ at which he expressed these concerns. ██████ response was that Pollard should follow orders. Subsequently, Pollard was given another \$2,000 by ██████ at ██████ direction and told to calm down.

Pollard advised that ██████ had inquired about the Middle East Arms Transfer (MEAT) working group (a U. S. inter-agency committee coordinating military hardware assistance) and asked if it were possible for Pollard to get on the committee. It was not possible because the MEAT was made up of senior U. S. officials. That was the only occasion Pollard was asked to join a group of that kind.

Pollard claimed he was tasked to obtain a specific FBI counterintelligence study but did not. According to Pollard, he did not believe the Israelis had a need for this information.

Pollard advised that he never had direct or indirect contact with any Israeli political figures; however, after the Tunis raid ██████ informed Pollard that "people at the highest levels of government" expressed their deepest appreciation for the information.

According to Pollard the Israelis never mentioned any official contacts with the Soviet Intelligence Service.

Pollard did not recall the Israelis targeting specific U. S. intelligence programs, although ██████ did specifically task Pollard to obtain documents relating to the GRANITE and HAVE programs, which apparently relate to foreign material exploitation.

██████ casually questioned Pollard about the Walker/Whitworth espionage cases, wanting to know what damage was done. He also asked about Morison, since Pollard had worked with Morison. ██████ expressed no interest in the Pelton or Chin cases.

Pollard was never directed to slant his own intelligence analysis so it would be more beneficial to Israel.

The Israelis never expressed interest in methods of communications used by U.S. Intelligence, COMSEC deficiencies, U. S. crypto systems, or keying material.

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Pollard was never asked to provide the names of analysts who were pro or anti Israeli.

The interview was terminated at 1515 in order for Pollard to be transported to the Washington Metropolitan Correction Center.

REPORTED BY


S/A NIS HQ

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RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH JONATHAN JAY POLLARD AS
RECORDED BY SPECIAL AGENT [REDACTED] ON
29 JULY 1986, IN WASHINGTON, D.C.

JONATHAN JAY POLLARD was interviewed beginning at 0930, 29 July 1986, at the United States District Court Building, Washington, D.C., by Reporting Agent and Special Agent [REDACTED], Naval Investigative Service (NIS), Special Agents [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and [REDACTED] OPNAV Damage Assessment. Pollard began by clarifying some points from the 24 July 1986, interview. He advised that his third meeting with [REDACTED] in Washington had occurred during the period of 15 to 21 July 1984. He arrived at these dates because the meeting occurred about one week before a dinner attended by Pollard and [REDACTED] with [REDACTED] and his wife, at the Four Ways Restaurant, Washington, D.C. (Agent's note: The date of that dinner, 28 July 1984, has been confirmed by credit card receipts.)

Concerning the daily intelligence summaries, Pollard advised that three separate summaries were provided to Israel. Pollard believed there were very few gaps in coverage as he had been "very thorough". The three summaries were the (1) Middle East and North Africa summary, originated by the National Security Agency (NSA), which was provided from mid July 1984, until his detection in mid November 1985; (2) the Indian Ocean Littoral Intelligence Summary, originated by FOSIF WESTPAC, from mid July 1984, until his detection; and (3) the Mediterranean Littoral OPINTEL Summary, originated by FOSIF Rota, which was provided from the time the Navy Anti-Terrorist Alert Center was placed on standard distribution for that document (approximately 1 Aug 84) until his detection.

Pollard claimed that his monthly compensation was raised from \$1,500 to \$2,500 during the Spring of 1985, by the Israelis based on their evaluation of the value of the material he was providing. Pollard said he did not request the raise but was informed of it by [REDACTED] when the increase took place. [REDACTED] had already been informed of the pay raise by "Tel Aviv" and the pay envelope at that meeting contained the extra \$1,000. Pollard stated that his second trip to Europe during July/August 1985, and personal meeting with [REDACTED] had nothing to do with the pay raise, which was already in effect by that time. Pollard stated that the pay raise was not "retroactive" to the beginning of the operation, however he only received "a couple" of \$1,500 payments before the increase.

Pollard advised that from the outset of the operation it had been understood that he and [REDACTED] would visit Israel about

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the time of their marriage. Initially there had been the thought that the wedding would take place in Israel but the Israelis had vetoed the plan because the required rabbinical investigation would have focused too much attention on Pollard and [REDACTED]. The Pollards next choice was Venice, Italy, where the wedding actually took place. The dates for the second European trip were established by the Spring of 1985. The Israelis portrayed the trip as a "homecoming" of sorts for Pollard and a preview of what his life would be like if he emigrated to Israel at the conclusion of the operation. Prior to the trip Yagur asked if Pollard knew anyone assigned to the American Embassy or Defense Attache Office in Israel, which he did not. The Pollard's made their own travel arrangements through the Cal Simmons Travel Agency in Georgetown. Pollard was directed to check into the Hilton Hotel in Tel Aviv but not to occupy a suite, as they had in Paris, because it might draw attention to them.

Pollard stated that they flew direct from New York to Tel Aviv aboard El Al Airlines because Pollard believed security was better on the Israeli carrier. He commented that El Al security in New York almost did not let [REDACTED] on the flight because she did not "look Jewish."

The day of their arrival at the Tel Aviv Hilton [REDACTED] telephonically contacted Pollard and arranged to meet them at the hotel the next day. [REDACTED] explained that his wife, [REDACTED] would take [REDACTED] sightseeing while he and Pollard visited the "Old Man" at the hospital. Pollard questioned going to the hospital for security reasons as there might be Americans in the area but [REDACTED] assured him that the hospital was secure and that the ward would be kept "clean" during the visit.

[REDACTED] picked Pollard up the next morning as arranged and they proceeded to the Ophthalmic Ward of the Beilinson Hospital, while the women went sightseeing. Pollard noted there was a guard in civilian clothes outside [REDACTED] room. The guard, who Pollard claimed was an Iraqi Jew, started to search Pollard but was stopped by [REDACTED]. Pollard described the hospital room as small and somewhat sparse, containing only one bed. A nurse was cleaning [REDACTED] eye when they entered so the interview did not start until she finished. Pollard stated that [REDACTED] did not look well and his eye looked "terrible." After the nurse left and greetings were exchanged [REDACTED] advised Pollard that they would meet both in the morning and afternoon.

During the morning meeting [REDACTED] went over a printed compendium of the material passed by Pollard up to that time. Pollard stated that the material was listed in a print out and

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included both publications and messages. The publications were listed by title and serial number, the messages by date time group, and the Intelligence Information Reports (IIR's) by originating Defense Attache Office and IIR number. Pollard recalled that periodic messages, such as the Mediterranean Littoral OPINTEL summary were grouped chronologically, such as 011907ZMAY85 to 301907ZMAY85. The only unusual observation by Pollard was that the NPIC document showing bomb damage to the Tuwaitha Nuclear Facility in Iraq was not included in the listing. Pollard believed that ██████████ had requested that document for personal reasons, since he had been Commander of the raid, and did not provide it to ██████████ or ██████████

According to Pollard it was never clear why ██████████ went over the documents with him. ██████████ commented favorably on the quality of the information being provided and its value to the State of Israel. He stated that the information was crucial and the volume being provided far exceeded their expectations. Pollard advised that the Israelis continued to express amazement that so much information could be obtained and he developed the opinion that the Israelis had thought that U. S. security procedures "were as good as their own."

██████████ told Pollard that the "RASIN" documents had already been put to operational use and were of assistance to the Israelis working on exploiting the satellite uplink at the Soviet Military Assistance Group Headquarters in Damascus. Pollard understood ██████████ to say that the manuals helped them "break out" the specific signals the Israelis were interested in without the necessary time and expense which would have been involved otherwise. ██████████ stated that eventually they would be able to "read" the signals "then the fun would begin." ██████████ described the information the Israelis hoped to obtain from the uplink as an Indications and Warning asset and that in the event of hostilities the intercepts would be crucial. Israel believed the Soviets would be completely intergrated into the Syrian military command, control and communications system.

Pollard stated that ██████████ gave him and update briefing on the Middle East situation as it pertained to countries the Israelis considered to be their greatest threat. Pollard claimed he had given the Israelis a DIA study which detailed an invasion scenario wherein Syria would attack Israel across the Golan Heights. The study estimated that the Syrians could recapture the occupied territory. ██████████ commented that the study had caused consternation among Israeli planners since it varied considerably from Israeli estimates of Syrian capabilities.

There were stacks of newspapers in the room giving Pollard the impression that ██████████ eyesight was not too badly

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impaired. According to Pollard, ██████████ was unaware that they might have to live in Israel for a period of time after the operation ended. He envisioned living in Israel for a while then moving to a country in Europe where ██████████ would be happy and he could continue to work for Israel.

After the morning session, ██████████ took Pollard to a steak house near the hospital for lunch, which was strictly social. Pollard advised that he still thought that ██████████ lived in Israel and did not find out otherwise until after his arrest. ██████████ talked about a house he was building in Israel and problems he was having with contractors and the required bomb shelter.

Upon returning to the hospital, ██████████ began a general discussion on security which revolved around the fact that Pollard should not be concerned about his safety. ██████████ stated that the operation was being managed consistent with Pollard's ideology, i.e. that nothing which would jeopardize U. S. lives would be targeted nor would they target the U. S. per se, only enemies common to the U. S. and Israel. Pollard claimed he told ██████████ that he was still concerned about what would happen to he and ██████████ if he was detected. ██████████ assured him that "no drastic action would be taken against you - it hasn't happened in the past. We (Israel) haven't taken action on the U. S. collecting here." ██████████ stated that if something did go wrong Israel would take care of him. Pollard asked for details and specifics of these planned actions but ██████████ dismissed the topic. According to Pollard this meeting was more of an argument than a discussion and at one point the guard looked into the room because the conversation had become so heated. In the midst of the argument ██████████ informed Pollard that they were setting up a Swiss bank account for him into which the Israelis would deposit \$30,000 per year. ██████████ stated that \$30,000 represented what his salary would be if he were working in Israel. ██████████ said the account would be in Pollard's "new name" and he would be given an Israeli passport with the new identity. ██████████ stated "we are taking a long range view of this. You will be working for 10 years, then will bow out and relocate here." Pollard stated that ██████████ who was present during both sessions, put his head down when ██████████ made these comments. Pollard stated that he was emotionally devastated by ██████████ revelation that the operation would continue for 10 years and was unable to respond. The interview was terminated shortly thereafter by ██████████. The afternoon session had lasted about one hour.

Pollard claimed he was told two things he had never heard before, the anticipated 10 year commitment and the planned Swiss bank account.

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On the ride back to the hotel ██████ was very quiet but did comment, "You're obviously not ready for this." Pollard replied in the affirmative and told him that he was particularly concerned about the 10 year long range plan. ██████ suggested that Pollard just relax and enjoy his trip for the time being.

The next day Pollard and ██████ moved to the King David Hotel in Jerusalem and were provided a tour guide with car by the Israelis. They visited the Golan, Massada, Jerico and a Palestinian refugee camp. At one point the guide commented to Pollard that it was unusual that the Prime Minister's Office call and arrange for the "best" tour guide available for the Pollards. The guide, who spoke good English, stated that he was a veteran of the Jewish Brigade (from England) in World War II. Pollard said that the services of the guide were paid for by the Israelis for a three day period.

Pollard stated that he continued to worry about his future with the Israelis and two days into the tour he telephonically contacted ██████ at his "home" and told him he wanted to see the "Old Man" again. Pollard wanted to know what specific actions the Israelis would take if something went wrong. He was also concerned that the Israelis assure him of attribution if his actions were detected. ██████ told Pollard to return to the Tel Aviv Hilton by taxi and he would arrange another meeting with ██████. On the taxi ride back from Jerusalem ██████ drove up behind Pollard's taxi and blew his horn. Pollard switched to ██████ car and they returned to the hospital.

According to Pollard he "exploded" on ██████ telling of his concerns for security. ██████ told him he better calm down because ██████ was already angry that Pollard had demanded a second meeting. After arriving at the hospital Pollard was directed to the security office rather than ██████ room. ██████ stormed into the room, obviously agitated and in some physical discomfort as he was holding one hand over his injured eye. The following meeting lasted only 15 to 20 minutes according to Pollard. Pollard informed ██████ that the whole operation "stunk." He wanted to know how it had been decided that the operation would continue for 10 years and what specific plans had been made for his protection. ██████ told Pollard he had nothing to worry about, that the Swiss bank account was being set up and that if anything happened ██████ would be protected. ██████ concluded the discussion by stating, "OK look, we'll give you a couple of thousand more dollars. Have a good time in Europe. End of discussion, I've had it. I'm running this operation." ██████ drove Pollard back to the

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Hilton where he took a taxi back to Jerusalem. That night, during a strictly social dinner with [REDACTED] and his wife, Pollard was given an envelope containing \$12,000, which Pollard assumed contained the \$2,000 referred to by [REDACTED]. The next day the Pollards left Israel and continued their trip through Europe without any further contact with the Israelis.

Pollard advised that in preparation for both his trips to Europe he advised the Naval Intelligence Command Security Office of his intention to travel outside of the U. S., as required by his security clearance. Pollard stated that he put in for annual leave for both trips. He thought he might have exceeded his annual leave credit on the books however he was not charged for leave without pay on either occasion.

When asked how he concealed his attitude toward Israel when dealing with topics concerning that country during his normal duties at the Anti-terrorist Alert Center (ATAC), Pollard stated he attempted to stay neutral concerning Israel so not to draw attention to his personal attitudes.

Pollard stated that the Israelis were not particularly interested in U. S. intelligence material related to Arab terrorist organizations. Early in the operation he had provided several documents on these topics and had been informed by the Israelis that they had better information than the U. S. so not to provide any more.

After some thought about meeting dates, Pollard advised that he may have had one meeting during December 1984, with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] house on Deborah Street. Pollard believed on that occasion [REDACTED] gave him the ring for [REDACTED] purchased in Paris and the "Uncle Joe Fisher" letter. If that were the case, according to Pollard, then the meeting at Deborah Street, when he saw the individual who appeared to reside at the the house with the camera and film, would have been during July 1984.

When it was pointed out to Pollard that almost all of the classified material seized from his residence dealt with two geographic areas, sub-Saharan Africa and the Indian subcontinent, Pollard stated that most of the material was for his own consumption, since both areas were of personal interest to him. Pollard stated, however, that he did provide some classified material to [REDACTED] for use in planning trips into Afghanistan. After reviewing lists of documents seized at his residence, Pollard identified the following documents which were read, or in one instance removed from the residence for several hours by [REDACTED]

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IIR 2 760 0210 84 AF/PK Border Crossing Points Under
Control of Afghan Military and Mujahidin Forces
Originated by US Army CDR USA OPSGP Ft Meade

DIADIN 277-6A Afghanistan: Situation Report
Originated by Defense Intelligence Agency

IIR 2 762 0135 84 Developments in the United Front of
Afghanistan
Originated by US Army CDR USA OPSGP Ft Meade

IIR 2 760 0217 84 Fundamentalist Alliance Views Toward
Return of King Zahir
Originated by US ARMY CDR USA OPSGP Ft Meade

IIR 2 760 0211 84 Mujahidin Use of Documentation for
Travel in AF
Originated by US ARMY CDR USA OPSGP Ft Meade

DIADIN 271-11A Pakistan: Afghan Refugee Problem
Increasing
Originated by Defense Intelligence Agency

DDB-2600-3493-84 Soviet Military Options Against Pakistan
Originated by Defense Intelligence Agency ([REDACTED] removed this
document from Pollard's residence for several hours.)

Pollard stated that the following documents seized from his
residence had been provided to the Israelis:

3/00/11907-85 (Classified Subject)
Originated by National Security Agency

IIR 6 844 0041 84 AN-32 Aircraft in India for Demonstration
Originated by Defense Intelligence Agency (USDAO New Delhi)

Intelligence Quarterly Autumn 1980
Article Entitled Coastal Missile Artillery Force: Soviet
Union and Warsaw Pact
Originated by Canadian Ministry of National Defense

DIADIN 276-17A USSR-Afghanistan: Electronic Warfare
Originated by Defense Intelligence Agency

ATC-AA-2660-005-84 Army Intelligence Survey, Saudi Arabia,
Vol II, Part VI, Chapters 7 through 9
Originated by US Army Threat Center

Pollard stated that he met [REDACTED] in 1984, before he was
assigned to the ATAC, at a party given by [REDACTED]

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Pollard at that time believed ██████████ to be a "Capitol Hill Type" since he talked about his contacts in the Congress. ██████████ was preparing for a trip to Afghanistan where he planned to film Mujahidin rebels operating against Soviet forces. Pollard recalled being very impressed with ██████████ conservative "credentials" and contacts. He next met ██████████ coincidentally at a party on Capitol Hill. Pollard did not recall who was giving the party, but ██████████ had by this time returned from a trip to Afghanistan. ██████████ was very candid about his connections with Pakistani intelligence. Later in their relationship Pollard visited ██████████ residence where he saw expensive gifts, such as a snow leopard coat, which ██████████ attributed to the Pakistanis. ██████████ also claimed close association with Saudi Arabian officials especially "Prince Bandar." One area of interest to ██████████ was the need of the Mujahidin for air transportation in and out of operational areas. Pollard mentioned the possibility of ultra light aircraft, about which ██████████ was very enthused. As a result, Pollard introduced ██████████, who was interested in ultra light aircraft as a hobby, to ██████████ ██████████ who worked at the Naval Intelligence Support Center, ██████████ and Pollard developed a plan to sell ultra lights to foreign governments for profit. Pollard actually discussed this matter with representatives of Kenya and Sri Lanka but nothing came of it.

Pollard stated that during his relationship with ██████████ he was introduced to two individuals who ██████████ identified as representatives of East German and Finnish intelligence respectively, although Pollard did not know if they actually were. No intelligence matters were discussed with these individuals in Pollard's presence. ██████████ also showed Pollard documents bearing classification markings which ██████████ claimed were given to him by ██████████, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Pollard claimed he read documents in ██████████ possession concerning how U. S. funds were provided to the Mujahidin through various cut outs to conceal its origin and how Yugoslavian arms were likewise being shipped to the Mujahidin on the "North West Frontier" of Pakistan by U. S. military attaches in Islamabad. These documents involved what Pollard described as DIA covert operations and contained code words he had never seen before. Lohbeck referred to "my sources at DIA" when discussing the documents. Pollard stated that ██████████ never indicated these "sources" were not legitimate. The documents dealt with contracts and monetary transactions. ██████████ also had classified maps showing Soviet positions in Afghanistan. Pollard stated he provided ██████████ with the documents previously described for review at both ██████████ and Pollard's

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apartments. After [redacted] returned from his first trip to Afghanistan he showed videos of Mujahidin attacks on Soviet columns. The rebels were using rocket propelled munitions and were having little success hitting targets. Pollard claims he told [redacted] that the Mujahidin should be using wire guided anti-tank missiles, which were available on the open market and much more accurate. [redacted] liked this idea and allegedly discussed the matter with [redacted], the Pakistani Defense Attache. [redacted] according to [redacted], agreed to act as an intermediary for the purchase of these weapons. Pollard claims that they decided on the Argentine "Mathogo" wire guided missile as weapon which would meet the Mujahidin needs. [redacted] wanted to broker the sale but had little knowledge of weapons, so it was agreed that Pollard would approach the Argentine Embassy. Pollard claims that he told [redacted] he would be unable to officially become involved because of his status as a government employee but that [redacted] could. Pollard then went to the Argentine Embassy using a fictitious name and talked to an attache, [redacted], who seemed very optimistic about the sale. [redacted] (phonetic) wanted Pollard to come to Argentina, which was impossible under the circumstances. Pollard stated that [redacted] was very unreliable in that he drank heavily and used marijuana. [redacted] became personally involved in the negotiations and did little to further them. [redacted] legal advisor, [redacted] also was involved in negotiations with the Argentineans. These negotiations occurred in 1984 and 1985, after Pollard had been to Paris and was heavily involved with the Israelis. Several telex messages were sent from [redacted] office to Argentine representatives, but the negotiations eventually broke down. Pollard believed the Mujahidin obtained another weapon.

Pollard stated that on another occasion he got a phone call one morning from [redacted] who asked him to come to Dulles Airport with his NIS credentials to assist a Mujahidin leader named [redacted] get through passport control. [redacted] claimed that [redacted] was travelling under an illegal Afghan passport and was being detained by immigration officials. Pollard stated that he refused to get involved. Pollard claims he later met [redacted] at [redacted] residence. [redacted] showed Pollard an enlarged satellite photograph of the city of Kabul which [redacted] claimed was a gift to [redacted] from [redacted]. At parties [redacted] enjoyed entertaining attendees by telling them stories of his Afghanistan adventures and contacts in the U. S. intelligence community. Pollard stated that on one occasion [redacted] displayed a video camera which he claimed to have received from DIA. The camera had a snap on parabolic dish which [redacted] claimed enabled him to send pictures back to the U. S. through burst transmissions. Also at a party, [redacted] told of

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attending a meeting at the DIA headquarters building for a committee headed by ██████████ and attended by ██████████ ██████████ of NSA, concerning providing aide to the Mujahidin. ██████████ stated that a representative of British MI-6 was also at the meeting. ██████████ described the "South Asia War Room" on the 7th floor of the DIAC and stated the room had extensive Tempest shielding including copper wire grids and white noise generators in voids in the walls. Pollard claimed that he later called ██████████ aside and cautioned him about discussing British involvement since the Thatcher government was on record that it did not provide clandestine support to the Mujahidin. Pollard stated that ██████████ parties were attended by numerous conservative congressional staff personnel and representatives of conservative political organizations, such as the National Conservative Political Action Committee. ██████████ routinely discussed matters that Pollard considered classified in front of these individuals, none of whom had security clearances as far as Pollard knew. Pollard stated that during a party honoring ██████████ a limousine from the Saudi Arabian Embassy arrived, and the chauffeur brought in an envelope full of cash as a gift for the Mujahidin leader.

Pollard stated that on another occasion ██████████ invited him to ██████████ office to meet the "Mossad contact on the Hill." Pollard, who was already working for the Israelis by this time, went out of curiosity and met an Israeli who claimed to be an arms broker. At his next drop with ██████████ Pollard left a note for ██████████ requesting information on this individual. ██████████ later told Pollard that the person in question was not Mossad but "dirt" and that Pollard should stay away from him.

According to Pollard, ██████████ had relationships with Congressman Lujan and Congressman Jack Kemp. Pollard stated that ██████████ once told him ██████████ was blackmailing ██████████ because ██████████ was aware that the Congressman had received "kickbacks." According to ██████████, ██████████ had embezzled election contributions from ██████████ so their relationship was based upon mutual knowledge of each others criminal culpability. Pollard stated that to display his "clout" ██████████ once took Pollard to ██████████ office and called the Congressman out of a meeting for a meaningless discussion. Additionally, Pollard allegedly went with ██████████ to the office of Congressman Jack Kemp where they walked into the Congressman's personal office without an appointment. With Pollard present, ██████████ discussed the upcoming visit of ██████████ with Kemp and his desire to set up a meeting between ██████████ and President Reagan. Kemp took notes as ██████████ talked, according to Pollard. Pollard stated that he attended the Presidential Inaugural Ball in January 1985 at the Shoreham

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Hotel as [REDACTED] guest. [REDACTED] seemed well known and respected at this function. [REDACTED] claimed to Pollard that television networks paid him well for filming stories in Afghanistan, but that he had not paid U. S. income taxes for 10 years.

According to Pollard, the documents recovered from his residence relating to South Africa/Southern Africa were never passed to unauthorized persons. Pollard claimed he had obtained these documents because of personal interest in that geographic area.

Concerning contacts with foreign embassies, Pollard advised he visited the following facilities, always using fictitious names, for the purpose of seeking commercial contacts:

Republic of South Africa - Pollard had two meetings, first with a "diplomat" at a hotel just off Dupont Circle in Washington to discuss the sale of night vision scopes for the Mujahidin. The contact concerned sales through "NIMROD International" which Pollard claimed was an official government trade organization. Within days the South African representative [REDACTED] contacted Pollard with a price breakdown which Pollard passed to [REDACTED]. Pollard was unaware if [REDACTED] ever followed up on the contact. The arrangement was for Pollard, through [REDACTED] to receive a percentage of the sale as a commission if a contract was executed. There was a second short meeting with [REDACTED] at National Airport. [REDACTED] attended both meetings but, according to Pollard, no contract resulted.

Brazil - Pollard spoke to a female in the embassy about obtaining the "Cobra" wire guided missile. [REDACTED] also attended this meeting.

Taiwan - Pollard approached the "Office of Special Liaison" to discuss obtaining the "Bumblebee" wire guided missile.

France - Pollard approached them regarding purchasing the "Mistrial" infra red missile for the Mujahidin.

Argentina - As previously discussed, this was the only negotiation which appeared viable, but nothing resulted.

Sri Lanka - Pollard approached the embassy regarding ultra light aircraft but never followed up.

Keyna - As previously discussed, Pollard approached this embassy to discuss ultra light aircraft but never followed up.

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According to Pollard, [REDACTED] was aware of his efforts with and for [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was provided [REDACTED] name but was unaware of how extensive Pollard's dealings with [REDACTED] were.

Regarding his contact with [REDACTED] Royal Australian Navy, Pollard advised that [REDACTED] was a regular official visitor to the Naval Intelligence Support Center (NISC) while Pollard was employed by that command. Pollard provided [REDACTED] a copy of the official U. S. position regarding disengagement from New Zealand which was contained in a Secret message originated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Pollard stated that [REDACTED] was the only document he provided [REDACTED]. According to Pollard, [REDACTED] visits to NISC stopped about the time the Sam Morison espionage case became public knowledge.

The interview was terminated at 1520, 29 July 1986.

REPORTED BY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
SPECIAL AGENT
NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

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RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH JONATHAN JAY POLLARD AS RECORDED BY
SPECIAL AGENT [REDACTED] ON 30 JULY 1986, AT THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT BUILDING WASHINGTON, D.C.

JONATHAN JAY POLLARD was interviewed starting at 1100 hours, 30 July 1986 by Reporting Agent and Special Agent [REDACTED] Naval Investigative Service (NIS), Special Agents [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and [REDACTED], Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Damage Assessment Task Force. Miscellaneous hand-written notes found in Pollard's desk at the Anti-Terrorist Alert Center (ATAC) were discussed to clarify whether or not they represented intelligence tasking from Israeli intelligence officers. Pollard advised that most of the notes specifically related to tasking from [REDACTED]. Some of these notes were actually written down by Pollard during personal meetings with [REDACTED] on graph paper supplied by [REDACTED]. Pollard also noted that if an asterisk appeared next to a document or topic it indicated this item was of particular importance to the Israelis.

The name [REDACTED] which appeared in the notes refers to an analyst at the National Security Agency (NSA) who provided Pollard with an Egyptian Air Defense Command Control and Communications Study (COMINT Report - Disposition of Egyptian Air Defense Forces). Two other persons mentioned in this note, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were names Pollard received as contact points at NSA when making inquiries about the RASIN manuals. Pollard did not recall actually contacting either individual.

Pollard stated that [REDACTED] was aware of an FBI counterintelligence bulletin containing information on Israeli intelligence and wanted to obtain a copy. According to Pollard he provided a general FBI counterintelligence review document to [REDACTED], which contained no information on Israel, and informed [REDACTED] that Israel was not considered a "criteria country" by the FBI. Pollard stated that [REDACTED] understood the meaning of the term "criteria country".

To obtain the RASIN documents Pollard told a female employee of the distribution section at NSA that he needed the material for a study being undertaken at the ATAC. After obtaining the documents, Pollard simply walked out of the building with them. Pollard claimed he made two trips to NSA to obtain the RASIN documents and another trip to obtain the Egyptian Air Defense Study from [REDACTED].

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Pollard stated that he was tasked by ██████ to obtain classified maps of Iraq, Pakistan and Syria but while working on this project he was informed by ██████ that Israel had signed an agreement with the Defense Mapping Agency and was legitimately obtaining this material.

Regarding personal contact with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) personnel, Pollard stated he obtained two documents through telephonic contact with CIA analysts. The first document concerned Iraqi chemical warfare capability. Pollard stated he obtained the name and secure voice telephone number of the author of the study in question when he read the publication at the NISC library. Since CIA controlled distribution of this particular manual the library would not release a copy to Pollard so he called the author, whose name he was unable to recall, and requested a copy be mailed to the ATAC, Attention J. Pollard. The second document, which involved Libyan nuclear developments, was obtained in a similar manner. Pollard recalled the analyst he spoke with remarked that he sat next to the analyst who provided the Iraqi chemical document. Pollard claimed that all other CIA documents were obtained from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and Naval Intelligence Support Center (NISC) libraries.

Pollard advised that he obtained material from the DIAOLS/COINS data base by providing taskings to ██████ of the NISC Special Intelligence (SI) library. Pollard would provide topic codes to ██████, such as electronic order of battle for Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Libya, then come back later to pick up the data. Pollard used an index available at the DIAOLS/COINS space to structure his searches of the data base. Pollard recalled requesting runs of Egyptian air fields, Arab intelligence services and terrorism from the DIAOLS/COINS data base. He tasked the DIAOLS/COINS system periodically throughout the operation but less than 10 times total.

Pollard noted that he first became aware of the presence of a ██████ system in Syria from the Chief of Naval Operations daily intelligence notes. ██████ was concerned about the Romona system because the Israelis did not know that the system had been deployed to Syria. Pollard stated that he went to NISC Code 50 (Electro-Magnetic Systems Department), obtained everything available on the Romona system and passed it to ██████. At the next meeting after passing the material, ██████ advised Pollard that the Israeli Air Force had been able to target all the Romona sites in Syria and planned to capture a complete system during the next hostilities.

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According to Pollard he was tasked by ██████ to obtain information on "CIRES" which he believed to be a Syrian R&D facility. ██████ advised that CIA had information regarding CIRES but Pollard was unable to locate anything on that topic. Yagur also thought that Egypt had published a study on the Israeli Air Force which he tasked Pollard to obtain, however Pollard was unable to locate the study. Likewise, ██████ requested information on Syrian remotely piloted vehicles which Pollard was unable to locate.

Reference is made in Pollard's notes to TABA, a geographic area of dispute between Israel and Egypt. ██████ requested Pollard obtain the U. S. State Department position on the dispute. Pollard claimed he never attempted to locate that information.

Pollard stated he was thinking about setting up a system which would allow him to automatically download selected data directly from the IAIPS computer system into his personal computer. He would then have been able to remove floppy discs from the building rather than hard copy messages, which would have been much more secure. Pollard claimed that it would have taken about six more months for this system to have been put into effect. He based this estimate on when the JSOC/IAIPS interface was due to come on line in the ATAC. ██████ knew computer systems and Pollard had discussed with him the feasibility of providing floppy discs vice hard copy. ██████ had concurred in the proposal. Pollard stated that he never mentioned any of the specific plans with ██████ - such as the JSOC/IAIPS interface. Likewise, the Israelis never discussed gaining direct access to any of the computer systems available to Pollard.

According to Pollard the DESIST computer data base was available in the ATAC but it was very difficult to use and he never gained the skill to access it. ATAC personnel derisively referred to the system as "resist" and only ██████ was able to routinely make the DESIST system operate. ██████ was also able to "break into" the NSA computer system through FLASHBOARD and cause NSA eyes only traffic to print out in the ATAC.

Pollard related that the receipt system in use by the NISC libraries was deficient. ATAC personnel would often sign for material addressed to other analysts. As a result the audit trail at NISC often showed the material being signed out to the wrong person. Pollard claimed that while he was working at NAVOPINTCEN it was common for personnel who had signed for classified material to be unable to locate it during subsequent

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accountability checks by the library. The person who could not account for the document would simply send a memo to the security officer stating that the material in question had been inadvertently destroyed, which cleared the missing document from the books. The interview was terminated at 1415 hours.

REPORTED BY: 

SPECIAL AGENT
NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

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RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH JONATHAN JAY POLLARD AS RECORDED
BY SPECIAL AGENT [REDACTED] ON 5 AUGUST 1986, AT
PETERSBURG, VIRGINIA

Jonathan J. POLLARD was interviewed beginning at 0922 hours, 5 August 1986, by Reporting Agent and Special Agent [REDACTED] Naval Investigative Service (NIS), Special Agents [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and [REDACTED], Chief of Naval Operations Damage Assessment Task Force.

POLLARD began by clarifying some points from previous debriefings. The 72 hour Syrian attack scenario which involved a two pronged attack on Israel from the Bekaa Valley and across the Golan Heights was presented by [REDACTED]. POLLARD stated he provided the Israelis with a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) study estimating that a Syrian attack at Golan would have only a better than average chance of retaking occupied territory in that area. POLLARD claimed he obtained the DIA study from the "Central Repository" at the Defense Intelligence Agency Center (DIAC). It was published in 1984/85, was approximately three inches thick and contained about 100 maps. POLLARD believed the document was either a study or estimate.

Regarding his plan for obtaining message traffic directly on his personal computer, POLLARD stated the procedure was to have assisted him in the logistics of moving large numbers of messages. It would have also been a more secure method of removing material from his office at the Anti-Terrorist Alert Center (ATAC) in the NIC-1 Building. The fact of the upcoming JSOC interface with the IAIPS computer was known to POLLARD but not the Israelis, who never mentioned JSOC.

POLLARD stated that during the December 1984 meeting on Deborah Street, he was given the keys to [REDACTED] apartment on Van Ness Street, N.W. in Washington by [REDACTED] and the future meeting schedule was established. POLLARD was not given the garage door opener for [REDACTED] building until a later meeting. The schedule called for bi-weekly drops of material with [REDACTED] and monthly meetings with [REDACTED]. POLLARD agreed that the 23 January 1985 meeting was out of sequence but was unable to recall why. He speculated that the change could have been predicated upon the three day weekend associated with the Presidential inauguration which was just prior to the meeting. In any case, the date for the January meeting with [REDACTED] was arrived at during the December 1984 meeting. POLLARD stated that neither he nor the Israelis realized how large the volume of material would be for the January meeting. When he actually started assembling the material in the ATAC he was surprised by the volume.

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POLLARD recalled that at the 23 January 1985 meeting, at [redacted] apartment, a second woman was present and assisted [redacted] carrying the material into the back room. POLLARD never saw this woman again, never learned her name, and is unable to identify her. As [redacted] and POLLARD finished reviewing documents they would be passed to [redacted] and the second woman and removed to the back room. Since none of the material left the apartment POLLARD surmised that it was being copied in the back room.

While in Paris during November 1984, POLLARD was directed by [redacted] to obtain passport photographs of himself and [redacted]. The Israelis did not offer instructions on where to have the photographs taken. POLLARD and [redacted] happened to walk by a photo kiosk on the Champs Elysee across from the Turkish Cultural Center so they used the opportunity to obtain the photographs.

POLLARD stated that [redacted] had been outraged by the killing of three Israelis in Cyprus by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). [redacted] specifically mentioned that PLO Force 17 was responsible for the act. [redacted] stated that the victims were civilians. POLLARD did not get the impression that [redacted] personally knew any of them.

According to POLLARD, [redacted] was concerned that Israel might be considered a "criteria" country because of technology transfer investigations and operations being conducted by the FBI.

During the Paris trip [redacted] was accompanied during shopping excursions by [redacted] and [redacted]. The wife of [redacted] was not present to POLLARD's knowledge.

POLLARD advised that he first met the South African, [redacted] while working on a research project in Washington for the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. POLLARD went to the Republic of South Africa Embassy and met [redacted] in the Attache Office. About two months later [redacted] invited POLLARD to an Attache function at Fort Myer. At a later date POLLARD mailed a book, "Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire" by [redacted], to [redacted] in care of the South African Embassy. POLLARD claimed that when he mailed the book he knew [redacted] was in South Africa but was not aware that [redacted] had been declared persona non grata by the U. S. Government. Subsequently, POLLARD received a thank you note from [redacted] posted from South Africa.

According to POLLARD he arranged for the second meeting with [redacted] in Tel Aviv by calling [redacted] at his "home" telephone number, which [redacted] had provided to POLLARD after his arrival in Israel. POLLARD claimed he burned the paper containing the note before he departed Israel. [redacted] wife answered the phone call. POLLARD

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believed the ██████ were living temporarily in a small apartment while awaiting completion of their new home. POLLARD claimed that he did not know ██████ lived in New York until after his own arrest. Additionally, POLLARD did not know the contact telephone number for ██████ was his residence in New York or that he was the Science Attache at the Israeli Consulate in that city. POLLARD commented that during personal meetings ██████ always looked "haggared" which POLLARD attributed to jet lag brought about by a trip from Israel.

POLLARD stated that one of his emergency drops at ██████ residence had been predicated upon a COMINT item he read in a National Security Agency (NSA), Middle East and North Africa Summary (MENAS). The item reported an impending truck bomb attack of a joint Israeli/Lebanese Armed Forces check point in Lebanon. POLLARD recalled that the MENAS item indicated the terrorists would be using a stolen French diplomatic license plate on the attack vehicle. POLLARD stated that he took the page of the MENAS containing the item in question to ██████ apartment after work and explained the time sensitivity of the item to ██████ who said that ██████ would be provided the information the same night. At their next personal meeting ██████ advised POLLARD that Israel had been able to interdict the planned attack. According to POLLARD, ██████ stated that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had provided Israel with a general threat warning about the same time frame but the information provided by POLLARD allowed Israel to pass a specific threat warning to its army in Lebanon.

On one occasion ██████ tasked POLLARD to verify that intelligence information being passed to U. S. Defense Attaches in Israel was reaching the United States in a timely manner. POLLARD stated that an Israeli HUMINT source had reported the introduction of a Soviet high energy proximity fuse jammer into Syria. The information was passed to the Defense Attache Office (DAO) Tel Aviv during routine liaison and ██████ wanted to ensure that it was passed on to the U. S. POLLARD was able to verify the transmission of the information in question because he had read the IIR which reported it.

POLLARD stated that ██████ told him that he was on a CIA "hit list" because his articles and television reporting were exposing the inadequacies of CIA support to the Mujahidin. ██████ claimed to have attended a meeting at CIA Headquarters where he was told to stay out of the northwest frontier territory of Pakistan. ██████ further stated that the Pakistanis guaranteed him safe passage to the northwest frontier of that country so he was not concerned with the alleged CIA threat. ██████ once mentioned that a Navy Lieutenant, not further identified, met him at the office of ██████ former National Security Advisor to the President, and had given him classified maps of Afghanistan after the classification markings had been removed.

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POLLARD stated he last saw ██████████ at a reception in his honor given by Readers Digest Magazine on the occasion of ██████████ return from one of his trips to Afghanistan. POLLARD claimed that he met several people at different times at ██████████ parties who claimed to be DIA employees. POLLARD was unable to recall the names of any of these individuals. He recalled meeting another individual who said he worked for the Army Materiel Command. POLLARD claimed he read "message format" material at Lohbeck's residence which contained unfamiliar codewords that POLLARD was unable to recall. POLLARD claimed that the first page was removed from the messages so he was unable to identify the originator or addressees. POLLARD stated ██████████, the Mujahidin Leader, was presented a "fantastic" map of Kabul. The map consisted of a satellite photograph of the city in outstanding detail, which had been overlaid with grid markings. Individual buildings were identified on the map in both English and the native language. POLLARD saw ██████████ present the map to ██████████. The scale of the map was 1:5000, and it was suitable for artillery targeting.

POLLARD believed ██████████ and ██████████, of the Pakistani Embassy, were engaged in a business relationship. Gifts from ██████████ to ██████████ were a result of their business relationship, according to POLLARD. ██████████ did not want POLLARD to meet ██████████. ██████████ claimed he kept ██████████ apprised of information he obtained from contacts with U. S. Intelligence personnel; for example, ██████████ claimed visit to the "South Asia War Room" at the DIAC. It was in relation to this meeting that ██████████ described the Tempest protection for the room, which he claimed consisted of white noise generators as well as internal copper shielding in voids between the walls. ██████████ was allegedly the chairman of the committee meeting ██████████ said he attended. Also present, according to what ██████████ told POLLARD, were a representative of MI-6, a U. S. Navy Commodore who had just returned from a clandestine visit to Kabul, as well as numerous uniformed personnel. ██████████ stated he informed ██████████ of this meeting, which was highly classified.

██████████ told POLLARD that before his first trip to Pakistan he had informed his associate ██████████ of his exact itinerary. During a portion of the trip ██████████ location was allegedly known to the Soviets, and the sites he visited were each attacked. POLLARD claims ██████████ stated the Pakistani Government had HUMINT which verified that ██████████ was in communication with the Soviets and had provided them with the locations of Mujahidin radio sites in Pakistan. As a result all of the sites were destroyed in a very short period of time. ██████████ claimed that the Pakistanis had arrested ██████████ but subsequently released him without explanation. According to POLLARD, ██████████ wanted nothing to do with U. S.

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Security organizations. ██████████ once asked POLLARD to act as an intermediary to provide a Pakistani Police report on ██████████ to the FBI, but POLLARD declined. ██████████ also became very upset when he learned that ██████████ had obtained Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) forms for registration as an international arms broker to execute in relation to their attempted arms sales to foreign countries. ██████████ was concerned that he might be subjected to a security background investigation.

POLLARD stated that ██████████ claimed he met ██████████ through their mutual involvement in mobilizing political support in the U. S. for the Mujahidin. ██████████ claimed to have been attracted to ██████████ because of his blatant anti-communism. ██████████ helped ██████████ plan his trips and routes into and out of Afghanistan. ██████████ claimed to have learned that ██████████ was born in East Germany. ██████████ claimed to be a West Point graduate and former Special Forces Officer. POLLARD stated that he never met ██████████

POLLARD noted that he found his NIS credentials to be very helpful in obtaining classified information, particularly from Navy commands. After the Samuel Morison espionage case this was particularly true because of the trauma it caused within the analytical community at the Naval Intelligence Command. Everyone had known what Morison was doing because he made no effort to conceal his relationship with the Jane's organization. The Israelis never offered POLLARD any guidance on obtaining information but left him to his own devices. POLLARD claimed that when the Israelis learned that copying machines were readily available in areas where classified material was stored, they began to understand the U. S. Intelligence Community was very vulnerable. At the beginning of the operation the Israelis had assumed it would be extremely difficult for POLLARD to obtain the material they wanted.

The other item that was of great assistance to POLLARD was his Office of Naval Intelligence courier card which enabled him to enter and exit Department of Defense (DOD) facilities with impunity. POLLARD commented that most portal guards at DOD buildings were more concerned with checking people coming in (looking for bombs) rather than attempting to locate classified material. POLLARD stated that he was very open with other analysts when explaining material he was trying to obtain and found them for the most part very helpful. POLLARD would often explain that he needed the material he sought for a "short fused" NIS counterintelligence project and ask assistance in obtaining the information. The combination of his simple cover story and the NIS credentials was usually sufficient to gain the cooperation of the persons with whom POLLARD was dealing. POLLARD stated that he found librarians to be the best source of assistance in locating and obtaining information because they did not understand the "need to know" doctrine and simply wanted to help. POLLARD claimed that when he was collecting information on the CONDOR missile for the Israelis three different analysts at NISC

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Code 40 called DIA requesting more information after they exhausted their own resources and POLLARD had indicated he needed additional material. According to POLLARD, no one in the ATAC ever questioned why so much information dealing with the Middle East was coming to the center addressed to POLLARD. POLLARD claimed that the only restrictions on his espionage activity were time and his own physical limitations. When material could not be obtained from one command, such as NISC, he would simply go to DIA.

POLLARD stated that his best sources for information were, in order of priority, as follows: DIA Special Intelligence Library; NISC Special Intelligence Library; NISC GenServ Library; DIA GenServ Library; DIA Central Reference Division.

The interview was terminated at 1415 hours.

Reported by 

Special Agent
Naval Investigative Service

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RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH JONATHAN JAY POLLARD
AS RECORDED BY SPECIAL AGENT [REDACTED]
ON 6 AUGUST 1986, AT PETERSBURG, VIRGINIA

Jonathan Jay Pollard was interviewed beginning at 0900 hours, 6 August 1986, by Reporting Agent and Special Agent [REDACTED] Naval Investigative Service (NIS), Special Agents [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and [REDACTED], Chief of Naval Operations Damage Assessment Task Force. Pollard began by clarifying some information provided at the previous interview. The period of time between the first and second personal meetings with [REDACTED] at the hospital in Israel was either two or three days. The second meeting occurred two days before Pollard and [REDACTED] departed Israel. Pollard stated that he was paid \$12,000 by [REDACTED] on his last night in Israel. The payment took place during an otherwise social engagement with [REDACTED] and his wife [REDACTED] which included dinner at a restaurant in Jaffa. While the women were window shopping [REDACTED] privately gave Pollard the money, which was in U.S. currency consisting of \$50 and \$100 denomination bills. Pollard further commented that he never actually met [REDACTED] on either European trip, but [REDACTED] met her in Paris.

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Pollard was asked to describe what security procedures which had or would have caused him concern during his espionage activity and what was of assistance. He commented that the availability of uncontrolled copying machines was of primary importance to him in collecting hard copy material. Had he been required to obtain these services through a copying center, where an audit trail would have been established, he would have been concerned. Furthermore, if there had been a requirement for Pollard to obtain a supervisor's written approval for copying services, he would have been even more restricted. Pollard stated he often thought that if classified message traffic (time sensitive material) were to be printed on light-sensitive paper which could not be reproduced through normal copy machine procedures, the volume of material he was able to obtain would have been tremendously reduced. Pollard stated, as an example, that he obtained information from the National Intelligence Daily (Central Intelligence Agency document) by hand copying or paraphrasing salient points and had found this to be an extremely time-consuming process.

One procedure that Pollard found assisted his espionage activity was that multiple copies of incoming traffic were being routed in the Anti-Terrorist Alert Center (ATAC). This allowed him to simply pull a copy from the package if it was of interest to the Israelis.

Pollard stated that he was very aware of the television cameras located in hallways at Naval Investigative Service Headquarters and avoided doing anything while in the range of the cameras which would draw attention to himself. Later he learned the television cameras were monitored in the Operations Control Center and that no one seemed to pay any attention to them, so he

was less concerned. Had there been television cameras within the ATAC with an unobstructed view of both watchstanders and analysts, Pollard would have been very concerned about storing and packaging classified material for delivery to the Israelis.

The fact that he was allowed flexible work hours was mentioned by Pollard as a factor that made his espionage activities less noticeable. First, he could come to the ATAC during hours outside of the normal work day to process material for the Israelis without being observed by day workers. Secondly, the flexibility allowed him to visit collateral libraries and commands during normal work hours without anyone from the ATAC being overly concerned about his absence.

Pollard also commented that having his security clearances permanently certified to CIA, DIA and NSA was convenient. Had this not been the case, he would have had to justify with his superiors each visit or contact with these agencies to obtain material. Repeated requests for clearance certifications would have drawn attention to his activities.

Toward the end of his operational involvement with the Israelis, Pollard found he was unable to meet his ATAC work responsibilities due to the extensive time he was spending servicing Israeli taskings. He referred to the Israeli demands as "collection hysteria." Pollard stated that if he had been assigned duties as the Middle East analyst his two "jobs" would have been compatible and he could have kept both the Israelis and his Navy supervisors happy. Pollard stated that in retrospect he would have been better off if he had remained at the Naval Intelligence Support Center (NISC) rather than transferring to the ATAC. His duties at NISC allowed him plausible access to the scientific and technical data the Israelis wanted. Pollard commented that [REDACTED] who was in charge of the ATAC, was "on his case" for lack of production on the Americas Desk. Had he not been arrested, he would have had to reduce the flow of information to the Israelis because he did not have time to both visit the libraries to collect the material they requested and spend the time necessary to complete his assignments in the ATAC. Pollard stated that he does not believe the Israelis ever thought that the level of their taskings would cause him to be detected by U.S. authorities. He believes the Israelis "got hooked" on the quality, quantity and regularity of the material he was providing and unconsciously became unreasonable in their demands. Pollard provided an example of "collection hysteria" in that [REDACTED] once chided him for missing one day of a Mediterranean Littoral OPINTEL Summary during a one-month period. Pollard was asked if he thought the Israelis might have known that he was going to be caught eventually, and were rushing him in order to obtain as much material as possible before this happened. He said that he did not think that was possible since, "I was in the position to blackmail the Israelis by threatening to turn them in. I never told them that. I'm a true believer."

When asked how he thought he was detected, Pollard opined that it was a result of the audit trail he created when removing

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material from various libraries. Pollard recalled that he was once questioned by ATAC supervisors regarding an "overdue list" on material he had removed from the NISC GenServ Library. Pollard noted that documents he had obtained from the DIA "Central Repository" were also a problem. DIA would not take them back and the material had been logged into the ATAC classified material control system. As a result Pollard could not simply "throw them into a burn bag"; he needed a formal destruction report, which would only draw attention to himself.

Pollard suggested that if someone reported having lost a document or having "inadvertently destroyed" classified material under his control, they should be required to take a polygraph examination regarding the veracity of their report. In a related matter, Pollard stated that the DIA libraries should be required to periodically provide supervisors with lists of material being checked out by their subordinates so that the employees' "need to know" could be validated by someone who knows what the duty assignment requires. Pollard stated he had "learned to live" with the fact that an audit trail of material he had obtained was in existence at DIA. He commented, "I never planned to get caught."

Pollard claimed that if a true "two person rule" were applied across the board, it would have been very difficult for him to have collected material for the Israelis. For example, if every evolution required two people - such as visits to other agencies and libraries - the second person from the ATAC would have questioned the "projects" Pollard alluded to when providing cover stories to obtain material. Pollard stated that he did not make extensive use of the telephone to collect information, preferring instead to make personal visits, but he did wonder why telephones were allowed in an SI space. Pollard viewed mobility as the key to his "success." Had he been unable to walk out of the building with a briefcase, his collection activities would have been limited to material concealable on his person or in his memory. Pollard commented that inadequate facilities at the ATAC were of assistance to his espionage. Because there was insufficient storage space, classified material was literally stacked to the ceiling, making it very easy for him to stage material near his desk until he was ready to remove it from the building. It would have been impossible for a "no clutter rule" to have been applied in the ATAC because the lack of space and large volume of classified material needed for their work made clutter inevitable.

Pollard noted that the unrestricted availability of computer discs in the ATAC, along with the large storage capacity of discs and the fact they could be easily concealed on his person, would have made it much easier to remove material for the Israelis if he could have solved the problem of having messages routed directly to his personal computer. Pollard believed the ATAC should establish a requirement that discs be accounted for in the same manner as classified material.

Pollard stated that if a perfect physical security environment had prevented him removing classified documents from the various repositories to which he had access, he could have still provided

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the Israelis verbal reports. He commented, however, that due to the technical nature of much of the material they desired - such as missile guidance systems, which involve numeric values and parameters - the volume of information would have been drastically reduced.

During the last few weeks before his detection, Pollard claims he was told by ██████████ an analyst in the ATAC, that she suspected that an investigation was underway in the ATAC, but she wasn't more specific. Pollard stated that he did not place any credence in ██████████ statement because he considered he "paranoid" and had no independent evidence to support her suspicion. Pollard commented that had he thought he was being investigated he would have "been on the next plane out of the country."

According to Pollard, prior to his arrest he made a personal decision to terminate his espionage activity in the near future. He believed that the initial objective he had set for himself, to give the Israelis enough data to enable them to win the next war, had been satisfied. He believed his "obligation" to the State of Israel was fulfilled. Pollard stated he had recently met an important Saudi Arabian, ██████████ and had cultivated this person to the point that he believed a formal monetary relationship was forthcoming. Pollard stated that ██████████ received a letter shortly before his arrest inviting her to the Saudi Arabian Embassy to discuss a business relationship. In this new position Pollard believed he could eventually be able to provide information to the Israelis, but not U.S. classified material. Although he did not view his activities with Israel as disloyal to the U.S., he did consider them "dishonest." The fact that he was "living a lie" 24 hours a day was causing him to "burn out." Pollard believed devoting his efforts toward Saudi Arabia would provide him a "cleaner" target, and that the Israelis would not object to his changing jobs. Pollard stated that at his last drop at ██████████ apartment he had left a letter for ██████████ stating that he (Pollard) planned to reimburse the Israeli government all the money he had been paid and endow a chair for intelligence at the Israeli Defense Forces Staff College. Pollard stated that he hoped to make sufficient money through his association with ██████████ to make this possible. Pollard claimed he believed that if he could establish himself with the Saudis, the Israelis, who were primarily concerned with scientific and technical intelligence, would turn him over to the Mossad for future operational use.

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According to Pollard, the CIA analyst who provided a document on Libyan nuclear development had mentioned a CIA program called NUCMART. Pollard recalled that NUCMART was a program which tracked the transfer of certain raw materials associated with the nuclear energy and arms industry. When he passed this information, ██████████ appeared to know that CIA was involved in such a tracking program but had been unaware of the project indicator. Pollard advised that ██████████ seemed very familiar with the CIA.

Pollard did not recall what happened to the two expandable leather briefcases he was given by the Israelis. He recalled that ██████████ said he had purchased the briefcases in New York. Pollard

stated that the briefcases had not been at the ATAC on 28 November 1985, or he would have used one of them to carry documents out to his car.

Pollard could recall five different visits to CIA Headquarters. In the summer of 1978, he visited a friend of a friend from graduate school who worked in the "OPSCEN" at CIAHQ. Pollard did not recall this individual's name. The second visit was in relation to the polygraph examination when he was applying for a job. Pollard stated he also visited CIAHQ with [REDACTED] to go to the "terrorist shop" during orientation with the ATAC. On another occasion Pollard attended a Terms of Reference conference involving setting collection targetting priorities in the Persian Gulf area as they related to terrorism. Pollard was selected by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to represent the ATAC. Pollard also recalled visiting CIAHQ in connection with his contact with the South African Embassy and association with Task Force 168. Pollard stated that he also visited CIA facilities in Manassas, Virginia, where he attended a terrorist intelligence exchange meeting, and Rosslyn, Virginia, where he received psychological testing in relation to his job application.

Pollard volunteered information regarding his contact with Michael Lance Walker at the Federal Correctional Institute in Petersburg, Virginia. Pollard stated he and Walker were assigned to the same block and for a period of time to the same cell. Walker informed Pollard he had passed information to his father, John Walker, on the Phalanx weapons system, SM-2 missile, Sea Sparrow missile, Harpoon missile, Tomahawk missile, and Phoenix missile. Michael Walker also stated he had provided a detailed war plan for Cuba which included a forward command post in the Florida Keys and ship deployments. Michael claimed he gave the Soviets, through his father, the best material he could obtain. Walker mentioned to Pollard the material on the Phalanx revealed that it suffered at 20% degradation of accuracy in rain, and said that the Phoenix information was in an NWP. The NWP described how the Phoenix and F-14 aircraft would be employed in wartime and, according to Walker, would allow the Soviets to "blow the Navy out of the water." Michael Walker allegedly stated that his father had asked him to obtain this information. Michael also stated that his father had pushed him to obtain a transfer to either NAS Point Mugu or the staff of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe to gain access to U.S. nuclear war plans. Pollard stated that he never saw information on the Walker investigation during his assignment at the ATAC; the only information he had was from conversations with Michael and press accounts of the investigation.

The interview was terminated at 1420 hours.

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Reported by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
Special Agent,
Naval Investigative Service

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RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH JONATHAN JAY POLLARD
AS RECORDED BY SPECIAL AGENT ██████████
ON 20 AUGUST 1986, IN PETERSBURG, VIRGINIA

Jonathan Jay Pollard was interviewed starting at 0928, at the Office of the Provost Marshall, Fort Lee, Virginia, by Reporting Agent and Special Agent ██████████ Naval Investigative Service (NIS), Special Agent ██████████ Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and ██████████ ██████████ OPNAV Damage Assessment Task Force.

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Pollard began by clarifying some points from previous interviews. ██████████ told Pollard that he was a missile design engineer and had previously served a tour for the Israeli government at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. At times during the espionage operation ██████████ would identify a document from Pollard as one previously provided to Israel by the U.S. during official intelligence exchanges. Pollard had no recollection of a specific document in this category, however. From time to time during the operation ██████████ showed Pollard Israeli intelligence photographs taken in Syria and Iraq. Pollard stated that some of the photographs were obviously taken at ground level (such as out of the window of an automobile) while others were aircraft/tactical reconnaissance photographs. The photographs generally concerned weapons installations. Pollard claimed that when providing taskings, ██████████ would present as many as four separate lists; one each from the Israeli Air Force, Army, Navy, and a consolidated "national" list. ██████████ had previous knowledge of the code word ██████████ and knew the meaning of the term. ██████████ never asked Pollard for imagery from a specific platform, such as the KH-11, nor did he ever ask about the organization or personnel of specific U.S. intelligence agencies.

Concerning tasking on Western Syria, Pollard stated that this area was of concern to the Israelis. Israel apparently had good intelligence from the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) with Syria extending about 90 miles in the direction of Damascus. ██████████ was particularly concerned about a series of air bases near Lake Assad which he believed would be a major Soviet resupply area should hostilities commence. Pollard claimed he was tasked to provide reconnaissance photographs of these airfields, Electronic Order of Battle for Syrian and Soviet forces stationed on the opposite side of Damascus from the FEBA, and information available on ground and missile exercise areas past Damascus, and any information available on the "CIRES" facilities.

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Pollard advised that ██████████ was also interested in intelligence reporting on the health of President Hafiz al-Assad of Syria. According to Pollard, ██████████ alluded to the fact that Israel hoped that should Hafiz die or become incapacitated, RUFAD al-Assad would become President of Syria. Pollard believed that the Israelis, particularly ██████████ thought they could deal with ██████████ Also regarding Syria, Pollard stated ██████████ requested any information he could obtain on the

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Soviet Military Assistance Group, the numbers and location of all Soviet advisors, the national level command, control and communications center in Damascus, the identities of Syrian units with Soviet advisors attached, and all training programs in the USSR for Syrian personnel.

When asked how he obtained specific IIRs, Pollard stated that he would request searches on specific topics on the DIAOLS computer through ██████████ at the Naval Intelligence Support Center (NISC). Upon receipt of the printout from ██████████ Pollard would go to the Defense Intelligence Agency Center (DIAC) and obtain the actual IIRs.

Pollard also recalled that the Israelis were interested in any intelligence available on Soviet reactive armor technology, and he was able to provide some information on that topic.

According to Pollard, ██████████ was concerned that the FBI was engaged in an ongoing counterintelligence program in the New York area which involved screening telephone calls originated by certain foreign nationals. Pollard stated that ██████████ requirement that Pollard use pay telephones for operational contacts was related to this concern. ██████████ informed Pollard that Israel was worried that their legal representatives in the U.S. were under surveillance by the FBI.

Pollard could recall only one occasion when he was tasked by ██████████ or any of the Israelis to obtain material generated by a U.S. contractor. That related to a study of Egyptian air defenses the Israelis believed the Westinghouse Corporation had conducted. ██████████ informed Pollard that Egypt was looking to establish a unified national air defense system to replace the patch work system which had evolved over the years. Pollard could not locate the study, so he contacted the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)/National Collection Division (NCD) in Rosslyn, Virginia and left a request for the information. Pollard stated that NCD would have recontacted him when the document requested was located. He made this request in the Spring or Summer of 1985, but did not receive a response from CIA. As an aside Pollard stated that he considered the NCD the "most vulnerable" source of intelligence information in Washington since they existed to facilitate requests for information from the entire U.S. intelligence community and did not appear to be concerned about "need to know" when responding to a request.

When questioned about a series of National Security Agency (NSA) documents found in his work space (Highlights, Ethiopia, Somalia and other Published Ethiopian and Somali Internal Communications; and, Horn of Africa Military SITREPS), Pollard stated he had no recollection of providing this material to the Israelis. Pollard commented that he may have passed one of these documents to ██████████ only to be told that it was not needed by the Israelis.

Pollard provided the following information regarding computerized data systems which were available to him:

IAIPS - This was the principle system used by Pollard. If he had any problems with the system, Pollard would ask ATAC employee [REDACTED] for assistance. Pollard stated he used IAIPS to obtain the daily Mediterranean Littoral Operational Intelligence Summary, the Middle East and North Africa Summary (NSA), and the Indian Ocean Littoral Intelligence Summary. According to Pollard, he would locate the messages on his computer by querrying the plain language address of the originator and date time group of the daily message (the summaries use the same dtg time, only the date and month change). After ordering the messages, Pollard would pick them up from the message center on the second deck of the NIC-1 building. Pollard stated that he also used IAIPS to screen Defense Attache Office (DAO) traffic. He would specifically look for traffic concerning major troop movements, weapons procurement, local security information and vulnerabilities, and biographic information on Arab officials. Pollard stated he would scroll through the DAO traffic by originator and order any messages he thought would be of interest to the Israelis. According to Pollard, there were two subsystems of IAIPS available in the Anti-Terrorist Alert Center (ATAC), the MPDS, which was a message distribution system and was his primary tool as explained above, and the APS, a system available for individual analysts to build their own data base. Pollard stated he used the APS exclusively on his official duties and not for espionage. Pollard advised that he would log onto the IAIPS using his personal code. There were no restrictions once on the system.

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DIAOLS/COINS - Pollard advised that although he had no direct access because the system was located in the NIC-2 building, he was able to make use of DIAOLS/COINS through [REDACTED] at the Naval Intelligence Support Center. If Pollard wanted to research a topic or request a message or IIR, he would provide the information to Pirnat. For example, if Pollard was interested in a particular radar system, he would obtain the DIA nickname for the system, such as [REDACTED] then task [REDACTED]. There were three types of runs available, to Pollard's knowledge, 1) all data available on the topic, 2) finished product SI, and 3) finished product GenServ. Pollard stated that he could also give [REDACTED] a country code plus a key word or words, for example, Electronic Order of Battle - Egypt, and request one of the three above described runs. When the material was available, [REDACTED] would call Pollard to pick it up from NIC-2. According to Pollard he never exploited DIAOLS/COINS to its full potential.

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SOLIS - Pollard stated that he had no recollection of using this system, although it might have been queried by [REDACTED] during projects on Pollard's behalf. Pollard denied knowing what information was available on this system.

DESIST - According to Pollard, he saw this system demonstrated once, and it did not work very well on that occasion. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] continued to work with DESIST, trying to learn how to use the system, but with little success. Pollard claimed he never obtained any information from DESIST, either for the Israelis or for his normal duties.

FLASHBOARD - Pollard stated that he used this system while on watch for communicating with other analysts. On occasion he sent reports to other intelligence community analysts, but he never provided any information obtained on this system to the Israelis. Pollard claimed that he did not want to tie up the system because it was a critical, real time alert system, and other methods were available to obtain the information he wanted.

DCII - Pollard stated that he ran a name check of [REDACTED] through the DCII and determined that any Army CID file on [REDACTED] was available, which he never ordered.

NEWS SERVICES (REUTERS AND NEXIS) - Pollard claimed that he never used these systems operationally.

CIRC - Pollard stated that he had heard of "CIRC searches" but did not know what it meant. Never used operationally.

MFE-2 - an electronic mail box that Pollard was aware of but never used.

SEA WATCH - The Navy global tracking system for vessels. Pollard was aware of the system but claims he did not use it operationally. According to Pollard, he obtained information on Soviet ships involved in weapons delivery through the daily CNO Intelligence Notes. Pollard stated that on the week of his arrest he was considering going to [REDACTED] shop at NISC to find the destination of a suspected Soviet SA-5 shipment. However, the information was reported in the CNO Intelligence Notes, so the trip was unnecessary. Pollard claimed that had he not been arrested this information would have been provided to the Israelis on a special drop.

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Pollard advised that the Israelis never asked him any specific questions about ADP systems. When Pollard suggested passing floppy discs rather than hard copy messages, [REDACTED] was very keen on the idea and encouraged Pollard to work on it. This occurred during the Spring of 1985, but Pollard stated he never discussed the details of how he planned to convert messages to discs. According to Pollard, [REDACTED] requested that he bring an example of a floppy disc so the Israelis could make sure it was compatible to their computer systems, but Pollard never provided the example. Pollard claimed that the Israelis never asked him what type of computer hardware was used in the ATAC.

Pollard believed that many of the security problems in the operation were the result of [REDACTED] lack of intelligence experience. Pollard believed that had the operation been turned over to the MOSSAD they would have been shocked at the lack of security and planning.

Concerning transfer of classified information from data bases to the analysts' personal computers in the ATAC, Pollard stated that [REDACTED] had worked out a "back door" routine which enabled the analysts to load material directly from the

IAIPS system to floppy discs on their computers. Pollard considered the routine too long and complicated to be of practical use in his espionage activity. For example, the routine took 20 minutes to obtain one section of a Middle East and North Africa Summary, and some of these messages were 20 sections long.

During a working lunch Pollard discussed his long range plans after release from prison. He initially stated it was his intention to emigrate to Israel. When asked about a military obligation (draft), Pollard stated he would have to serve two years active duty and have an additional three year reserve obligation. Pollard speculated that he would not be assigned to a military unit where he was at risk of capture because he "knew too much."

Pollard commented further that once he became an Israeli citizen he might stand for election to the Knesset. Pollard noted that a French Jew who had been previously incarcerated for drug smuggling had been elected to the Knesset after emigrating. Pollard commented that the residents of the Israeli West Bank settlements were notoriously radical in their devotion to Israel and might be attracted to him because of his service to the state through espionage. Pollard also speculated that the Israeli government might not want him to become a citizen unless he promised to maintain a low profile since press conferences and other publicity would bring more embarrassment to the state. In this regard Pollard commented that he fully intended to find out why he had been "abandoned" by the Israelis after their promises to protect him. He stated that something must have gone wrong (with the escape plan), and he wanted to find out who was responsible. Pollard expressed considerable dislike for [REDACTED].

Agent's Note: During the entire series of interviews, Pollard has depicted [REDACTED] as the "bad" Israeli, while his comments about the others involved in the operation have been either positive or neutral. He consistently refers to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] as though they are close personal friends, and his attitude toward [REDACTED] in particular borders on hero worship. His outward devotion to the State of Israel appears to be unaffected by his present status as a convicted spy.

The interview was terminated at 1415 hours.

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[REDACTED]

Special Agent
Naval Investigative Service

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ROUTINE

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TO COMNAVSECINVCOM WASHINGTON DC NAVINVSERVREGO NORFOLK VA

BT UNCLAS LINDIS [REDACTED] /N03850//

ACTION/LEAD SHEET (PENDING) 10 SEP 86
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[REDACTED] (U) b7c
COMMAND/NAVINVSERVCOM, WASHINGTON, DC/63285
MADE AT/05DC/WASHINGTON, DC/[REDACTED] SPECIAL AGENT
REFERENCE

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(A) 05DC ALS/23JUL86
SYNOPSIS

1. REF (A) ADVISED THAT A SECOND FBI/NIS INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED] WAS CONDUCTED ON 21 JUL 86. THE FBI FD-302 9ETAILING THIS INTERVIEW IS APPENDED AS EXHIBIT (1)
2. REPORTING OF ALL SUBJECT INTERVIEWS TO DATE WILL BE FORWARDED SHORTLY, UPON COMPLETION. DEBRIEFING OF SUBJECT BY NSA REPRESENTATIVES WAS CONDUCTED 13/14 AUG 86 IN PETERSBURG, VA, IN THE PRESENCE OF REPORTING AGENT AND FBI CASE AGENT, S/A [REDACTED]. NSA REPRESENTATIVES WERE BRIEFED AS TO THE CONTENT OF PREVIOUS INTERVIEWS SO AS TO PREVENT DUPLICATE COVERAGE OF TOPICS ALREADY DISCUSSED.
EXHIBIT
(1) FD-302/INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED] 29JUL86...
(COPY ALL/BY MAIL)

DISTRIBUTION
NSICHO: 0022 (M)
CONTROL: 05HQ (M)
[REDACTED]

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RESULTS OF INTERVIEW WITH
JONATHAN JAY POLLARD
AS RECORDED BY
SPECIAL AGENT [REDACTED]
ON 23 JULY 1986 IN WASHINGTON, D.C.

ON 23 JULY 86, JONATHAN JAY POLLARD WAS INTERVIEWED AT THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, WASHINGTON, D.C., BY SPECIAL AGENTS [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE (NIS); SPECIAL AGENTS [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI) AND [REDACTED] OP-009BZ (OPNAV DAMAGE ASSESSMENT TASK FORCE).

POLLARD WAS INITIALLY ASKED TO DISCUSS HIS ASSOCIATION WITH [REDACTED] AND HE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: POLLARD ADVISED THAT HE RENEWED HIS ASSOCIATION WITH HIS CHILDHOOD FRIEND, [REDACTED], IN LATE 1983 WHEN [REDACTED] CALLED POLLARD FROM NEW YORK AND DISCUSSED PROSPECTUSES ON AN ISRAELI MILITARY COMPANY AND A BELGIAN STOCK COMPANY. THEY ALSO DISCUSSED, AT [REDACTED] INITIATION, THE EFFECT ON THE OIL MARKET OF A POSSIBLE PERSIAN GULF/STRAIT OF HORMUZ CLOSURE. THEY CONTINUED TO HAVE SIMILAR TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS UNTIL THE SPRING OF 1984, WHEN THEY MET AT L'ENFANT PLAZA IN WASHINGTON, D.C., WHERE [REDACTED] WAS ATTENDING A ZIONIST CONFERENCE OF A HIGH POWERED ZIONIST FUND RAISING ORGANIZATION, OF WHICH [REDACTED] WAS A MEMBER. THEY ONLY VISITED FOR TEN TO FIFTEEN MINUTES ON THIS OCCASION AND THE CONVERSATION WAS PURELY SOCIAL. POLLARD RECALLED THIS MEETING TAKING PLACE PRIOR TO HIS 17 JUN 84 TRANSFER TO NIS AND THAT HIS [REDACTED] WAS PRESENT AT THIS MEETING.

SOMETIME AFTER THIS MEETING, [REDACTED] AGAIN CALLED POLLARD AND THEY TALKED ABOUT THE SYRIAN THREAT TO ISRAEL. LATER IN THE CONVERSATION, [REDACTED] SAID HE'D LIKE TO INTRODUCE POLLARD TO A HIGH-RANKING AIR FORCE MAN, WHO WAS UNDERSTOOD BY POLLARD TO BE AN ISRAELI. POLLARD RECOUNTED THAT HE IMMEDIATELY SAID TO HIMSELF "THAT'S MY OPPORTUNITY" TO BEGIN PROVIDING INFORMATION TO THE ISRAELIS. [REDACTED] SAID HE WOULD GIVE POLLARD'S HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER TO THIS INDIVIDUAL, WHO WAS NOT IDENTIFIED BY [REDACTED] AND HAVE HIM CALL POLLARD; TO WHICH POLLARD AGREED. HE RECALLED THAT ONE OR TWO DAYS LATER HE RECEIVED A CALL FROM [REDACTED] (LATER IDENTIFIED AS [REDACTED]), WHO SAID HE WAS [REDACTED] FRIEND AND WANTED TO MEET POLLARD. WITHIN A WEEK OF [REDACTED] PHONE CALL, WHICH POLLARD PLACES IN JUNE 1984, THEY HAD THEIR FIRST MEETING IN WASHINGTON, D.C. AT THE WASHINGTON HILTON HOTEL ON CONNECTICUT AVENUE AND POLLARD OFFERED TO PROVIDE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO ISRAEL. IT WAS OBVIOUS TO POLLARD AT THIS MEETING THAT [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] WERE CLOSE FRIENDS. ADDITIONAL DETAILS OF THIS MEETING ARE PROVIDED LATER IN THIS RESULTS OF INTERVIEW.

SEVERAL DAYS AFTER THIS MEETING, [REDACTED] CALLED POLLARD AND ASKED HIM "HOW DID THINGS GO?", TO WHICH POLLARD REPLIED "WE'LL BE SEEING MORE OF EACH OTHER" AND [REDACTED] RESPONDED "GOOD."

THE NEXT MEETING WITH [REDACTED] OCCURRED AT THE SHERATON WASHINGTON HOTEL ON CONNECTICUT AVENUE, WHICH POLLARD PLACED IN EITHER AUG/SEP 1984 OR WINTER 84, DURING WHICH [REDACTED] ASKED "WHAT'S GOING ON WITH THE ISRAELIS?" AND POLLARD PROVIDED HIM DETAILS OF THE RELATIONSHIP. POLLARD DESCRIBED THE CONVERSATION AS A "NUTS AND BOLTS" DISCUSSION AND SAID HE TOLD [REDACTED] HOW THE ISRAELIS WERE ABOUT TO SEND RECONNAISSANCE DRONE FLIGHTS INTO

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SYRIA; THE ABILITY FOR WHICH THEY ACQUIRED THROUGH DOCUMENTS POLLARD HAD ALREADY PROVIDED. █████ WAS INTERESTED IN THE USEFULNESS OF POLLARD'S INFORMATION TO THE ISRAELIS FOR "THE CAUSE" AND APPEARED TO POLLARD TO HAVE A GOOD LAYMAN'S GRASP OF TECHNICAL MATTERS SUCH AS ONE MIGHT RECEIVE FROM READING PROFESSIONAL LITERATURE. █████ WAS NOT PRESENT AT THIS MEETING, ACCORDING TO POLLARD, BECAUSE HE DIDN'T WANT █████ TO REPORT HER PRESENCE BACK TO █████, WHO HAD INSISTED THAT SHE NOT BE MADE KNOWLEDGEABLE OF THE OPERATION. █████ NAME OCCURRED OPERATIONALLY ON ONLY ONE MORE OCCASION, AND THAT WAS FOLLOWING POLLARD'S RETURN FROM HIS TRIP TO PARIS IN NOV 1984 WHEN POLLARD HAD A DISCUSSION WITH █████ HIS PRIMARY HANDLER, ABOUT MONEY. █████ WANTED TO GIVE POLLARD AND █████ HOUSE IN WASHINGTON, D.C., WHICH COULD ALSO BE USED AS A SAFEHOUSE, AS COMPENSATION FOR HIS ACTIVITIES AND █████ AND POLLARD DISCUSSED HOW IT COULD BE COVERTLY FINANCED. █████ SUGGESTED THAT █████ COULD BUY THE HOUSE AS A WEDDING GIFT FOR POLLARD AND HE ASKED POLLARD TO ASSESS █████ RELIABILITY, WHICH MEANT TO POLLARD THAT █████ OBVIOUSLY HAD NEVER MET █████ WHEN POLLARD DESCRIBED █████ AS COMPLETELY RELIABLE, █████ INDICATED HE WOULD DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH █████ AND POLLARD LATER GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY HAD MET BUT NOT DISCUSSED THE HOUSE AS IT NEVER CAME UP IN DISCUSSION AGAIN. █████ NAME ONLY CAME UP IN CONVERSATION WITH THE ISRAELIS ONCE MORE, AND THAT WAS RELATIVE TO █████ █████ MENTIONED TO POLLARD THAT HE WAS GOING TO CUT █████ OUT OF THE OPERATION BECAUSE WHEN HE LAST SAW HIM █████ WAS "CRACKING DOWN THE MIDDLE" DUE TO █████

THE NEXT TOPIC OF INTERVIEW WAS AN ISRAELI INDIVIDUAL KNOWN ONLY AS █████. POLLARD DESCRIBED █████ AS A MISSILE ENGINEER WHO GRADUATED FROM TECHNION IN HAIFA, ISRAEL, AND WAS A MILITARY RESERVE OFFICER WHO WORKED IN █████ OFFICE. POLLARD ADVISED HE MET █████ ON ONLY TWO OCCASIONS; ONCE AT THE DEBORAH STREET SAFEHOUSE IN DEC 84 WITH █████ AND THE SECOND TIME IN ISRAEL IN JUL 85. HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT █████ WAS DESIGNATED AS █████ REPLACEMENT AS HIS HANDLER IN THE OPERATION AT SOME POINT IN THE FUTURE. WHILE IN ISRAEL IN JUL 85, POLLARD RECALLED THAT HE AND █████ HAD DINNER AT █████ HOUSE IN TEL AVIV. █████ PICKED THEM UP AT THE TEL AVIV HILTON IN A LATE MODEL BLUE FOUR DOOR AUDI WHICH LOOKED LIKE A MERCEDES, POSSIBLY THE AUDI 5000. █████ HOUSE WAS APPROXIMATELY A TWENTY MINUTE DRIVE FROM THE HILTON AND WAS IN AN ELEGANT NEIGHBORHOOD OF TWO STORY WHITE STUCCO VILLAS WITH RED TILE ROOFS. THE HOUSE, LOCATED ON A CIRCULAR DEAD END, HAD A TWO CAR GARAGE FACING THE STREET AND WAS SEPARATED FROM NEIGHBORING HOUSES BY HEDGES. POLLARD FELT THE HOUSE WAS ACTUALLY █████ RESIDENCE AS OPPOSED TO A SAFEHOUSE DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF CHILDREN'S TOYS IN THE YARD, FAMILY PICTURES IN THE HOUSE, AND EXPENSIVE TV'S AND STEREO EQUIPMENT. POLLARD DESCRIBED █████ AS FATTER THAN █████ AND AT LEAST AS TALL. BESIDES POLLARD AND █████ AND █████ AND HIS WIFE, NAME UNKNOWN, THE OTHER GUESTS AT █████ HOUSE WERE █████ AND HIS WIFE, █████, AND █████ AND HIS WIFE, █████

POLLARD WAS QUESTIONED REGARDING A NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE CENTER (NPIC) STUDY ON THE RAWALPINDI NUCLEAR REACTOR IN PAKISTAN. HE EXPLAINED THAT HE OBTAINED THAT BECAUSE THE ISRAELIS WANTED POLLARD TO FIND OUT (A) HOW MUCH OF THE ISRAELI NUCLEAR PROGRAM WAS KNOWN OUTSIDE ISRAEL AND (B) INFORMATION ON ARAB NUCLEAR PROGRAMS. THEY WANTED INFORMATION ON NUCLEAR PLANTS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT, DELIVERY PLATFORMS, ETC. THEY ALSO WANTED GENERAL NUCLEAR INTELLIGENCE (NUCINT) ON ARABS AND COLLATERAL COUNTRIES. THE ISRAELIS FOCUSED ON RAWALPINDI RIGHT AWAY. █████ TOLD HIM THAT PRIOR TO POLLARD'S INVOLVEMENT, ISRAEL HAD APPROACHED INDIA REGARDING ASSISTANCE TO INDIA IN AN INDIAN STRIKE TO KNOCK OUT RAWALPINDI, BUT THE INDIANS HAD TOLD ISRAEL THAT THEY DID NOT WANT ANY HELP. POLLARD'S INPUT

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WAS THEREFORE STRICTLY FOR ISRAEL'S CONTINGENCY PLANNING. POLLARD SUPPLIED THEM WITH AN NPIC STUDY ON RAWALPINDI, WHICH HE BELIEVED HE HAD OBTAINED FROM ██████████ A NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT CENTER (NISC) ANALYST IN NISC 42 .

THE FOLLOWING SECTION DETAILS POLLARD'S ATTEMPT TO RECRUIT ██████████ ██████████ A FORMER FLETCHER ROOMMATE, AS AN ASSISTANT TO HELP HIM IN THE LOGISTICS OF PROVIDING INFORMATION TO ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE. POLLARD STATED THAT WHEN HE DECIDED TO APPROACH ██████████ HE HAD NOT YET HAD ANY CONTACT WITH ██████████ BUT HE HAD ALREADY FORMULATED HIS PLAN TO ASSIST ISRAEL AND HE BELIEVED HE WOULD NEED A BACK UP TO ASSIST HIM IN THE OPERATION, I.E. SERVICING DROPS, ATTENDING MEETS, ETC. HIS CONCEPT WAS TO PRESENT ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE WITH AN IN-PLACE "NET" OR OPERATING RING WHICH COULD BEGIN WITH MINIMAL STARTUP TIME. HE SELECTED ██████████ WHO WORKED AT THE VOICE OF AMERICA, BECAUSE HE KNEW HE HAD ACCESS TO HIGHLY PLACED OFFICIALS, HE WAS SYMPATHETIC TO THE STATE OF ISRAEL, WAS JEWISH, HAD TRAVELLED THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, AND MIGHT EVEN HAVE SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE NOT AVAILABLE TO POLLARD.

POLLARD RECALLED THAT IN THE SPRING OF 1984, PRIOR TO EMPLOYMENT WITH NIS, HE TELEPHONED ██████████ WHO LIVED IN AN APARTMENT IN WASHINGTON, D.C., AND INVITED HIMSELF AND ██████████ OVER FOR A SHORT VISIT. WHEN THEY ARRIVED, POLLARD TOLD ██████████ THAT HE WAS GOING TO SET UP A "RELATIONSHIP" WITH THE ISRAELIS AND WOULD NEED SOME HELP. ██████████ HEDGED, AND SAID NEITHER YES NOR NO WHEN POLLARD ASKED HIM DIRECTLY IF HE WOULD LIKE TO BECOME INVOLVED. THE SUBJECT OF FINANCIAL REMUNERATION CAME UP, HOWEVER POLLARD CAN'T RECALL WHO BROUGHT IT UP. ██████████ BECAME NOTICEABLY UNCOMFORTABLE DURING THE CONVERSATION AND POLLARD AND ██████████ DEPARTED THE APARTMENT SHORTLY THEREAFTER WITH NO COMMITMENT FROM ██████████ THE FOLLOWING DAY, ██████████ CONTACTED POLLARD AND REQUESTED A MEETING. THEY MET, AND DURING A LONG WALK TOGETHER ██████████ TRIED TO GET POLLARD TO SAY THAT THE CONVERSATION OF THE PREVIOUS DAY NEVER TOOK PLACE. POLLARD STATED THAT HE BELIEVED ██████████ WANTED POLLARD TO DENY THE RECRUITMENT PITCH HAD EVER BEEN MADE SO HE WOULD HAVE A PLAUSIBLE DENIAL SHOULD HE EVER BE QUESTIONED IN THE FUTURE. FOLLOWING THESE TWO MEETINGS, ██████████ NEVER EXPRESSED ANY CURIOSITY OVER POLLARD'S OPERATION AND IT WAS NEVER DISCUSSED AGAIN.

POLLARD WAS NEXT ASKED TO DISCUSS HIS PERSONAL HISTORY RELATIVE TO HOW HE ARRIVED AT THE DECISION TO COMMIT ESPIONAGE. POLLARD ADVISED THAT HE ALWAYS FELT AN UNCOMFORTABLE DUALITY OF LOYALTY TO BOTH THE U.S. AND ISRAEL DUE TO "ETHNIC PARANOIA." HIS HOUSEHOLD WAS FANATICALLY PRO-U.S. BUT HIGHLY POLITICIZED REGARDING ZIONISM. DUE TO CHILDHOOD EXPERIENCES, ETC., POLLARD EXPLAINED THAT HE ONLY FELT HAPPINESS WITH HIS "OWN KIND" AND HE STATED THAT HE HAD ALWAYS WANTED TO EMIGRATE. SOME ZIONISTS EMIGRATE, HE EXPLAINED, OTHERS STAY IN THE DIASPORA AS "BEACH HEADS." POLLARD CONTINUED THAT HE FELT ISRAEL COULDN'T EXIST WITHOUT A VIABLE ISRAELI COMMUNITY IN AMERICA, AND SINCE HIS PARENTS DIDN'T WANT HIM TO EMIGRATE HE DECIDED TO ASSIST ISRAEL WHILE REMAINING IN THE U.S. HIS ULTIMATE GOAL, HOWEVER, WAS TO EMIGRATE.

POLLARD ATTENDED AN ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCE-U.S. (IDF/US) EXCHANGE CONFERENCE IN 1982 AND FOR THE FIRST TIME BEGAN TO CONTEMPLATE DIRECT ACTION OTHER THAN EMIGRATION. HE WAS HORRIFIED BY THE ANTI-SEMITIC REMARKS HE HEARD FROM THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVES AT THE CONFERENCE, SUCH AS "LET'EM LOSE A COUPLE OF PILOTS AND THEY'LL FIGURE IT OUT." THE U.S. DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS DID NOT SEEM TO AGREE WITH THE TENOR OF THE AGREEMENTS FOR

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EXCHANGE. THE CHEMICAL WARFARE QUESTION, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS RESPONDED TO WITH A JOKE ABOUT NAZI GAS CHAMBERS RATHER THAN PROVIDING THE PERINENT DOCUMENTS. POLLARD CLAIMED HE "SNAPPED." HE DECIDED IF HE COULD SAVE ONE ISRAELI LIFE AND HELP ISRAEL WIN THE NEXT WAR WITH THE ARABS AND THE RUSSIANS, HE WOULD. THE BEIRUT MARINE BOMBING, WITH THE U.S. DETERMINED TO DO NOTHING IN RESPONSE, CONFIRMED THE CORRECTNESS OF SPYING TO HIM. HE WAS ALSO "PATHOLOGICAL" TOWARD THE RUSSIANS, BY HIS OWN DESCRIPTION. HE CLAIMED TO HAVE PERSONALLY SEEN THE SOVIET TAKEOVER OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN 1968, WHICH HAD ENDED HIS CHILDHOOD AND DEMONSTRATED TO HIM WHAT A COUNTRY UNDER RUSSIAN COMMUNIST RULE WAS LIKE. AT THAT MOMENT, THEREFORE, HE FELT HE SHOULD PUT UP OR SHUT UP RELATIVE TO HELPING ISRAEL AND BY THE TIME HE ATTENDED HIS SECOND IDF/US EXCHANGE, IN OCT 83, HE HAD DECIDED HE HAD TO DO SOMETHING. AT THE 1982 CONFERENCE HE SPOKE IN HEBREW TO ██████████ AN ISRAELI MILITARY OFFICER, HOWEVER THERE WAS NO ATTEMPT AT RECRUITMENT BY ██████████ THAT POLLARD WAS AWARE OF. POLLARD SAW ██████████ AGAIN AT THE 1983 CONFERENCE, BUT THEY DID NOT SPEAK. FOLLOWING HIS DECISION TO ASSIST ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE, HE CONSIDERED APPROACHING THE ISRAELI MILITARY ATTACHE BUT HE NEEDED AN INTERMEDIARY AND SO THOUGHT OF ██████████. BUT AFTER ██████████ REJECTED HIS RECRUITMENT BID POLLARD HAD NO VIABLE "CUT-OUT" TO EFFECT THE LINK, AND SO HE TALKED TO ██████████ ABOUT EMIGRATING. HER REFUSAL TO DO SO PUT HIM IN A QUANDARY BECAUSE HE PLACED HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH HER ABOVE HIS PERSONAL DESIRES AND THEREFORE WAS COMPELLED TO REMAIN IN THE U.S. HE CONSIDERED QUITTING THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND GOING TO WORK IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, TAKING WITH HIM A STOCKPILE OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS TO PASS TO ISRAEL, BUT HE DECIDED THIS WAS UNPROFESSIONAL. HE THEN CONSIDERED WORKING IN THE U.S. FOR ISRAELI AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES (IAI), ISRAELI MILITARY INDUSTRIES (IMI), OR ZIM. BUT ONCE ██████████ CALLED, POLLARD NO LONGER HAD TO CONSIDER THESE OTHER OPTIONS. ██████████ KNEW POLLARD'S KNOWLEDGE, INTEREST, AND DUALITY OF LOYALTY, SO POLLARD FELT THAT ██████████ KNEW HE (POLLARD) WAS RECRUITABLE, ALTHOUGH THAT WAS NEVER DISCUSSED. THEY DISCUSSED THE MIDDLE EAST A GREAT DEAL. ██████████ WAS ADVISING DURING THEIR EARLY CONVERSATIONS THAT POLLARD SHOULD EITHER EMIGRATE OR GO TO IAI, IMI, ETC., IN THE U.S. IN ORDER TO HELP ISRAEL. CONSEQUENTLY, BY THE SPRING OF 1984 WHEN ██████████ SUGGESTED POLLARD MEET AN ISRAELI OFFICER, POLLARD WAS READY TO DO WHAT HE FELT HAD BEEN NECESSARY ALL ALONG.

AT THE INITIAL MEETING WITH ██████████ CLEARLY DEFINED THE TARGET OF THE OPERATION AS THE RUSSIANS AND THE ARABS. POLLARD DESCRIBED ██████████ AS A MAGNETIC "CHUCK YAEGER" TYPE. HE SUBSEQUENTLY LEARNED THAT ██████████ SHOT DOWN SOVIET PILOTED EGYPTIAN MIGS OVER THE SUEZ IN 1969, AND ANYONE WITH "RUSSIAN BLOOD ON HIS HANDS" WAS ALRIGHT WITH POLLARD. POLLARD DESCRIBED TO ██████████ WHERE HE WORKED, WHAT HE DID AND DID NOT HAVE ACCESS TO (DIA, NSA, CIA, NPIC) AND PROMISED HE COULD EXPLOIT SECURITY "CHASMS." ██████████ DID NOT BELIEVE THAT SECURITY COULD BE THAT LAX AND SEEMED SKEPTICAL. ██████████ STATED FLATLY TO POLLARD THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD ISRAEL REQUEST ANY INFORMATION ON U.S. MILITARY CAPABILITIES, CODES OR CIPHERS AND PROVIDING ANY SUCH INFORMATION WOULD BE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE TERMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP. ██████████ REQUESTED THAT POLLARD PROVIDE HIM TELEPHONE NUMBERS FOR CONTACT PURPOSES, SO POLLARD LEFT THE MEETING FOR TWENTY MINUTES AND RETURNED WITH THE NUMBERS OF TELEPHONE BOOTHS IN THE VICINITY OF HIS APARTMENT. ██████████ MADE UP A ONE-LETTER CODE FOR EACH TELEPHONE NUMBER AND EXPLAINED THAT HE WOULD CALL POLLARD AT HOME, GIVE POLLARD A CODE, AND THEN POLLARD WAS TO GO TO THAT PHONE BOOTH AND WAIT FOR A CALL. ██████████ SAID HE WOULD CALL POLLARD WHEN IT WAS TIME FOR THE NEXT MEETING, AND HE WANTED POLLARD TO BRING WITH HIM TO THAT MEETING ANYTHING ON SAUDI ARABIA AND ON SOVIET AIR DEFENSE. ██████████ ALSO MADE A PERSONAL REQUEST FOR A SATELLITE PHOTO

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OF THE ISRAELI BOMBING RAID ON A TUWAITHA NUCLEAR REACTOR (A RAID WHICH [REDACTED] HAD COMMANDED).

THE NEXT MEETING WITH [REDACTED] OCCURRED A WEEK TO TEN DAYS LATER AT THE HILTON HOTEL IN WASHINGTON, D.C. AS BEFORE. POLLARD RECALLED THAT HE WALKED THERE FROM HIS APARTMENT, CARRYING A BRIEFCASE CONTAINING THE REQUESTED MATERIAL. POLLARD STATED THAT AT THAT TIME HE HAD THE DAY OFF FROM HIS DUTIES AS AN ATAC WATCHSTANDER, BUT HE DROVE TO THE OFFICE PRIOR TO THE MEETING AND PICKED UP THE DOCUMENTS HE HAD STOCKPILED THERE. POLLARD MET [REDACTED] IN THE HOTEL LOBBY, WHEREUPON [REDACTED] SUGGESTED THEY GO SOMEWHERE. POLLARD THEN SUGGESTED THEY DRIVE TO DUMBARTON OAKS FOR THEIR MEETING, WHICH THEY DID. UPON THEIR ARRIVAL THERE, THEY CONVERSED AT A PICNIC TABLE AT THE REAR OF THE DESERTED PARK. [REDACTED] WAS SHOCKED AT THE SATELLITE PHOTO POLLARD HAD BROUGHT WHICH DEMONSTRATED THE SUCCESS OF THE RAID ON TUWAITHA. POLLARD ALSO BROUGHT A THREE-VOLUME SERIES ON SAUDI ARABIAN GROUND FORCES AND A GROUND LOGISTICS STUDY, BOTH OF WHICH [REDACTED] SAID HE HAD NEVER SEEN ANYTHING SIMILAR TO BEFORE. [REDACTED] INDICATED THAT ALL ISRAEL HAD ON SAUDI ARABIA WAS EXXON MAPS. [REDACTED] APPEARED VISIBLY RELIEVED AT THE QUALITY AND CONTENT OF POLLARD'S SAMPLES AND SHOWED NO CONCERN WITH DETECTION OR COUNTERSURVEILLANCE AT THE MEETING. [REDACTED] STRESSED THAT SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION WAS THE MOST USEFUL AND THAT ISRAEL DID NOT NEED MUCH TERRORIST INFORMATION FROM THE U.S. AIR DEFENSE WAS OF PRIMARY INTEREST, INCLUDING COCKPIT LAYOUTS, UPLINKS AND DOWNLINKS, RADAR, NAVIGATION BEACONS, ETC. NO MENTION WAS MADE OF FOREIGN MILITARY SALES OR FOREIGN MATERIAL EXPLOITATION. POLLARD TOOK THE SAMPLE DOCUMENTS BACK TO THE OFFICE, BUT LATER PROVIDED THEM TO THE ISRAELIS AGAIN AT THE FIRST DEBORAH STREET MEETING. THE MENAS (MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA SUMMARY) TRAFFIC AND NSA MATERIAL WAS GATHERED FOR THE THIRD MEETING. POLLARD PROVIDED OVERLAPPING CONTINUAL COVERAGE BEGINNING TWO WEEKS PRIOR TO THE FIRST DEBORAH STREET MEET AND HE STATED THAT HE TOOK EVERY MENAS MESSAGE FROM THE TIME OF HIS INVOLVEMENT (1984). HE OBTAINED THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (NID) FROM NISC AND XEROXED OR WROTE IT OUT IN LONGHAND THERE, AND HE ADDITIONALLY OBTAINED AN NSA STUDY ON EGYPTIAN AIR DEFENSE C. POLLARD ALSO SCREENED USDAO HARD COPY REPORTS FROM THE MIDDLE EAST AND WAS ABLE TO ACCESS THEM ON HIS TERMINAL AT ATAC. WHEN MELOS (MEDITERRANEAN LITTORAL OPINTEL SUMMARY) BECAME AVAILABLE LATER AT ATAC, HE WAS ABLE TO OBTAIN IT BY SCROLLING THROUGH USDAO REPORTS. THE ISRAELIS USED THE MENAS SUMMARIES TO IDENTIFY NEW UNITS IN ARAB ORDERS OF BATTLE. POLLARD'S ABILITY TO STOCKPILE DOCUMENTS IN THE ATAC NEAR HIS DESK WAS FACILLITATED BY THE CHAOS AND DISORGANIZATION IN ATAC, WHERE STACKS OF MESSAGES WERE LAYING AROUND THE OFFICE.

POLLARD PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING EXAMPLE TO DEMONSTRATE HOW IMPORTANT THE MENAS WAS TO THE ISRAELIS: SOMETIME IN 1985, CIA HAD ALERTED ISRAEL TO A COMING ARAB TERRORIST ATTACK WITHIN THE WEEK, BUT HAD NOT TOLD THEM WHERE, WHEN, HOW, OR WHO. POLLARD WAS ABLE TO OBTAIN THE MENAS MESSAGE WHICH IDENTIFIED THE PARTICULARS, AND WHEN [REDACTED] SAW IT AT THE VAN NESS STREET LOCATION, HE SAID THAT NOW HE KNEW WHERE THE ATTACK WOULD BE, AND LEFT [REDACTED] APARTMENT FOR ABOUT AN HOUR (PRESUMABLY GOING TO THE EMBASSY). LATER THE ISRAELIS BLEW UP A TRUCK WITH FRENCH DIPLOMATIC PLATES BECAUSE OF THIS INFORMATION; OTHERWISE THEY WOULD HAVE WAVED SUCH A TRUCK THROUGH TO AVOID OFFENDING THE UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (UNIFIL).

BEFORE DESCRIBING HIS THIRD MEETING WITH [REDACTED] POLLARD WAS ASKED TO DISCUSS THE SUMMER SCIENCE CAMP HE ATTENDED IN ISRAEL IN 1971 THROUGH

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THE WEIZMAN INSTITUTE. HE ADVISED THAT HE LEARNED OF IT FROM A NOTICE AT HIS SYNAGOGUE, AND THAT ██████████ INITIALLY DIDN'T WANT HIM TO GO BECAUSE SHE WAS AFRAID HE WOULDN'T RETURN TO THE U.S. HE WENT, HOWEVER, AND RECALLED VISITING A NUCLEAR REACTOR AND A PARATROOPER PLANT. HE INDICATED THAT THE EMPHASIS OF THE CAMP WAS TO ENCOURAGE FUTURE EMIGRATION, AND THAT MANY OF THE JEWISH TEENAGERS WHOM HE KNEW DID ULTIMATELY EMIGRATE.

WHEN QUESTIONED REGARDING HIS STATEMENTS TO FELLOW STUDENTS AT STANFORD THAT HE WAS A MEMBER OF MOSSAD WHILE IN COLLEGE, POLLARD STATED THAT THAT STATEMENT WAS AN INVENTION ON HIS PART. SIMILARLY, THE INCIDENT IN WHICH HE WAVED A GUN AROUND WHILE AT STANFORD, CLAIMING HIS LIFE WAS THREATENED, WAS THE RESULT OF DELIRIUM FROM A FEVER CAUSED BY MONONUCLEOSIS AND HALLUCINOGENIC MUSHROOMS.

THE THIRD MEETING BETWEEN POLLARD AND ██████████ STARTED AT THE HOLIDAY INN-CHEVY CHASE APPROXIMATELY A WEEK FOLLOWING THE DUMBARTON OAKS MEETING. AFTER THEY MET AT THE HOTEL, ██████████ DROVE POLLARD TO THE DEBORAH STREET HOUSE IN THE SAME RENTAL CAR (NEW YORK TAGS, THAT HE HAD DRIVEN FOR THE SECOND MEETING. ██████████ TOLD HIM TO REMEMBER THE ROUTE, AS HE WAS TO DRIVE THERE ALONE NEXT TIME. WHEN THEY ARRIVED, POLLARD SAW AN UNKNOWN MALE IN THE HOUSE, ALTHOUGH THEY WERE NOT INTRODUCED. POLLARD LATER TENTATIVELY IDENTIFIED A PHOTOGRAPH OF ██████████ AS BEING SIMILAR TO THE MAN HE SAW. POLLARD DESCRIBED THIS MAN'S ROLE AS PURELY SUPPORT; STATING THAT ALTHOUGH HE AND ██████████ WERE MEETING IN WHAT APPEARED TO BE THIS MAN'S HOUSE, HE WAS NOT A PARTICIPANT IN THE OPERATIONAL DISCUSSIONS. THE HOUSE WAS A SMALL RANCH STYLE AND ALL THE BLINDS WERE DRAWN, ALTHOUGH IT WAS A DAYTIME MEETING. ██████████ AND POLLARD SAT AT THE DINING ROOM TABLE, AND AS EACH DOCUMENT POLLARD BROUGHT WAS REVIEWED IT WAS TAKEN UPSTAIRS AND PRESUMABLY COPIED BY THE OTHER MAN. POLLARD SAW A LARGE FORMAT HASSELBLAD CAMERA IN THE OTHER MAN'S POSSESSION, AND AT ONE POINT HE TOOK COLOR ILFORD FILM OUT OF THE REFRIGERATOR BEFORE GOING BACK UPSTAIRS. POLLARD RECALLED THAT ON ONE OCCASION HE HAD TO BRING A WHOLE STACK OF DOCUMENTS BACK TO THE ISRAELIS BECAUSE SOME FILM HAD BEEN ACCIDENTLY EXPOSED. ADDITIONALLY, POLLARD'S NIS CREDENTIALS AND NIS COURIER CARD WERE COPIED, WHICH HE COULD CONFIRM WHEN THEY SHOWED HIM THE PHOTOCOPY THAT DAY.

AT THIS MEETING, A TRIP TO PARIS WAS DISCUSSED TO MEET "THE OLD MAN." POLLARD ASKED HOW HE WAS SUPPOSED TO AFFORD THAT AND HE WAS TOLD TO PUT IT ON AMERICAN EXPRESS AND THEY WOULD TAKE CARE OF IT. ██████████ TOLD POLLARD TO TELL ██████████ THAT THE TRIP WAS BEING PAID FOR BY A RELATIVE WHO OWNED A JEWELRY BUSINESS, AND THAT IT WAS AN ENGAGEMENT PRESENT (POLLARD AND ██████████ ██████████). NOVEMBER 1984 WAS THE MONTH AGREED UPON, BUT THE EXACT DATES WERE LEFT UP TO POLLARD. IT WAS ALSO DISCUSSED THAT ██████████ NEEDED TO MEET ██████████ SO THAT SHE'D SEE A FAMILIAR FACE IN PARIS; POLLARD'S STORY WAS TO BE THAT HE AND ██████████ WERE OLD SCHOOL BUDDIES AND THAT THE MEETING IN PARIS WAS COINCIDENTAL. ██████████ ALSO REQUESTED THAT POLLARD "PITCH" FOR HIS RETENTION AS HIS HANDLER WHEN HE SAW THE "OLD MAN" IN PARIS.

PAYMENTS WERE ALSO DISCUSSED, BUT THAT SUBJECT HAD FIRST BEEN BROUGHT UP BY ██████████ AT THE SECOND MEETING, ACCORDING TO POLLARD. ██████████ SAID "YOU'LL HAVE TO GET A SALARY FOR THIS." ██████████ ALSO SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD GET ██████████ A GOOD-PAYING JOB AT A JEWISH FIRM. AFTER POLLARD JOKINGLY MENTIONED A FIGURE OF \$200,000; THEY DISCUSSED A SALARY BASED ON POLLARD'S ANNUAL INCOME OF \$30,000, BUT SPECIFICS WERE NOT DISCUSSED. ACCORDING TO POLLARD, IT LATER DEVELOPED (IN PARIS) THAT NEITHER ██████████ NOR ██████████ WANTED MONEY TO BE INVOLVED AS COMPENSATION FOR POLLARD'S ACTIVITIES - IT OBSCURED THE MOTIVE

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IF THINGS LATER WENT WRONG, BESIDES WHICH MONEY WAS DIFFICULT FOR SPIES TO MANAGE.

BECAUSE [REDACTED] WANTED TO MEET [REDACTED] POLLARD CONTACTED HER AT CAMP PERRY, OHIO, WHERE SHE HAD BEEN TEMPORARILY SENT BY THE NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, AND CONVINCED HER TO FLY DOWN TO WASHINGTON THAT NIGHT, 28 JUL 84, FOR DINNER. SHE AND POLLARD SUBSEQUENTLY MET [REDACTED] AND HIS WIFE, [REDACTED] FOR DINNER AT THE FOUR WAYS RESTAURANT, WHERE [REDACTED] MADE A POINT OF SPEAKING ALMOST ENTIRELY TO [REDACTED] ASKING STRICTLY SOCIAL QUESTIONS. FOLLOWING THE DINNER, POLLARD TOLD [REDACTED] THAT [REDACTED] WAS TO BE HIS HANDLER. NO FURTHER CONTACT OCCURRED BETWEEN POLLARD AND [REDACTED] PRIOR TO THE PARIS TRIP, ACCORDING TO POLLARD.

THE LAST TOPIC OF INTERVIEW ON 23 JUL 86 WAS THE TRIP TO PARIS IN NOV 84 BY POLLARD AND [REDACTED]. POLLARD HAD BEEN TOLD BY [REDACTED] AT THE LAST MEETING AT THE DEBORAH STREET LOCATION THAT HE WAS TO BOOK A SUITE AT THE PARIS HILTON AND TO MAKE ALL THE ITINERARY ARRANGEMENTS HIMSELF AND THAT HE WOULD BE REIMBURSED. THE SECOND DAY AFTER THEY ARRIVED IN PARIS, 08 NOV 84, [REDACTED] CALLED THEM IN THEIR \$300.00 A DAY SUITE AND INVITED THEM TO HAVE LUNCH WITH HE AND HIS WIFE AFTER WHICH THE PLAN WAS FOR [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] TO GO SHOPPING AT A JEWELRY STORE WHILE [REDACTED] AND POLLARD WENT FOR A WALK, ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] INSTRUCTIONS ON THE PHONE. THE FOUR THEN MET AT THE INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL FOR LUNCH, AFTER WHICH [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] WENT SHOPPING AND POLLARD AND [REDACTED] WENT FOR A WALK. THEY DISCUSSED THE SYRIAN ACQUISITION OF THE FROGFOOT TRAINER, THE TRAINING OF SYRIAN MIG-29 PILOTS IN THE USSR, AND THE CHANGE IN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS BALANCE OF POWER IF SYRIA DEPLOYED THE SU-27; ALL OF WHICH POLLARD HAD OBTAINED FROM MENAS TRAFFIC AND WHICH HE PROVIDED TO [REDACTED] ONLY VERBALLY AS HE HAD BROUGHT NO DOCUMENTS WITH HIM TO PARIS, OTHER THAN A LEAVE AND EARNINGS STATEMENT FROM NIS. THEIR WALK LASTED 3-4 HOURS AND THEY MET THEIR WIVES BACK AT THE INTERCONTINENTAL, WHERE [REDACTED] ADVISED THEM THAT [REDACTED] HAD SEEN A RING SHE LIKED AT A JEWELRY STORE. THEY ALL WALKED TO THE STORE TO LOOK AT IT AND POLLARD TOLD [REDACTED] AFTER SEEING IT THAT HE COULDN'T AFFORD IT. [REDACTED] REMAINED IN THE JEWELRY STORE FOR A FEW MINUTES AFTER THE OTHERS WALKED OUTSIDE AND HE SPOKE WITH THE MOROCCAN JEWELER. ALL FOUR THEN WENT BACK TO THE HILTON (WHERE THE [REDACTED] WERE ALSO STAYING) AND MET AGAIN THAT NIGHT FOR A DINNER CRUISE. [REDACTED] PAID FOR THE ENTIRE EVENING, CHARGING IT ON HIS AMERICAN EXPRESS CARD, AND AT ONE POINT DURING THE EVENING WHEN A ROVING PHOTOGRAPHER PHOTOGRAPHED THE TWO COUPLES TOGETHER [REDACTED] MADE A SCENE BY SEIZING THE ROLL OF FILM FROM THE PHOTOGRAPHER.

THE NEXT DAY, [REDACTED] AGAIN WENT SHOPPING AND SIGHTSEEING WITH [REDACTED] AND A THIRD WOMAN, [REDACTED] WHO TURNED OUT TO BE THE WIFE OF [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] MET POLLARD AT 9:00 AM IN THE HOTEL LOBBY AND THEY TOOK A 30 MINUTE TAXI RIDE TO AN APARTMENT IN THE CITY, WHICH POLLARD SURMISED PROBABLY BELONGED TO AN ELDERLY GERMAN COUPLE WHO WERE NOT AT HOME. THEY WERE MET AT THE DOOR BY [REDACTED], WHO DID NOT GIVE HIS LAST NAME AND WHOM POLLARD MET FOR THE FIRST TIME. POLLARD WALKED ACROSS THE APARTMENT TO MEET AN OLDER MAN SEATED IN A CHAIR, AND HE WAS INTRODUCED BY [REDACTED] AS [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] SHOOK HANDS WITH POLLARD AND SAID "YOU'RE ONE OF US." BOTH [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] SHOWED DEFERENCE TO [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] TOLD [REDACTED] TO "GET LOST", WHICH RESULTED IN [REDACTED] SITTING ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE ROOM BUT STILL WITHIN EARSHOT OF THE OTHERS. THE NEXT 45 MINUTES WERE VERY OFFICIAL, WHEREIN POLLARD WAS SWORN IN AS AN ISRAELI CITIZEN. POLLARD DESCRIBED IT AS VERY IMPRESSIVE AND VERY CALCULATED AT THE SAME TIME. [REDACTED] TOLD POLLARD THAT THE QUALITY OF THE ISRAELI DEFENSE WOULD BE SHAPED BY WHAT HE COULD GIVE THEM, AND PULLED OUT

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A DOCUMENT CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET IN HEBREW, WHICH APPEARED TO POLLARD TO BE AN ISRAELI PRIME MINISTERIAL BRIEFING PAPER AND VERBALIZED ISRAEL'S PROBLEMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THEN HE "SCARED" POLLARD WITH A PAPER ON THE SYRIAN THREAT, WHICH POLLARD DESCRIBED AS A GENERIC SCENARIO CONCERNING DIFFERENT TYPES OF ATTACKS WHICH COULD BE MOUNTED AGAINST ISRAEL BY SYRIA AND COULD OVERRUN ISRAEL IN 72 HOURS. [REDACTED] HAD ACCURATE ORDER OF BATTLE INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT, AND HE PROCEEDED TO QUERY POLLARD ON HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE SYRIAN ORDER OF BATTLE; INCLUDING THE SA-10, SA-11, AND SA-12 MISSILES, ADVANCED MIG AND SUKHOI AIRCRAFT, ELECTRONICS AND ELECTRICAL INTELLIGENCE, AND ALL OF THE SOVIET ARTILLERY IN THE SYRIAN INVENTORY. [REDACTED] LATER SAID IT WAS [REDACTED]'S STANDARD PITCH USED IN FRONT OF THE CABINET TO LET THEM KNOW WHAT THE ISRAELIS WERE UP AGAINST. A CATERED LUNCH FOLLOWED, DURING WHICH THEY ENGAGED IN SMALL TALK REGARDING POLLARD'S EMPLOYMENT, AND THEN [REDACTED] BEGAN THE AFTERNOON WITH THE REAL EEI'S (ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION) WHICH HE HAD LISTED ON A PREPARED SHEET. THERE WAS NO ATTEMPT IN THE AFTERNOON SESSION TO SEGREGATE [REDACTED] THE EEI'S WERE PRIORITIZED AS FOLLOWS: 1) ARAB NUCINT, 2) ARAB EXOTIC WEAPONRY (CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL/NEUTRON), 3) SOVIET AIR DEFENSE AND C-3, 4) SOVIET AIRCRAFT, AIR -TO-AIR MISSILES (AAM'S), AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES (ASM'S), 5) SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES (SSM'S), AND 6) ARAB ORDERS OF BATTLE, DEPLOYMENT, READINESS, AND SECRET SERVICES. SECRET SERVICES WERE OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE TO [REDACTED] WHO INTERJECTED AT THAT POINT. ONLY ONE SPECIFIC DOCUMENT WAS DISCUSSED AND THAT WAS THE RASIN MANUAL. NO ONE THERE, INCLUDING POLLARD, KNEW AT THAT TIME WHAT THE RASIN WAS; BUT POLLARD SAID HE WOULD FIND OUT SINCE IT SEEMED TO BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO [REDACTED] [REDACTED] INDICATED THAT HE BELIEVED IT HAD SOMETHING TO DO WITH SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE, BUT HE DIDN'T KNOW WHO THE ORIGINATOR WAS.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE WERE DEEMED OF LESSER IMPORTANCE, AND PROCUREMENT OF THAT INFORMATION WAS LEFT UP TO POLLARD'S INITIATIVE. [REDACTED] THEN INDICATED HE WANTED ANY "DIRT" ON ISRAELI CABINET MEMBERS, I.E. CIA PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES, OR IDENTIFICATION OF "RATS" IN ISRAEL, BUT [REDACTED] (STANDING BEHIND [REDACTED] VIOLENTLY SHOOK HIS HEAD "NO" TO BOTH REQUESTS. LATER IN THE KITCHEN, AWAY FROM [REDACTED] [REDACTED] REITERATED TO POLLARD THAT HE WAS NOT TO PROCURE SUCH INFORMATION, AND THAT TO DO SO WOULD BE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE TERMINATION, AS WOULD PROCUREMENT OF U.S. CAPABILITIES.

[REDACTED] LATER DISPLAYED A NAVY ORGANIZATIONAL CHART WHICH INCLUDED A PHYSICAL DIAGRAM OF WHERE EVERYONE WAS LOCATED IN U.S. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. THIS CHART HAD NOT BEEN PROVIDED BY POLLARD. [REDACTED] ALSO DISCUSSED POLLARD'S CLEARANCES AND ASKED FOR INFORMATION ON ANY OPERATIONS THE U.S. HAD TARGETTING THE ISRAELIS, WHICH POLLARD MAINTAINED THAT HE NEVER PROVIDED TO THEM DURING THE COURSE OF THE OPERATION.

POLLARD STATED THAT ALTHOUGH [REDACTED] ASKED HIM TO, HE NEVER COMPROMISED ANY DIA HUMINT FILES OR ANY SOURCE IDENTITIES DURING THIS OPERATION, AND THAT ALTHOUGH SOME SOURCE NUMBERS WERE IDENTIFIED ON SEVERAL IIR'S FOUND IN POLLARD'S APARTMENT, HE NEVER DISCLOSED THEIR IDENTIFIES TO THE ISRAELIS. [REDACTED] STRESSED AT THE END OF THIS DAY'S MEETING THAT HE SHOULD RESIGN IF TOLD TO TAKE A POLYGRAPH. NO INSTRUCITONS WERE PROVIDED ON BEATING THE POLYGRAPH, HE WAS SIMPLY DIRECTED NOT TO TAKE ONE.

END OF RESULTS OF INTERVIEW FOR 23 JULY 86.

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REPORTED BY: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] SPECIAL AGENT
NISRA WASHINGTON, D.C.

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ADMINISTRATIVE MESSAGE

PRIORITY

P 282135Z AUG 86 ZYB

FM NAVINVSERVRA PEARL HARBOR HI

TO COMNAVSECINVCOM WASHINGTON DC

INFO NAVINVSERVREGOPAC PEARL HARBOR HI
NAVINVSERVREGO NORFOLK VA

DECLASSIFIED

NAVINVSERVRA WASHINGTON DC

BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L DIS [REDACTED] //N00000//

U.S. NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
ACTION/LEAD SHEET (PENDING)/28AUG86
ESPIONAGE/CONTROL: 12NOV85-05DC-0637-3CNA

[REDACTED] (U) [REDACTED] b7c
COMMAND/NAVSEVINVCOM WASHINGTON DC/63285
MADE AT/80HN/PEARL HARBOR HI [REDACTED] SPECIAL AGENT

REFERENCE
(A) 05DC ALS/25AUG86
(B) 80HN ROI/24DEC85
COMMENT

1. ~~DECLASSIFIED~~ IN RESPONSE TO REF (A), 80HN COPY OF REF (B) IS NO LONGER
HELD IN HISRA FILES. CONTACT WITH 80HQ DISCLOSED THAT REF (B) IS
NOT HELD THERE EITHER. REQUEST 05DC PROVIDE 80HN WITH COPY OF REF
(B) AS THE AGENT WHO DID THE INTERVIEW AT 80HN HAS TRANSFERED.

ACTION/LEAD
A.05DC... (U) PROVIDE A COPY OF REF (A) TO 80HN.

DISTRIBUTION
NSIC HQ: 0022
CONTROL: 80HQ
ACTION: 05DC
INFO: 05HQ
DECL: OADR
BT

Declassified by authority of
5513.4C
19 Aug 91
On [REDACTED]
By [REDACTED]

DLVR:NAVINVSERVRA WASHINGTON DC(1)...INFO

RTD:000-000/COPIES:0001

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CSN:RXOY0407 NAVINVSERVRA PEARL HARBOR HI

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U.S. NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: [REDACTED] b7c
CCN: 12NOV85-05DC-0637-3CNA

INVESTIGATIVE ACTION: RESULTS OF INTERVIEW

1. ON 23 JUL 86, JONATHAN JAY POLLARD WAS INTERVIEWED AT THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, WASHINGTON, D.C., BY SPECIAL AGENTS [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED], NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE (NIS); SPECIAL AGENTS [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI) AND [REDACTED], OP-009BZ.

2. POLLARD WAS INITIALLY ASKED TO DISCUSS HIS ASSOCIATION WITH [REDACTED] AND HE PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: POLLARD ADVISED THAT HE RENEWED HIS ASSOCIATION WITH HIS CHILDHOOD FRIEND, [REDACTED] IN LATE 1983 WHEN [REDACTED] CALLED POLLARD FROM NEW YORK AND DISCUSSED PROSPECTUSES ON AN ISRAELI MILITARY COMPANY AND A BELGIAN STOCK COMPANY. THEY ALSO DISCUSSED, AT [REDACTED] INITIATION, THE EFFECT ON THE OIL MARKET OF A POSSIBLE PERSIAN GULF/STRAIT OF HORMUZ CLOSURE. THEY CONTINUED TO HAVE SIMILAR TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS UNTIL THE SPRING OF 1984, WHEN THEY MET AT L'ENFANT PLAZA IN WASHINGTON, D.C., WHERE [REDACTED] WAS ATTENDING A ZIONIST CONFERENCE OF A HIGH POWERED ZIONIST FUND RAISING ORGANIZATION, OF WHICH [REDACTED] WAS A MEMBER. THEY ONLY VISITED FOR TEN TO FIFTEEN MINUTES ON THIS OCCASION AND THE CONVERSATION WAS PURELY SOCIAL. POLLARD RECALLED THIS MEETING TAKING PLACE PRIOR TO HIS 17 JUN 84 TRANSFER TO NIS AND THAT [REDACTED] WAS PRESENT AT THIS MEETING.

3. SHORTLY AFTER THIS MEETING, [REDACTED] AGAIN CALLED POLLARD AND THEY TALKED ABOUT THE SYRIAN THREAT TO ISRAEL. LATER IN THE CONVERSATION, [REDACTED] SAID HE'D LIKE TO INTRODUCE POLLARD TO A HIGH-RANKING AIR FORCE MAN, WHO WAS UNDERSTOOD BY POLLARD TO BE AN ISRAELI. POLLARD RECOUNTED THAT HE IMMEDIATELY SAID TO HIMSELF "THAT'S MY OPPORTUNITY" TO BEGIN PROVIDING INFORMATION TO THE ISRAELIS. [REDACTED] SAID HE WOULD GIVE POLLARD'S HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER TO THIS INDIVIDUAL, WHO WAS NOT IDENTIFIED BY [REDACTED] AND HAVE HIM CALL POLLARD; TO WHICH POLLARD AGREED. HE RECALLED THAT ONE OR TWO DAYS LATER HE RECEIVED A CALL FROM [REDACTED] (LATER IDENTIFIED AS [REDACTED], WHO SAID HE WAS [REDACTED] FRIEND AND WANTED TO MEET POLLARD. WITHIN A WEEK OF [REDACTED] PHONE CALL, WHICH POLLARD PLACES IN JUNE 1984, THEY HAD THEIR FIRST MEETING IN WASHINGTON, D.C. AT THE WASHINGTON HILTON HOTEL ON CONNECTICUT AVENUE AND POLLARD OFFERED TO PROVIDE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO ISRAEL. IT WAS OBVIOUS TO POLLARD AT THIS MEETING THAT [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] WERE CLOSE FRIENDS. ADDITIONAL DETAILS OF THIS MEETING ARE PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH (12), INFRA.

4. SEVERAL DAYS AFTER THIS MEETING, [REDACTED] CALLED POLLARD AND ASKED HIM "HOW DID THINGS GO?", TO WHICH POLLARD REPLIED "WE'LL BE SEEING MORE OF EACH OTHER" AND [REDACTED] RESPONDED "GOOD."

5. THE NEXT MEETING WITH [REDACTED] OCCURRED AT THE SHERATON WASHINGTON HOTEL ON CONNECTICUT AVENUE, WHICH POLLARD PLACED IN EITHER AUG/SEP

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1984-16-8

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86

U.S. NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: ██████████ **b7E**
 CCN: 12NOV85-05DC-0637-3CNA

1984 OR WINTER 84, DURING WHICH ██████████ ASKED "WHAT'S GOING ON WITH THE ISRAELIS?" AND POLLARD PROVIDED HIM DETAILS OF THE RELATIONSHIP. POLLARD DESCRIBED THE CONVERSATION AS A "NUTS AND BOLTS" DISCUSSION AND SAID HE TOLD STERN HOW THE ISRAELIS WERE ABOUT TO SEND RECONNAISSANCE DRONE FLIGHTS INTO SYRIA; THE ABILITY FOR WHICH THEY ACQUIRED THROUGH DOCUMENTS POLLARD HAD ALREADY PROVIDED. ██████████ WAS INTERESTED IN THE USEFULNESS OF POLLARD'S INFORMATION TO THE ISRAELIS FOR "THE CAUSE" AND APPEARED TO POLLARD TO HAVE A GOOD LAYMAN'S GRASP OF TECHNICAL MATTERS FROM READING PROFESSIONAL LITERATURE. ██████████ WAS NOT PRESENT AT THIS MEETING, ACCORDING TO POLLARD, BECAUSE HE DIDN'T WANT ██████████ TO REPORT HER PRESENCE BACK TO ██████████ WHO HAD INSISTED THAT SHE NOT BE MADE KNOWLEDGEABLE OF THE OPERATION. ██████████ NAME OCCURRED OPERATIONALLY ON ONLY ONE MORE OCCASION, AND THAT WAS FOLLOWING POLLARD'S RETURN FROM HIS TRIP TO PARIS IN NOV 1984 WHEN POLLARD HAD A DISCUSSION WITH ██████████ HIS PRIMARY HANDLER, ABOUT MONEY. ██████████ WANTED TO GIVE POLLARD AND ANNE A HOUSE IN WASHINGTON, D.C., WHICH COULD ALSO BE USED AS A SAFEHOUSE, AS COMPENSATION FOR HIS ACTIVITIES AND ██████████ AND POLLARD DISCUSSED HOW IT COULD BE COVERTLY FINANCED. ██████████ SUGGESTED THAT ██████████ COULD BUY THE HOUSE AS A WEDDING GIFT FOR POLLARD AND HE ASKED POLLARD TO ASSESS ██████████ RELIABILITY, WHICH MEANT TO POLLARD THAT ██████████ OBVIOUSLY HAD NEVER MET ██████████ WHEN POLLARD DESCRIBED ██████████ AS COMPLETELY RELIABLE, ██████████ INDICATED HE WOULD DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH ██████████ AND POLLARD LATER GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY HAD MET BUT NOT DISCUSSED THE HOUSE AS IT NEVER CAME UP IN DISCUSSION AGAIN. ██████████ NAME ONLY CAME UP IN CONVERSATION WITH THE ISRAELIS ONCE MORE, AND THAT WAS RELATIVE TO ██████████ SON; WHO HAS LEUKEMIA. ██████████ MENTIONED TO POLLARD THAT HE WAS GOING TO CUT ██████████ OUT OF THE OPERATION BECAUSE WHEN HE LAST SAW HIM ██████████ WAS "CRACKING DOWN THE MIDDLE" DUE TO HIS SON'S CONDITION.

6. THE NEXT TOPIC OF INTERVIEW WAS AN ISRAELI INDIVIDUAL KNOWN ONLY AS ██████████ POLLARD DESCRIBED ██████████ AS A MISSLE ENGINEER WHO GRADUATED FROM TECHNION IN HAIFA, ISRAEL, AND WAS A MILITARY RESERVE OFFICER WHO WORKED IN ██████████ OFFICE. POLLARD ADVISED HE MET ██████████ ON ONLY TWO OCCASIONS; ONCE AT THE DEBORAH STREET SAFEHOUSE IN DEC 84 WITH ██████████ AND THE SECOND TIME IN ISRAEL IN JUL 85. HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT ██████████ WAS DESIGNATED AS ██████████ REPLACEMENT AS HIS HANDLER IN THE OPERATION AT SOME POINT IN THE FUTURE. WHILE IN ISRAEL IN JUL 85, POLLARD RECALLED THAT HE AND HIS WIFE HAD DINNER AT ██████████ HOUSE IN TEL AVIV. ██████████ PICKED THEM UP AT THE TEL AVIV HILTON IN A LATE MODEL BLUE FOUR DOOR AUDI WHICH LOOKED LIKE A MERCEDES, POSSIBLY THE AUDI 5000. ██████████ HOUSE WAS APPROXIMATELY A TWENTY MINUTE DRIVE FROM THE HILTON AND WAS IN AN ELEGANT NEIGHBORHOOD OF TWO STORY WHITE STUCCO VILLAS WITH RED TILE ROOFS. THE HOUSE, LOCATED ON A CIRCULAR DEAD END, HAD A TWO CAR GARAGE FACING THE STREET AND WAS SEPARATED FROM NEIGHBORING HOUSES BY HEDGES. POLLARD FELT THE HOUSE WAS ACTUALLY ██████████ RESIDENCE AS OPPOSED TO A SAFEHOUSE DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF CHILDREN'S TOYS IN THE YARD, FAMILY PICTURES IN THE HOUSE, AND EXPENSIVE TV'S AND STEREO

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U.S. NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

TITLE: [REDACTED] b7E
CCN: 12NOV85-05DC-0637-3CNA

EQUIPMENT. POLLARD DESCRIBED [REDACTED] AS FATTER THAN [REDACTED] AND AT LEAST AS TALL. BESIDES POLLARD AND [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] AND HIS WIFE, NAME UNKNOWN, THE OTHER GUESTS AT [REDACTED] HOUSE WERE AVI AND HIS WIFE, [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] AND HIS WIFE, [REDACTED]

7. POLLARD WAS QUESTIONED REGARDING A NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE CENTER (NPIC) STUDY ON THE RAWALPINDI NUCLEAR REACTOR IN PAKISTAN. HE EXPLAINED THAT HE OBTAINED THAT BECAUSE THE ISRAELIS WANTED POLLARD TO FIND OUT (A) HOW MUCH OF THE ISRAELI NUCLEAR PROGRAM WAS KNOWN OUTSIDE ISRAEL AND (B) INFORMATION ON ARAB NUCLEAR PROGRAMS. THEY WANTED INFORMATION ON NUCLEAR PLANTS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT, DELIVERY PLATFORMS, ETC. THEY ALSO WANTED GENERAL NUCLEAR INTELLIGENCE (NUCINT) ON ARABS AND COLLATERAL COUNTRIES. THE ISRAELIS FOCUSED ON RAWALPINDI RIGHT AWAY. [REDACTED] TOLD HIM THAT PRIOR TO POLLARD'S INVOLVEMENT, ISRAEL HAD APPROACHED INDIA REGARDING ASSISTANCE TO INDIA IN AN INDIAN STRIKE TO KNOCK OUT RAWALPINDI, BUT THE INDIANS HAD TOLD ISRAEL THAT THEY DID NOT WANT ANY HELP. POLLARD'S INPUT WAS THEREFORE STRICTLY FOR ISRAEL'S CONTINGENCY PLANNING. POLLARD SUPPLIED THEM WITH AN NPIC STUDY ON RAWALPINDI, WHICH HE BELIEVED HE HAD OBTAINED FROM [REDACTED] A NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT CENTER (NISC) ANALYST IN NISC 42 .

8. THE FOLLOWING SECTION DETAILS POLLARD'S ATTEMPT TO RECRUIT [REDACTED] A FORMER FLETCHER ROOMMATE, AS AN ASSISTANT TO HELP HIM IN THE LOGISTICS OF PROVIDING INFORMATION TO ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE. POLLARD STATED THAT WHEN HE DECIDED TO APPROACH [REDACTED] HE HAD NOT YET HAD ANY CONTACT WITH [REDACTED] BUT HE HAD ALREADY FORMULATED HIS PLAN TO ASSIST ISRAEL AND HE BELIEVED HE WOULD NEED A BACK UP TO ASSIST HIM IN THE OPERATION, I.E. SERVICING DROPS, ATTENDING MEETS, ETC. HIS CONCEPT WAS TO PRESENT ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE WITH AN IN-PLACE "NET" OR OPERATING RING WHICH COULD BEGIN WITH MINIMAL STARTUP TIME. HE SELECTED [REDACTED] WHO WORKED AT THE VOICE OF AMERICA, BECAUSE HE KNEW HE HAD ACCESS TO HIGHLY PLACED OFFICIALS, HE WAS SYMPATHETIC TO THE STATE OF ISRAEL, WAS JEWISH, HAD TRAVELLED THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, AND MIGHT EVEN HAVE SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE NOT AVAILABLE TO POLLARD.

9. POLLARD RECALLED THAT IN THE SPRING OF 1984, PRIOR TO EMPLOYMENT WITH NIS, HE TELEPHONED [REDACTED] WHO LIVED IN AN APARTMENT IN WASHINGTON, D.C., AND INVITED HIMSELF AND [REDACTED] OVER FOR A SHORT VISIT. WHEN THEY ARRIVED, POLLARD TOLD [REDACTED] THAT HE WAS GOING TO SET UP A "RELATIONSHIP" WITH THE ISRAELIS AND WOULD NEED SOME HELP. [REDACTED] HEDGED, AND SAID NEITHER YES NOR NO WHEN POLLARD ASKED HIM DIRECTLY IF HE WOULD LIKE TO BECOME INVOLVED. THE SUBJECT OF FINANCIAL REMUNERATION CAME UP, HOWEVER POLLARD CAN'T RECALL WHO BROUGHT IT UP. [REDACTED] BECAME NOTICEABLY UNCOMFORTABLE DURING THE CONVERSATION AND POLLARD AND [REDACTED] DEPARTED THE APARTMENT SHORTLY THEREAFTER WITH NO COMMITMENT FROM [REDACTED] THE FOLLOWING DAY, [REDACTED] CONTACTED POLLARD AND REQUESTED A MEETING. THEY MET, AND DURING A LONG WALK TOGETHER [REDACTED]

*U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1984-429-883

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TITLE: ██████████ **b7E**
 CCN: 12NOV85-05DC-0637-3CNA

TRIED TO GET POLLARD TO SAY THAT THE CONVERSATION OF THE PREVIOUS DAY NEVER TOOK PLACE. POLLARD STATED THAT HE BELIEVED ██████████ WANTED POLLARD TO DENY THE RECRUITMENT PITCH HAD EVER BEEN MADE SO HE WOULD HAVE A PLAUSIBLE DENIAL SHOULD HE EVER BE QUESTIONED IN THE FUTURE. FOLLOWING THESE TWO MEETINGS, ██████████ NEVER EXPRESSED ANY CURIOSITY OVER POLLARD'S OPERATION AND IT WAS NEVER DISCUSSED AGAIN.

10. POLLARD WAS NEXT ASKED TO DISCUSS HIS PERSONAL HISTORY RELATIVE TO HOW HE ARRIVED AT THE DECISION TO COMMIT ESPIONAGE. POLLARD ADVISED THAT HE ALWAYS FELT AN UNCOMFORTABLE DUALITY OF LOYALTY TO BOTH THE U.S. AND ISRAEL DUE TO "ETHNIC PARANOIA." HIS HOUSEHOLD WAS FANATICALLY PRO-U.S. BUT HIGHLY POLITICIZED REGARDING ZIONISM. DUE TO CHILDHOOD EXPERIENCES, ETC., POLLARD EXPLAINED THAT HE ONLY FELT HAPPINESS WITH HIS "OWN KIND" AND HE STATED THAT HE HAD ALWAYS WANTED TO EMIGRATE. SOME ZIONISTS EMIGRATE, HE EXPLAINED, OTHERS STAY IN THE DIASPORA AS "BEACH HEADS." POLLARD CONTINUED THAT HE FELT ISRAEL COULDN'T EXIST WITHOUT A VIABLE ISRAELI COMMUNITY IN AMERICA, AND SINCE HIS PARENTS DIDN'T WANT HIM TO EMIGRATE HE DECIDED TO ASSIST ISRAEL WHILE REMAINING IN THE U.S. HIS ULTIMATE GOAL, HOWEVER, WAS TO EMIGRATE.

11. POLLARD ATTENDED AN ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCE-U.S. (IDF/US) EXCHANGE CONFERENCE IN 1982 AND FOR THE FIRST TIME BEGAN TO CONTEMPLATE DIRECT ACTION OTHER THAN EMIGRATION. HE WAS HORRIFIED BY THE ANTI-SEMITIC REMARKS HE HEARD FROM THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVES AT THE CONFERENCE, SUCH AS "LET'EM LOSE A COUPLE OF PILOTS AND THEY'LL FIGURE IT OUT." THE U.S. DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS DID NOT SEEM TO AGREE WITH THE TENOR OF THE AGREEMENTS FOR EXCHANGE. THE CHEMICAL WARFARE QUESTION, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS RESPONDED TO WITH A JOKE ABOUT NAZI GAS CHAMBERS RATHER THAN PROVIDING THE PERTINENT DOCUMENTS. POLLARD CLAIMED HE "SNAPPED." HE DECIDED IF HE COULD SAVE ONE ISRAELI LIFE AND HELP ISRAEL WIN THE NEXT WAR WITH THE ARABS AND THE RUSSIANS, HE WOULD. THE BEIRUT MARINE BOMBING, WITH THE U.S. DETERMINED TO DO NOTHING IN RESPONSE, CONFIRMED THE CORRECTNESS OF SPYING TO HIM. HE WAS ALSO "PATHOLOGICAL" TOWARD THE RUSSIANS, BY HIS OWN DESCRIPTION. HE CLAIMED TO HAVE PERSONALLY SEEN THE SOVIET TAKEOVER OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN 1968, WHICH HAD ENDED HIS CHILDHOOD AND DEMONSTRATED TO HIM WHAT A COUNTRY UNDER RUSSIAN COMMUNIST RULE WAS LIKE. AT THAT MOMENT, THEREFORE, HE FELT HE SHOULD PUT UP OR SHUT UP RELATIVE TO HELPING ISRAEL AND BY THE TIME HE ATTENDED HIS SECOND IDF/US EXCHANGE, IN OCT 83, HE HAD DECIDED HE HAD TO DO SOMETHING. AT THE 1982 CONFERENCE HE SPOKE IN HEBREW TO ██████████, AN ISRAELI MILITARY OFFICER, HOWEVER THERE WAS NO ATTEMPT AT CO-OPTING BY ██████████. POLLARD SAW ██████████ AGAIN AT THE 1983 CONFERENCE, BUT THEY DID NOT SPEAK. FOLLOWING HIS DECISION TO ASSIST ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE, HE CONSIDERED APPROACHING THE ISRAELI MILITARY ATTACHE BUT HE NEEDED AN INTERMEDIARY AND SO THOUGHT OF ██████████ BUT AFTER ██████████ REJECTED HIS RECRUITMENT BID POLLARD HAD NO VIABLE "CUT-OUT" TO EFFECT THE LINK, AND SO HE TALKED TO ██████████ ABOUT

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EMIGRATING. HER REFUSAL TO DO SO PUT HIM IN A QUANDARY BECAUSE HE PLACED HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH HER ABOVE HIS PERSONAL DESIRES AND THEREFORE WAS COMPELLED TO REMAIN IN THE U.S. HE CONSIDERED QUITTING THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND GOING TO WORK IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, TAKING WITH HIM A STOCKPILE OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS TO PASS TO ISRAEL, BUT HE DECIDED THIS WAS UNPROFESSIONAL. HE THEN CONSIDERED WORKING IN THE U.S. FOR ISRAELI AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES (IAI), ISRAELI MILITARY INDUSTRIES (IMI), OR ZIM. BUT ONCE ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CALLED, POLLARD NO LONGER HAD TO CONSIDER THESE OTHER OPTIONS. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ KNEW POLLARD'S KNOWLEDGE, INTEREST, AND DUALITY OF LOYALTY, SO POLLARD FELT THAT ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ KNEW HE (POLLARD) WAS RECRUITABLE, ALTHOUGH THAT WAS NEVER DISCUSSED. THEY DISCUSSED THE MIDDLE EAST A GREAT DEAL. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ WAS ADVISING DURING THEIR EARLY CONVERSATIONS THAT POLLARD SHOULD EITHER EMIGRATE OR GO TO IAI, IMI, ETC., IN THE U.S. IN ORDER TO HELP ISRAEL. CONSEQUENTLY, BY THE SPRING OF 1984 WHEN ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SUGGESTED POLLARD MEET AN ISRAELI OFFICER, POLLARD WAS READY TO DO WHAT HE FELT HAD BEEN NECESSARY ALL ALONG.

12. AT THE INITIAL MEETING WITH ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CLEARLY DEFINED THE TARGET OF THE OPERATION AS THE RUSSIANS AND THE ARABS. POLLARD DESCRIBED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AS A MAGNETIC "CHUCK YAEGER" TYPE. HE SUBSEQUENTLY LEARNED THAT ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SHOT DOWN SOVIET PILOTED EGYPTIAN MIGS OVER THE SUEZ IN 1969, AND ANYONE WITH "RUSSIAN BLOOD ON HIS HANDS" WAS ALRIGHT WITH POLLARD. POLLARD DESCRIBED TO ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ WHERE HE WORKED, WHAT HE DID AND DID NOT HAVE ACCESS TO (DIA, NSA, CIA, NPIC) AND PROMISED HE COULD EXPLOIT SECURITY "CHASMS." ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DID NOT BELIEVE THAT SECURITY COULD BE THAT LAX AND SEEMED SKEPTICAL. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATED FLATLY TO POLLARD THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD ISRAEL REQUEST ANY INFORMATION ON U.S. MILITARY CAPABILITIES, CODES OR CIPHERS AND PROVIDING ANY SUCH INFORMATION WOULD BE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE TERMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ REQUESTED THAT POLLARD PROVIDE HIM TELEPHONE NUMBERS FOR CONTACT PURPOSES, SO POLLARD LEFT THE MEETING FOR TWENTY MINUTES AND RETURNED WITH THE NUMBERS OF TELEPHONE BOOTHS IN THE VICINITY OF HIS APARTMENT. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MADE UP A ONE-LETTER CODE FOR EACH TELEPHONE NUMBER AND EXPLAINED THAT HE WOULD CALL POLLARD AT HOME, GIVE POLLARD A CODE, AND THEN POLLARD WAS TO GO TO THAT PHONE BOOTH AND WAIT FOR A CALL. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SAID HE WOULD CALL POLLARD WHEN IT WAS TIME FOR THE NEXT MEETING, AND HE WANTED POLLARD TO BRING WITH HIM TO THAT MEETING ANYTHING ON SAUDI ARABIA AND ON SOVIET AIR DEFENSE. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ALSO MADE A PERSONAL REQUEST FOR A SATELLITE PHOTO OF THE ISRAELI BOMBING RAID ON A TUWAITHA NUCLEAR REACTOR (A RAID WHICH ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ HAD CONDUCTED).

13. THE NEXT MEETING WITH ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ OCCURRED A WEEK TO TEN DAYS LATER AT THE HILTON HOTEL IN WASHINGTON, D.C. AS BEFORE. POLLARD RECALLED THAT HE WALKED THERE FROM HIS APARTMENT, CARRYING A BRIEFCASE CONTAINING THE REQUESTED MATERIAL. POLLARD STATED THAT AT THAT TIME HE HAD THE DAY OFF FROM HIS DUTIES AS AN ATAC WATCHSTANDER, BUT HE DROVE TO THE OFFICE PRIOR TO THE MEETING AND PICKED UP THE DOCUMENTS HE HAD

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STOCKPILED THERE. POLLARD MET [REDACTED] IN THE HOTEL LOBBY, WHEREUPON [REDACTED] SUGGESTED THEY GO SOMEWHERE. POLLARD THEN SUGGESTED THEY DRIVE TO DUMBARTON OAKS FOR THEIR MEETING, WHICH THEY DID. UPON THEIR ARRIVAL THERE, THEY CONVERSED AT A PICNIC TABLE AT THE REAR OF THE DESERTED PARK. [REDACTED] WAS SHOCKED AT THE SATELLITE PHOTO POLLARD HAD BROUGHT WHICH DEMONSTRATED THE SUCCESS OF THE RAID ON TUWAITHA. POLLARD ALSO BROUGHT A THREE-VOLUME SERIES ON SAUDI ARABIAN GROUND FORCES AND A GROUND LOGISTICS STUDY, BOTH OF WHICH [REDACTED] SAID HE HAD NEVER SEEN ANYTHING SIMILAR TO BEFORE. [REDACTED] INDICATED THAT ALL ISRAEL HAD ON SAUDI ARABIA WAS EXXON MAPS. [REDACTED] APPEARED VISIBLY RELIEVED AT THE QUALITY AND CONTENT OF POLLARD'S SAMPLES AND SHOWED NO CONCERN WITH DETECTION OR COUNTERSURVEILLANCE AT THE MEETING. [REDACTED] STRESSED THAT SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION WAS THE MOST USEFUL AND THAT ISRAEL DID NOT NEED MUCH TERRORIST INFORMATION FROM THE U.S. AIR DEFENSE WAS OF PRIMARY INTEREST, INCLUDING COCKPIT LAYOUTS, UPLINKS AND DOWNLINKS, RADAR, NAVIGATION BEACONS, ETC. NO MENTION WAS MADE OF FOREIGN MILITARY SALES OR FOREIGN MATERIAL EXPLOITATION. POLLARD TOOK THE SAMPLE DOCUMENTS BACK TO THE OFFICE, BUT LATER PROVIDED THEM TO THE ISRAELIS AGAIN AT THE FIRST DEBORAH STREET MEETING. THE MENAS (MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA SUMMARY) TRAFFIC AND NSA MATERIAL WAS GATHERED FOR THE THIRD MEETING. POLLARD PROVIDED OVERLAPPING CONTINUAL COVERAGE BEGINNING TWO WEEKS PRIOR TO THE FIRST DEBORAH STREET MEET AND HE STATED THAT HE TOOK EVERY MENAS MESSAGE FROM THE TIME OF HIS INVOLVEMENT (1984). HE OBTAINED THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (NID) FROM NISC AND XEROXED OR WROTE IT OUT IN LONGHAND THERE AND HE ADDITIONALLY OBTAINED AN NSA STUDY ON EGYPTIAN AIR DEFENSE C³. POLLARD ALSO SCREENED USDAO HARD COPY REPORTS FROM THE MIDDLE EAST AND WAS ABLE TO ACCESS THEM ON HIS TERMINAL AT ATAC. WHEN MELOS (MEDITERRANEAN LITTORAL OPINTEL SUMMARY) BECAME AVAILABLE LATER AT ATAC, HE WAS ABLE TO OBTAIN IT BY SCROLLING THROUGH USDAO REPORTS. THE ISRAELIS USED THE MENAS SUMMARIES TO IDENTIFY NEW UNITS IN ARAB ORDERS OF BATTLE. POLLARD'S ABILITY TO STOCKPILE DOCUMENTS IN THE ATAC NEAR HIS DESK WAS FACILLITATED BY THE CHAOS AND DISORGANIZATION IN ATAC, WHERE STACKS OF MESSAGES WERE LAYING AROUND THE OFFICE.

14. POLLARD PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING EXAMPLE TO DEMONSTRATE HOW IMPORTANT THE MENAS WAS TO THE ISRAELIS: SOMETIME IN 1985, CIA HAD ALERTED ISRAEL TO A COMING ARAB TERRORIST ATTACK WITHIN THE WEEK, BUT HAD NOT TOLD THEM WHERE, WHEN, HOW, OR WHO. POLLARD WAS ABLE TO OBTAIN THE MENAS MESSAGE WHICH IDENTIFIED THE PARTICULARS, AND WHEN [REDACTED] SAW IT AT THE VAN NESS STREET LOCATION, HE SAID THAT NOW HE KNEW WHERE THE ATTACK WOULD BE, AND LEFT [REDACTED] APARTMENT FOR ABOUT AN HOUR (PRESUMABLY GOING TO THE EMBASSY). LATER THE ISRAELIS BLEW UP A TRUCK WITH FRENCH DIPLOMATIC PLATES BECAUSE OF THIS INFORMATION; OTHERWISE THEY WOULD HAVE WAVED SUCH A TRUCK THROUGH TO AVOID OFFENDING THE UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (UNIFIL).

15. BEFORE DESCRIBING HIS THIRD MEETING WITH [REDACTED] POLLARD WAS

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ASKED TO DISCUSS THE SUMMER SCIENCE CAMP HE ATTENDED IN ISRAEL IN 1971 THROUGH THE WEIZMAN INSTITUTE. HE ADVISED THAT HE LEARNED OF IT FROM A NOTICE AT HIS SYNAGOGUE, AND THAT [REDACTED] INITIALLY DIDN'T WANT HIM TO GO BECAUSE SHE WAS AFRAID HE WOULDN'T RETURN TO THE U.S. HE WENT, HOWEVER, AND RECALLED VISITING A NUCLEAR REACTOR AND A PARATROOPER PLANT. HE INDICATED THAT THE EMPHASIS OF THE CAMP WAS TO ENCOURAGE FUTURE EMIGRATION, AND THAT MANY OF THE JEWISH TEENAGERS WHOM HE KNEW DID ULTIMATELY EMIGRATE.

16. WHEN QUESTIONED REGARDING HIS STATEMENTS TO FELLOW STUDENTS AT STANFORD THAT HE WAS A MEMBER OF MOSSAD WHILE IN COLLEGE, POLLARD STATED THAT THAT STATEMENT WAS AN INVENTION ON HIS PART. SIMILARLY, THE INCIDENT IN WHICH HE WAVED A GUN AROUND WHILE AT STANFORD, CLAIMING HIS LIFE WAS THREATENED, WAS THE RESULT OF DELIRIUM FROM A FEVER CAUSED BY MONONUCLEOSIS AND HALLUCINOGENIC MUSHROOMS.

17. THE THIRD MEETING BETWEEN POLLARD AND [REDACTED] STARTED AT THE HOLIDAY INN-CHEVY CHASE APPROXIMATELY A WEEK FOLLOWING THE DUMBARTON OAKS MEETING. AFTER THEY MET AT THE HOTEL, [REDACTED] DROVE POLLARD TO THE DEBORAH STREET HOUSE IN THE SAME RENTAL CAR (NEW YORK TAGS, THAT HE HAD DRIVEN FOR THE SECOND MEETING. [REDACTED] TOLD HIM TO REMEMBER THE ROUTE, AS HE WAS TO DRIVE THERE ALONE NEXT TIME. WHEN THEY ARRIVED, POLLARD SAW [REDACTED] FOR THE FIRST TIME, ALTHOUGH THEY WERE NOT INTRODUCED. POLLARD DESCRIBED [REDACTED] ROLE AS PURELY SUPPORT, STATING THAT ALTHOUGH HE AND [REDACTED] WERE MEETING IN [REDACTED] HOUSE, [REDACTED] WAS NOT A PARTICIPANT IN THE OPERATIONAL DISCUSSIONS. THE HOUSE WAS A SMALL RANCH STYLE AND ALL THE BLINDS WERE DRAWN, ALTHOUGH IT WAS A DAYTIME MEETING. [REDACTED] AND POLLARD SAT AT THE DINING ROOM TABLE, AND AS EACH DOCUMENT POLLARD BROUGHT WAS REVIEWED IT WAS TAKEN UPSTAIRS AND PRESUMABLY COPIED BY [REDACTED] POLLARD SAW A LARGE FORMAT HASSELBLAD CAMERA IN [REDACTED] POSSESSION, AND AT ONE POINT [REDACTED] TOOK COLOR ILFORD FILM OUT OF THE REFRIGERATOR BEFORE GOING BACK UPSTAIRS. POLLARD RECALLED THAT ON ONE OCCASION HE HAD TO BRING A WHOLE STACK OF DOCUMENTS BACK TO THE ISRAELIS BECAUSE SOME FILM HAD BEEN ACCIDENTLY EXPOSED. ADDITIONALLY, POLLARD'S NIS CREDENTIALS AND NIS COURIER CARD WERE COPIED, WHICH HE COULD CONFIRM WHEN THEY SHOWED HIM THE PHOTOCOPY THAT DAY.

18. AT THIS MEETING, A TRIP TO PARIS WAS DISCUSSED TO MEET "THE OLD MAN." POLLARD ASKED HOW HE WAS SUPPOSED TO AFFORD THAT AND HE WAS TOLD TO PUT IT ON AMERICAN EXPRESS AND THEY WOULD TAKE CARE OF IT. [REDACTED] TOLD POLLARD TO TELL [REDACTED] THAT THE TRIP WAS BEING PAID FOR BY A RELATIVE WHO OWNED A JEWELRY BUSINESS, AND THAT IT WAS AN ENGAGEMENT PRESENT (POLLARD AND [REDACTED] GOT ENGAGED 04 JUL 84). NOVEMBER 1984 WAS THE MONTH AGREED UPON, BUT THE EXACT DATES WERE LEFT UP TO POLLARD. IT WAS ALSO DISCUSSED THAT [REDACTED] NEEDED TO MEET [REDACTED] SO THAT SHE'D SEE A FAMILIAR FACE IN PARIS; POLLARD'S STORY WAS TO BE THAT HE AND [REDACTED] WERE OLD SCHOOL BUDDIES AND THAT THE MEETING IN PARIS WAS COINCIDENTAL.

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[REDACTED] ALSO REQUESTED THAT POLLARD "PITCH" FOR HIS RETENTION AND HIS HANDLER WHEN HE SAW THE "OLD MAN" IN PARIS.

19. PAYMENTS WERE ALSO DISCUSSED, BUT THAT SUBJECT HAD FIRST BEEN BROUGHT UP BY [REDACTED] AT THE SECOND MEETING, ACCORDING TO POLLARD. [REDACTED] SAID "YOU'LL HAVE TO GET A SALARY FOR THIS." [REDACTED] ALSO SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD GET [REDACTED] A GOOD-PAYING JOB AT A JEWISH FIRM. AFTER POLLARD JOKINGLY MENTIONED A FIGURE OF \$200,000; THEY DISCUSSED A SALARY BASED ON POLLARD'S ANNUAL INCOME OF \$30,000, BUT SPECIFICS WERE NOT DISCUSSED. ACCORDING TO POLLARD, IT LATER DEVELOPED (IN PARIS) THAT NEITHER [REDACTED] NOR [REDACTED] WANTED MONEY TO BE INVOLVED AS COMPENSATION FOR POLLARD'S ACTIVITIES - IT OBSCURED THE MOTIVE IF THINGS LATER WENT WRONG, BESIDES WHICH MONEY WAS DIFFICULT FOR SPIES TO MANAGE.

20. BECAUSE [REDACTED] WANTED TO MEET [REDACTED] POLLARD CONTACTED HER AT CAMP PERRY, OHIO, WHERE SHE HAD BEEN TEMPORARILY SENT BY THE NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, AND CONVINCED HER TO FLY DOWN TO WASHINGTON THAT NIGHT, 28 JUL 84, FOR DINNER. SHE AND POLLARD SUBSEQUENTLY MET [REDACTED] AND HIS WIFE, [REDACTED], FOR DINNER AT THE FOUR WAYS RESTAURANT, WHERE [REDACTED] MADE A POINT OF SPEAKING ALMOST ENTIRELY TO [REDACTED] ASKING STRICTLY SOCIAL QUESTIONS. FOLLOWING THE DINNER, POLLARD TOLD ANNE THAT [REDACTED] WAS TO BE HIS HANDLER. NO FURTHER CONTACT OCCURRED BETWEEN POLLARD AND [REDACTED] PRIOR TO THE PARIS TRIP, ACCORDING TO POLLARD.

21. THE LAST TOPIC OF INTERVIEW ON 23 JUL 86 WAS THE TRIP TO PARIS IN NOV 84 BY POLLARD AND [REDACTED] POLLARD HAD BEEN TOLD BY [REDACTED] AT THE LAST MEETING AT THE DEBORAH STREET LOCATION THAT HE WAS TO BOOK A SUITE AT THE PARIS HILTON AND TO MAKE ALL THE ITINERARY ARRANGEMENTS HIMSELF AND THAT HE WOULD BE REIMBURSED. THE SECOND DAY AFTER THEY ARRIVED IN PARIS, 08 NOV 84, [REDACTED] CALLED THEM IN THEIR \$300.00 A DAY SUITE AND INVITED THEM TO HAVE LUNCH WITH HE AND HIS WIFE AFTER WHICH THE PLAN WAS FOR [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] TO GO SHOPPING AT A JEWELRY STORE WHILE [REDACTED] AND POLLARD WENT FOR A WALK, ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] INSTRUCTIONS ON THE PHONE. THE FOUR THEN MET AT THE INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL FOR LUNCH, AFTER WHICH [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] WENT SHOPPING AND POLLARD AND [REDACTED] WENT FOR A WALK. THEY DISCUSSED THE SYRIAN ACQUISITION OF THE FROGFOOT TRAINER, THE TRAINING OF SYRIAN MIG-29 PILOTS IN THE USSR, AND THE CHANGE IN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS BALANCE OF POWER IF SYRIA DEPLOYED THE SU-27; ALL OF WHICH POLLARD HAD OBTAINED FROM MENAS TRAFFIC AND WHICH HE PROVIDED TO [REDACTED] ONLY VERBALLY AS HE HAD BROUGHT NO DOCUMENTS WITH HIM TO PARIS, OTHER THAN A LEAVE AND EARNINGS STATEMENT FROM NIS. THEIR WALK LASTED 3-4 HOURS AND THEY MET THEIR WIVES BACK AT THE INTERCONTINENTAL, WHERE [REDACTED] ADVISED THEM THAT [REDACTED] HAD SEEN A RING SHE LIKED AT A JEWELRY STORE. THEY ALL WALKED TO THE STORE TO LOOK AT IT AND POLLARD TOLD [REDACTED] AFTER SEEING IT THAT HE COULDN'T AFFORD IT. [REDACTED] REMAINED IN THE JEWELRY STORE FOR A FEW MINUTES AFTER THE OTHERS WALKED OUTSIDE AND HE SPOKE WITH THE MOROCCAN JEWELER. ALL FOUR THEN WENT BACK TO THE HILTON (WHERE THE [REDACTED] WERE ALSO STAYING) AND MET AGAIN THAT NIGHT

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FOR A DINNER CRUISE. [REDACTED] PAID FOR THE ENTIRE EVENING, CHARGING IT ON HIS AMERICAN EXPRESS CARD, AND AT ONE POINT DURING THE EVENING WHEN A ROVING PHOTOGRAPHER PHOTOGRAPHED THE TWO COUPLES TOGETHER [REDACTED] MADE A SCENE BY SEIZING THE ROLL OF FILM FROM THE PHOTOGRAPHER.

22. THE NEXT DAY, [REDACTED] AGAIN WENT SHOPPING AND SIGHTSEEING WITH [REDACTED] AND A THIRD WOMAN, [REDACTED] WHO TURNED OUT TO BE THE WIFE OF [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] MET POLLARD AT 9:00 AM IN THE HOTEL LOBBY AND THEY TOOK A 30 MINUTE TAXI RIDE TO AN APARTMENT IN THE CITY, WHICH POLLARD SURMISED PROBABLY BELONGED TO AN ELDERLY GERMAN COUPLE WHO WERE NOT AT HOME. THEY WERE MET AT THE DOOR BY [REDACTED] WHO DID NOT GIVE HIS LAST NAME AND WHOM POLLARD MET FOR THE FIRST TIME. POLLARD WALKED ACROSS THE APARTMENT TO MEET AN OLDER MAN SEATED IN A CHAIR, AND HE WAS INTRODUCED BY [REDACTED] AS [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] SHOOK HANDS WITH POLLARD AND SAID "YOU'RE ONE OF US." BOTH [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] SHOWED DEFERENCE TO [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] TOLD [REDACTED] TO "GET LOST", WHICH RESULTED IN [REDACTED] SITTING ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE ROOM BUT STILL WITHIN EARSHOT OF THE OTHERS. THE NEXT 45 MINUTES WERE VERY OFFICIAL, WHEREIN POLLARD WAS SWORN IN AS AN ISRAELI CITIZEN. POLLARD DESCRIBED IT AS VERY IMPRESSIVE AND VERY CALCULATED AT THE SAME TIME. [REDACTED] TOLD POLLARD THAT THE QUALITY OF THE ISRAELI DEFENSE WOULD BE SHAPED BY WHAT HE COULD GIVE THEM, AND PULLED OUT A DOCUMENT CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET IN HEBREW, WHICH APPEARED TO POLLARD TO BE AN ISRAELI PRIME MINISTERIAL BRIEFING PAPER AND VERBALIZED ISRAEL'S PROBLEMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THEN HE "SCARED" POLLARD WITH A PAPER ON THE SYRIAN THREAT, WHICH POLLARD DESCRIBED AS A GENERIC SCENARIO CONCERNING DIFFERENT TYPES OF ATTACKS WHICH COULD BE MOUNTED AGAINST ISRAEL BY SYRIA AND COULD OVERRUN ISRAEL IN 72 HOURS. [REDACTED] HAD ACCURATE ORDER OF BATTLE INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT, AND HE PROCEEDED TO QUERY POLLARD ON HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE SYRIAN ORDER OF BATTLE; INCLUDING THE SA-10, SA-11, AND SA-12 MISSILES, ADVANCED MIG AND SUKHOI AIRCRAFT, ELECTRONICS AND ELECTRICAL INTELLIGENCE, AND ALL OF THE SOVIET ARTILLERY IN THE SYRIAN INVENTORY. [REDACTED] LATER SAID IT WAS [REDACTED] STANDARD PITCH USED IN FRONT OF THE CABINET TO LET THEM KNOW WHAT THE ISRAELIS WERE UP AGAINST. A CATERED LUNCH FOLLOWED, DURING WHICH THEY ENGAGED IN SMALL TALK REGARDING POLLARD'S EMPLOYMENT, AND THEN [REDACTED] BEGAN THE AFTERNOON WITH THE REAL EEI'S (ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION) WHICH HE HAD LISTED ON A PREPARED SHEET. THERE WAS NO ATTEMPT IN THE AFTERNOON SESSION TO SEGREGATE [REDACTED] THE EEI'S WERE PRIORITIZED AS FOLLOWS: 1) ARAB NUCINT, 2) ARAB EXOTIC WEAPONRY (CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL/NEUTRON), 3) SOVIET AIR DEFENSE AND C-3, 4) SOVIET AIRCRAFT, AIR -TO-AIR MISSILES (AAM'S), AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES (ASM'S), 5) SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES (SSM'S), AND 6) ARAB ORDERS OF BATTLE, DEPLOYMENT, READINESS, AND SECRET SERVICES. SECRET SERVICES WERE OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE TO [REDACTED] WHO INTERJECTED AT THAT POINT. ONLY ONE SPECIFIC DOCUMENT WAS DISCUSSED AND THAT WAS THE RASIN MANUAL. NO ONE THERE, INCLUDING POLLARD, KNEW AT THAT TIME WHAT THE RASIN WAS; BUT POLLARD SAID HE WOULD FIND OUT SINCE IT SEEMED TO BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] INDICATED THAT HE BELIEVED IT HAD SOMETHING TO DO WITH SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE, BUT HE DIDN'T KNOW WHO THE ORIGINATOR WAS.

23. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE WERE DEEMED OF LESSER IMPORTANCE, AND PROCUREMENT OF THAT INFORMATION WAS LEFT UP TO POLLARD'S INITIATIVE. [REDACTED] THEN INDICATED HE WANTED ANY "DIRT" ON ISRAELI CABINET MEMBERS, I.E. CIA PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES, OR IDENTIFICATION OF "RATS" IN ISRAEL, BUT [REDACTED] (STANDING BEHIND [REDACTED]) VIOLENTLY SHOOK HIS HEAD "NO" TO BOTH REQUESTS. LATER IN THE KITCHEN, AWAY FROM [REDACTED], [REDACTED] REITERATED TO POLLARD THAT HE WAS NOT TO PROCURE SUCH INFORMATION, AND THAT TO DO SO WOULD BE GROUNDS FOR IMMEDIATE TERMINATION, AS WOULD PROCUREMENT OF U.S. CAPABILITIES.

24. [REDACTED] LATER DISPLAYED A NAVY ORGANIZATIONAL CHART WHICH INCLUDED A PHYSICAL DIAGRAM OF WHERE EVERYONE WAS LOCATED IN U.S. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. THIS CHART HAD NOT BEEN PROVIDED BY POLLARD. [REDACTED] ALSO DISCUSSED POLLARD'S CLEARANCES AND ASKED FOR INFORMATION ON ANY OPERATIONS THE U.S. HAD TARGETTING THE ISRAELIS, WHICH POLLARD MAINTAINED THAT HE NEVER PROVIDED TO THEM DURING THE COURSE OF THE OPERATION.

25. POLLARD STATED THAT ALTHOUGH [REDACTED] ASKED HIM TO, HE NEVER COMPROMISED ANY DIA HUMINT FILES OR ANY SOURCE IDENTITIES DURING THIS OPERATION, AND THAT ALTHOUGH SOME SOURCE NUMBERS WERE IDENTIFIED ON SEVERAL IIR'S FOUND IN POLLARD'S APARTMENT, HE NEVER DISCLOSED THEIR IDENTIFIES TO THE ISRAELIS. [REDACTED] STRESSED AT THE END OF THIS DAY'S MEETING THAT HE SHOULD RESIGN IF TOLD TO TAKE A POLYGRAPH. NO INSTRUCITONS WERE PROVIDED ON BEATING THE POLYGRAPH, HE WAS SIMPLY DIRECTED NOT TO TAKE ONE.

26. END OF RESULTS OF INTERVIEW FOR 23 JUL 86.

b7c

REPORTING AGENT: [REDACTED]
OFFICE: NISRA WASHINGTON, DC
DATE PREPARED: 23 JUL 86
DATE TYPED: 11 AUG 86

WARNING

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BT
UNCLAS LIMDIS [REDACTED]//N03850//

b7E

ACTION/LEAD SHEET (PENDING) 07 JUL 86
ESPIONAGE [REDACTED] CONTROL: 12NOV85-05DC-0637-3CNA

b7E

COMMAND/COMNAVSECINVCOM, WASHINGTON, DC/63285
MADE AT/05DC/WASHINGTON, DC/[REDACTED] SPECIAL AGENT

- REFERENCES
- (A) 05DC ALS/17JUN86
- (B) 05DC ALS/16JUN86

SYNOPSIS

1. REF (A) ADVISED THAT INTERVIEWS OF SUBJECT WERE SCHEDULED TO BEGIN ON 23 JUN 86 AT FT. LEE, VA. THAT DATE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY CHANGED TO 30 JUN 86 AND THEN TO 08 JUL 86 BY FBI-WFO IN CONJUNCTION WITH RICHMOND FBI, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PHYSICAL SECURITY OF SUBJECT. ON 04 JUL 86, FBI-WFO ADVISED THAT FBIHQ HAD INFORMED THEM THAT THEY (WFO) WERE TO LIAISON WITH THE U.S. MARSHAL SERVICE FOR THE TRANSPORTATION/SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUBJECT, VICE RICHMOND FBI. CONSEQUENTLY, THE COMMENCEMENT DATE FOR THE INITIAL INTERVIEW HAS AGAIN BEEN MOVED BACK PENDING ADDITIONAL LIAISON BY FBI-WFO WITH FBIHQ AND THE U.S. MARSHAL'S. AS A RESULT OF THE ABOVE AND OTHER CONVERSATIONS BY THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SENTENCING OF SUBJECT [REDACTED] PROBABLY WILL NOT TAKE PLACE PRIOR TO EARLY OCT 86.

b7C

2. ON 27 JUN 86, [REDACTED] WAS INTERVIEWED AT FBI-WFO BY REPORTING AGENT AND S/A [REDACTED] FBI-WFO, IN THE PRESENCE OF [REDACTED] ATTORNEY, [REDACTED] THIS INTERVIEW WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PLEA AGREEMENT SHE EXECUTED ON 29 MAY 86, SPECIFICALLY PARA 3 (A) OF EXHIBIT (3) TO REF (B). THE RESULTS OF THE INTERVIEW WILL BE DOCUMENTED VIA FBI FD-302 AND WILL BE FORWARDED UPON COMPLETION. ONE ADDITIONAL INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED] IS ANTICIPATED TO RESOLVE SEVERAL OUTSTANDING ISSUES, BUT NO DATE HAS YET BEEN SET.

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